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This project examines the legal discourses surrounding Langland’s Piers
Plowman to show that the language of the law courts, and the dilemmas faced
there on a daily basis about the authority of the law, are mirrored in the way in
which Langland presents Christ’s harrowing of hell at one of the narrative
climaxes of the poem. The state of English law inflects the literature, even when
the issue presented appears to be covenantal theology, because the questions over
the basis of legal authority being asked in the courtroom were so enmeshed in the
language of the courtroom being used in the poem. Although it is impossible to
say which of the law or literature influenced the other more, this project
demonstrates how Langland, when speaking of the nature of legal authority,
carves out a place for his poem as an authoritative alternative discourse that might
bridge the gaps between theology and the common law.
To show how Langland achieves this, chapter one of the project focuses
on his engagement with the four main institutional sources of contemporary

ii

authority: the church, the law, the political community, and the schools. I argue
that Langland creates authority for his poem by reframing their main ideas
through his poem’s creative manipulation of their discourses.

Specifically,

chapter two illustrates how he enters the debate over the basis of the authority of
the law through his framing of Christ’s harrowing of hell in an unequivocably
legal understanding of the terms ‘riht’ and ‘reson’ in order to emphasize the
importance of Christian ideas of Mercy in the administration of justice. Chapter
three focuses on Langland’s understanding of reason as the conduit to legal
authority to show his belief that justice demands ‘riht’ and ‘reson’ must act
together.
The second part of the project examines the legal, historical and literary
circumstances surrounding Edward III’s passing of the 1351 statute, De natis
ultra mare, and its later interpretation to illustrate how Langland’s views on the
nature of kingship examined in chapter four promoted ideas that played an
integral part in the legal development of the idea of citizenship and the role of the
king. Chapter fives details the shift from the legal definitions of personal status in
terms of slave and master to those of citizen and king – a process which led
eventually to the divisions by nation and nationality that still define the
contemporary world – to demonstrate how it was the acceptance of the ideas of
kingship reflected in Piers Plowman that led the statute to be interpreted by
judges as it was, so enshrining Langland’s ideas on kingship into law.
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INTRODUCTION:
In 1345, the Chief Justice of the Common Pleas, Sir John Stonor, responded to an
assertion by a fellow Justice, Sir Roger Hillary, that law is the will of the justices by
countering, ‘Nanyl, ley est resoun.’ At stake in that debate was no less than the authority
of the law, and the philosophy of law that developed around its outcome would affect the
development of the common law as it stands today. In his translation of that 1345 year
book, Pike translates ‘resoun’ as ‘right’ in this instance, but in his introductions to the
Yearbooks 18 & 19 Edward III, p.xxvi, n.I and 20 Edward III, pt.ii, p.lxxiv., he translates
the same word as ‘reason’. A study of the judgments and comments of Sir William
Shareshull, Chief Justice of the King's Bench from 26 October 1350 to 5 July 1361,
reveals that he too was trying to understand the relationship between ‘ley’ and ‘resoun,’
as he repeatedly uses phrases such as ‘contrary to reason’ and ‘against law and reason.’ 1
It appears from their context that, despite his use of the conjunction, he views the terms
as linked entities. However, that he considers they might also be separated is clear from
pleadings (many years before he became a judge) when he argued that it would be
‘against reason’ 2 were a writ of trespass to be set aside against all but one of the
defendants due to an error in form, and for that one defendant then to be held liable for all
of the damages. In that case, Shareshull’s pleadings request a judgment contrary to a
strict interpretation of the law. His opponent, Shardelow, simply asserted that the law by
its nature could not be unreasonable and pled in rebuttal: ‘It will not be against reason,

1

See for example, inter alia, R.S.Y.B. 13 Edw III, Hil. Pl. 19 (p114); 16, Mich. Pl. 22 (342). All of these
exhibit the spelling of ‘resoun’ for reason.

2

Y.B. 6 Edw III, Mich. Pl. 7.

1

for it is law.’ 3 Time and again the Sergeants and Justices are trying to do ‘riht’ by
upholding the law, but finding that ‘resoun’ suggests a different course that will itself
also do ‘riht.’
This project began when I started reading the yearbooks and realized that the
fourteenth-century lawyers were having the same trouble pinning down the meanings of
‘reso(u)n’ and ‘riht’ that I encountered on reading Piers Plowman. Their efforts to create
a philosophy of law consistent with both their Christian belief system and the practical
reality of a codified and document-based legal system mirrored the attempts of literary
critics trying to find a unified legal and religious philosophy that might make sense of the
sprawling poem. Certainly, the vocabulary tools are the same, as are the philosophical
heritage and social considerations. Reading the yearbooks and poem together, and seeing
the clear parallels which can be drawn between the two when considering spiritual and
earthly authority, led me to believe that these parallels represent Langland entering the
courtroom debate himself, and creating within his work a poetic space in which to work
towards possible answers.
Green suggests that readers of medieval English literature need to understand
medieval law and medieval literature as “parallel forms of discourse.” 4 In fact, so much
has now been written about the importance of interdisciplinary scholarship that this
seems rather a statement of the obvious. However, it is only in the last decades that
medievalist literary criticism has moved from an examination of use of legal terminology
and imagery as another tool in the author’s bag to analysis of the cultural implications of
3

Ibid.

4

Richard Firth Green. “Medieval Law and Literature.” The Cambridge History of Medieval English
Literature. ed. David Wallace. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1999): 407 – 431.

2

this profusion of legal references for the English vernacular literary tradition. There is a
good historical reason for this critical pattern; as Alford notes, law is a regular feature of
the literature of this period because medieval man had a “profound faith in law as the tie
that binds all things in heaven and in earth,” 5 and he would simply not have recognized
any distinctions a contemporary critic might choose to make between secular or canonical
law. Green makes the same point when he notes that, in the Mirror of Justices, no
distinction is made by the author between actions that a modern reader would consider
immoral but not illegal or vice versa, and gives the example of the law being described as
‘nothing else but the rules laid down by our holy predecessors in Holy Writ for the
salvation of souls from everlasting damnation.’ 6 Green then points out that at the word
level, ‘in [the author’s] subsequent discussion of the minutiae of common-law procedure
he repeatedly used the word ‘sin’ where we would expect terms like ‘crime’ or
‘offence.’ 7 Such an attitude is not so far removed from contemporary culture if we
consider lawmakers such as Roy Moore, the Alabama Chief Justice embroiled just a few
years ago in a dispute over his erection of a monument of the Ten Commandments in the
rotunda of the state judicial building. Moore argued in his defense: “I have no intention
of removing the monument of the Ten Commandments, the moral foundation of our
law.” 8 Probably unwittingly, he is echoing Eike von Repgow’s early thirteenth-century

5

John Alford and Dennis Seniff, Literature and Law in the Middle Ages. (New York, 1984): 942.

6

Green, 411.

7

Green gives the example of ‘it is an abuse to amerce a man on the warrant of a presentment of a personal
trespass, since no one is amerceable save for sin [pecchie] in a real or mixed action ‘ from Andrew Horne.
The Mirror of Justices. Ed. William J. Whittaker. (Selden Society 7. London: B. Quaritch, 1895): 159.

8

Statement released by Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore dated August 14th 2003. “Defiant chief justice
vows to keep Ten Commandments monument.”
www.cnn.com/2003/LAW/08/14/alabama.tencommandments
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legal treatise, known as Sachsenspiegel, which emphasizes that “God is himself Law,”
and opens with a verse prologue in which divine law is said to subsume secular law.
Even at that time, this was not a new or controversial claim, but rather reflected the
popular contemporary view of the law as existing to enforce the divine will in human
affairs.
However, by the second half of the fourteenth century, this relationship was being
described in more complex terms in William Langland’s Piers Plowman: his Prologue
has “an aungel of hevene” differentiating between the human institution of law subject to
the will of earthly rulers and law as a reflex of divine justice. The angel warns:
”Sum Rex, sum Princeps”; neutrum fortasse deinceps!
O qui iura regis Christi specialia regis,
Hoc quod agas melius – iustus es, esto pius!
Nudum ius a te vestiri vult pietate.
Qualia vis metere, tali grana sere:
Si ius nudatur, nudo de iure metatur;
Si seritur pietas, de pietate metas. 9 (Prologue: B.132-138)
[(You say) ‘I am King, I am Ruler’; you may perhaps be neither in future. O you who
administer the sublime laws of Christ the King, in order to do better what you do, as you
are just, be godly! Naked law requires to be clothed by you with a sense of your duty to
God. Sow such grain as you wish to reap. If the law is nakedly administered by you,
then let [judgment] be measured out [to you] according to the letter. If goodness is sown
[by you], may you reap goodness.] 10
Langland contrasts the duty to God emphasized by the angel with the absolutist Roman
law advocated by “ the commune” in line 143: “Precepta Regis sunt nobis vincula legis!”
[The King’s bidding has for us the binding force of law]. The ensuing fable of the rats

9

This quote and all others from the text are from William Langland, Piers Plowman: The B Version. Eds.
George Kane and E. Talbot Donaldson. (London: Athlone Press, 1975; 2nd impression 1988).
10

This translation – along with all others in the paper - is from Schmidt’s footnotes to the text in William
Langland, The Vision of Piers Plowman: a complete edition of the B-text.. Ed. A.V. C. Schmidt. (London:
Everyman, 1978): 8.
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and mice and the cat illustrates the conflict of these two statements, showing in topical
practical terms (through the analogy of the influence of John of Gaunt over the boy King
Richard II) how the reality of the rule of law under a monarchy contrasts with the angel’s
ideal expression of the law. 11 In this way, Langland is able to offer both a sociopolitical
commentary for his time and a more general discussion of the legal structures of power
and social order which questions the balance of power between common and canon law.
Alford and Seniff have noted that bearing in mind literary production at the time
of Piers Plowman was mostly by authors trained for a life in the Church or in the law - or
in a mixture of both – “it is hardly surprising that the writings of the period, both secular
and religious, should be pervaded by legal influence in one form or another.” 12 In
examining the legal diction of Piers Plowman, Alford points out that the distinctions
between legal and theological disciplines may not be so clear simply because
so intertwined historically are the vocabularies of law and theology that medieval
writers found it impossible to explain certain doctrines of Christianity without
recourse to legal terminology. The Bible is largely responsible for this
intermingling. Not only does it describe the history of mankind as a judicial
process – crime, punishment, pardon – but quite naturally it also employs the
words of the law itself….. Thus in his choice of vocabulary (if indeed he really
had a choice), Langland was simply using the words best suited by tradition to his
subject matter. 13

There is, of course, the further point that, since clerical skills such as reading and writing
were learned and practiced at centers requiring minor holy orders, the readers and writers
of literary texts and legal documents were one and the same, so well-versed in the
11

See pages 144-6 for further discussion of this example in chapter two.

12

Alford and Seniff, ix.

13

John Alford, Piers Plowman: A Glossary of Legal Diction. (Cambridge: St. Edmundsbury Press,
1988): pxiv

5

vocabulary of all three disciplines. This was true not only on the word level, but also on
the practical level: we need only to consider Chaucer’s position as Comptroller of
Customs for the port of London, and the literary use he made of his military and
diplomatic trips to Europe to see the crossover in action. It is not unreasonable to believe
that the debates in the literature of the period were also being held in the legal and
executive halls of government and mulled over by the same, relatively small, group of
people. As Binder observes, “to say that law is literary is also to admit that literature is
like law, an arena of strategic conflict.” 14
In The Letter of the Law: Legal Practice and Literary Production in Medieval
England, 15 editors Emily Steiner and Candace Barrington provide illuminating examples
of ways in which the intersection of literary and legal scholarship can benefit both
disciplines. As the editors note, Mathews’ essay 16 in that volume shows how “literary
texts devise formal and ideological alternatives to exclusive legal practices” 17 but then
develops away from the more obvious discourse of resistance to show how the text
formulates ideas of character along the lines of legal practice. Here literary text is not
simply exposing the weakness of the law but offering alternatives, something I believe is
also taking place in Langland’s work. Of particular interest to this project, Green’s essay
in the collection, “Palamon’s appeal of treason in the Knight’s Tale” shows how
Chaucer’s use of legal vocabulary on the micro level expresses the macro level concern

14

Guyora Binder, “The Law and Literature Trope” in Law & Literature. Eds. Michael Freeman and
Andrew D.E. Lewis. (Oxford; New York : Oxford UP, 1999): xx.
15

(Ithaca, Cornell UP, 2002).

16

Jana Mathews, “Land, Lepers and the Law in The Testament of Cresseid.” Ibid., 40 – 66.

17

Ibid., 5.

6

for the future of the rule of law under an autocratic young King. Green shows how sharp
literary comment can have pointed legal implications.
Given this interrelation between literature and law, critics have been faced with a
question of approach, and tended to shape their answer according to the scholarly
preoccupations of their time. For example, one of the first influential studies of the
relationship between literature and law, ‘Von der Poesie im Recht’ 18 by Grimm in 1818,
uses linguistic proof to emphasize the fact that both subjects go back to a common origin
and thus share certain characteristics. As one of the founders of historical linguistics,
Grimm naturally starts with language as his basic evidence for a close connection
between law and literature. Those scholars following his lead emphasize either the
“poetic” features of early legal treatises or the assistance the study of literary language
can provide in the understanding of legal terminology. In their bibliography of the
scholarship of the literature and law of the early Middle Ages, Alford and Seniff find the
“clearest evidence of Grimm’s influence” in Schwartz 1970’s proposal 19 for using
“comparative linguistics as the means for reconstructing Germanic law.” 20 Had they
been compiling their bibliography today, it would have been a much larger undertaking
and there would have been many more examples. For example, In ‘“Acquiteth yow
now”: Textual contradiction and Legal Discourse in the Man of Law’s Introduction,’21
Nolan examines the contradictions and textual difficulties associated with The Man of
18

Jacob Grimm, “Von der Poesie im Recht.” Zeitschrift fur geschichtliche Rechtswissenschaft, 2 (1816),
25-99; rpt. Kleinere Schriften. (Hildesheim: Olms, 1965, 6):152-191.

19

Stephen Schwartz, “Comparative Legal Reconstruction in Germanic.” Myth and Law Among the IndoEuropeans. Ed. Jaan Puhvel. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970): 39-53.
20

Alford and Seniff, ix.

21

The Letter of the Law, 136.

7

Law’s Tale and its Introduction and Epilogue in Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales to show
how the Host’s invitation to the Man of Law to “acquiteth yow now of youre biheeste” 22
“simultaneously puts into play two discursive systems, a poetic signification produced
by the fictional world of pilgrimage and a legal lexicon rendered comprehensible only by
reference to some external semiotic structure.”

It is the tension between the two

discourses that she finds provides insight about them both, a tension that is reflected in
the real world maneuvering for authority of the canon and common law.
The historical approach to literature looks at literary works as evidence in the
search for historical truth - a particular interest of the nineteenth century.

This is

“literature as document” with literary works providing evidence of a social and political
culture not documented or evidenced elsewhere.

Alford and Seniff’s bibliography

therefore includes several important late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century articles
on medieval poems that have been extracted from legal journals such as Zeitschrift der
Savigny-Stiftung fur Rechtsgeschichte and The Law Magazine and Review. These articles
are written by legal scholars examining medieval works both for evidence of legal
custom and as the evidence itself. The dangers of such an approach are illustrated by
Giancarlo when he details the critical understanding of the official account of Richard
II’s deposition at the assembly of 30 September 1399, the “Record and Process”
contained in the Rotuli Parliamentorum. 23 Giancarlo notes that the parliamentary roll was
for some time the accepted foundation for William Stubbs’s thesis of Lancastrian
22

Nolan notes that “The Middle English Dictionary’s definitions of “acquit” and “quite” both include the
meaning “to clear oneself of a charge “ (“acquit” 4b; “quite” 4a and b); in both cases, the first recorded use
of the terms in this way appears in the late fourteenth century (1390 – 1400).”” (p147).
23

Matthew Giancarlo, “Murder, Lies and Storytelling: the Manipulation of Justice(s) in the Parliaments of
1397 and 1399.” Speculum, 77, No.1 (Jan., 2002): 76-112.

8

constitutionalism,

until

Clarke

and

Galbraith

exposed

its

omissions

and

misrepresentations as fabrications intended to legitimate the claims of Henry
Bolingbroke. 24

He quotes Given-Wilson’s comment that in fact the roll should be

considered “a case study in the detection of partisanship, credulity and deliberate
misinformation in medieval historical writing” and shows that it “is clear from even a
bare summary of the events in question, the parliamentary proceedings of these years and
their documentary records were quite consciously cultivated to rewrite the past.”25
Giancarlo’s example provides a salutary lesson against any approach that uses for its
evidence the language of an historic document without consideration of its provenance,
audience and intended purpose(s). Even if the document is written as a sincere attempt to
reflect a historical truth, its terms must be carefully examined in a greater historical
context: consider, for example, the U.S. Declaration of Independence which holds “these
truths to be self evident … that all men are created equal” at a time when its framers were
quite comfortable with the oppositional idea of slavery. Giancarlo is not seeking to
reveal a historical truth or untruth, though this is naturally a part of the effect of his work,
but rather to expose the ways in which the commissioned justices of the Crown who
wrote the documentary record “understood the relationships between the institutions and
persons, between narratives and law, and between documentary evidence and the
storytellers who present it.” 26

24

M.V. Clarke and V. H. Galbraith, “The Deposition of Richard II,” Bulletin of the John Rylands Library
14 (1930): 125-81.
25

Giancarlo, 78.

26

Ibid., 79.

9

Steiner points us to a fourteenth century example of a lawmaker concerned with a
further dilemma in Documentary Culture and the Making of Medieval English
Literature, 27 when she examines Henry de Bracton’s 28 De legibus et consuetidinibus
Angliae. 29 Steiner highlights Bracton’s discomfort that the physical documents he
describes are being given too much agency, that “they are wrongly thought to establish
instead of proving the juridical act, and he repeats several times that a gift is not made
valid simply by the drawing up of charters and instruments.” However, as Steiner notes,
the ironic effect of Bracton’s efforts to theorize the relationship between charters and the
human will which he believes is the nexus of any transaction is to show that the charter
serves as a written transcript of that will. By logical extension, the charter is therefore
probative of that will, regardless of the presence of the creator of the charter. In his
absence, the charter becomes his proxy, not only the only substantive proof of the fact of
his will but also the means by which it is enacted. Bracton’s attempts at theory thus
provide the evidence to undermine his own argument, but modern scholars would
congratulate him on his distrust of the document as the perfect vessel in which to find
“the whole truth.”

27
Emily Steiner, Documentary Culture and the Making of Medieval English Literature. (Cambridge UP,
2003): 21.
28

For discussion as to how much of Bracton’s De Legibus et consuetidinibus Angliae was compiled by
him and whether it is a true reflection of the practice of the royal courts in the 1230s -1250s Steiner directs
her reader to J.L. Barton, “The Mystery of Bracton.” Journal of Legal History 14 (1993): 1-142 and Paul
Brand, “’The Age of Bracton’” in The History of English Law: Centenary Essays on “Pollock and
Maitland.” Ed. John Hudson. (Oxford, Oxford UP for the British Academy, 1996): 65-90. See also Samuel
Thorne’s introduction to volume III of his translation which details the difficulties in producing a text that
can be considered anything like that envisaged by Bracton: Bracton, Henry de. De legibus et
consuetidinibus Angliae. Trans. Samuel E. Thorne. (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard U.P., in
association with the Seldon Society,1968).

29

Henry de Bracton, De legibus et consuetidinibus Angliae. Trans. Samuel E. Thorne. (Cambridge:
Belknap Press of Harvard U.P., in association with the Seldon Society,1968).
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Whilst critical work on the Icelandic sagas has questioned for a long time how
accurately the literature reflects contemporary legal practice, 30 this has only been a more
recent development in the study of literature in Latin, French, German and English. The
historical and linguistic approach to literary works in the nineteenth century moved on
instead to an early twentieth century preoccupation with the “art” of the text itself. In this
approach, an understanding of the legal concerns of the text is used as a tool through
which critics might understand the text more fully; for example, by illustrating how the
use of legal terminology/process adds to the richness of the language and the depth of the
metaphors. Alford describes this shift as the move “from “literature in the service of
law” .. to “law in the service of literature.”” 31
The later twentieth century preoccupations with more abstract literary theoretical
techniques self-referentially place the approach of the critic at the focus of the criticism.
Approaches such as semiology and hermeneutic theory resulted in the content of the text
or the application of the law fading into the background while more abstract questions of
rhetoric and interpretation applicable to all texts and all critical approaches took center
stage. What are the similarities between interpreting the law and interpreting a text?
What are the similarities in constructing a case and writing a poem? What is truth in
cultural history? Often the interest is in the law as literature – for example the narrative
to be found in historical depositions. 32

30

See, for example, Andreas Heusler, Die altgermanische Dichtung. (Berlin: Athenaion, 1924; rpt.
Darmstadt: Gentner, 1957): Chapter 1.
31

Alford and Seniff, x.

32

An example of this at Washington University in St. Louis is the recent interest in the depositions taken
during the Dredd Scott case and the other “freedom” cases. David Konig, the professor of history and law
most involved in the project is quoted in the Summer edition of Washington University’s Arts & Sciences
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Criticism of medieval literature has now moved from a mostly philological
emphasis at the beginning of the twentieth century to a more historicist approach, with
scholars working to show the interdependence of literary and non-literary texts of the
period. The benefits of examining the political and social contexts of the texts has been
well illustrated in recent work. 33 In Hochon’s Arrow, Strohm argues that:
Composed within history, fictions offer irreplaceable historical evidence in their
own right … they offer crucial testimony on other, though no less historical,
matter: on contemporary perception, ideology, belief, and – above all – on the
imaginative structures within which fourteenth-century participants acted and
assumed that their actions would be understood. 34
The interdisciplinary studies and globalization of the early twenty-first century
lead now to questions of whether or not there is any boundary at all between disciplines
or whether the deeper understanding of the texts and the laws of the period lies in an
amalgam of the rigors of both, perhaps taking Alford’s description one step further to
“literature and law in partnership” while getting closer to Green’s “parallel discourses.”
It is his enormous undertaking in A Crisis of Truth 35 that seems the most obvious
example of the recent scholarship that has certainly taken this line. Following on the

magazine saying “a first rate civics lesson is taking shape from the amazing array of information being
assembled.” The depositions were examined for the evidence of cultural and societal norms they provide
rather than their legal importance to the Dredd Scott case.
33

See for example, Paul Strohm’s, Hochon’s Arrow (Princeton, 1992) and Social Chaucer (Cambridge,
MA, 1989); Lee Patterson’s Chaucer and the Subject of History (Madison, 1991) and Negotiating the
Past: The Historical understanding of Medieval Literature (Madison, 1987); and The Cambridge History
of Medieval England Literature (Cambridge, 1999) edited by David Wallace.

34

Paul Strohm. Hochon’s Arrow. (Princeton, 1992): 4.

35

Richard Firth Green. A Crisis of Truth: Literature and Law in Ricardian England. (Philadelphia:
Pennsylvania UP: 1999).

12

interesting work of Michael Clanchy in From Memory to Written Record 36, Green
carefully considers the development and use of the Middle English word trouthe in legal,
religious and literary sources, and examines its use in four senses – legal, ethical,
theological and intellectual.

He then uses his understanding of the shift “from the

communally authenticated trothplight to the judicially enforced written contract, from a
truth that resides in people to one located in documents” 37 to re-examine texts of the
Ricardian period and, inter alia, Piers Plowman. In a critique looking the other way,
from law to literature, 38 Middleton looks at the terms of the vagrancy legislation of 1388
and examines how Langland’s narrator defends himself in the C-text of Piers Plowman
using those same terms to claim a poetic authority for his vernacular poem.
The response to these projects has been resoundingly positive and it seems that
the one thing upon which all modern literary critics are agreed is that there is much rich
work to be done in this vein. Andrew Galloway puts it most succinctly when he says:
“The context and cultural implications of medieval law are themselves as complex, vast,
obscure, and crucial to Piers as the poem’s contact with the context is pervasive,
complex, and potentially illuminating of medieval law.” 39 The editors of “The Letter of
the Law: legal practice and literary production in medieval England,” 40 collected nine
essays covering a mixed spread of literary texts (ranging from Robin Hood ballads, to
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Chaucer’s Knight’s Tale and The Man of Law’s Introduction, to lollard preaching) which
collectively provide persuasive evidence “that Middle English literature … developed in
dialogue with legal discourse, practices, and material culture, and further that insular law
and English literature were bound up together in larger processes of institutional,
linguistic and social change.”
This project aims to look at the legal discourses surrounding Langland’s Piers
Plowman. I shall show that the language of the law courts and the dilemmas faced there
on a daily basis as to the authority of the law are reflected in the way in which Langland
presents Christ’s harrowing of hell at one of the narrative peaks of the poem in Passus
XVIII. The state of English law inflects the literature even when the issue presented
appears to be covenantal theology because the questions over the basis of legal authority
being asked in the courtroom were so enmeshed in the language of the courtroom being
used in the poem. I shall show that although it is impossible to say which of the law or
literature influenced the other more when speaking of the nature of legal authority, we
can see that Langland is carving out a place for his poem as an authoritative alternative
discourse that might bridge the gaps between theology and the common law. Chapter
one will develop this idea of Langland’s attempt to claim authority for his poem through
his manipulation of easily recognized contemporary literary practices in the choices he
makes in his construction of the poem, whilst chapters two and three will show him
entering the debate on the basis of legal authority as he portrays Christ’s harrowing of
hell.
In the final part of the project, chapters four and five, I will show that Langland’s
views on the nature of kingship promoted ideas that played an integral part in the legal
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development of the idea of citizenship and the role of the king, in the move from slave
and master to citizen and king that led eventually to the international divisions that define
the contemporary world. By examining the legal, historical and literary circumstances
surrounding Edward III’s passing of the 1351 statute De natis ultra mare (‘De Natis’) and
its later interpretation, I shall show that it was the acceptance of the ideas of kingship
reflected in Piers Plowman that led the statute to be interpreted in the fashion that it was.
There is no doubt that this was a crucial period in the development of the idea of kingship
because of the instability of the time. As Lynn Staley explains:
During the reign of Richard II, the prestige of the English crown and the terms
used to define that crown were in flux. The Rising of 1381, the challenge to the
church voiced by John Wyclif that escalated from the early 1370s on, the tensions
of war with France, and the personal and political difficulties Richard had in
assuming a position of true sovereignty after his accession to the throne as a child
in 1377 were all factors in what has been described as a long crisis of authority. 41
Yet, whilst the events of Richard’s life may have entrenched his views on the idea of the
royal prerogative, it is notable that neither he nor successive kings were able to establish
that absolute authority for themselves. The conflict over the royal prerogative in fact
came to a head two and a half centuries later when the judges of the English courts
asserted that they had the right to determine the limits of the royal prerogative in the Case
of Proclamations (1611), a precedent that was never challenged by the Crown after the
reign of William and Mary. It is my contention that Langland’s poem played a key role
in that outcome.
Since it was the same group of people who were reading, writing and discussing
the issues of the day that made up the reading public, it was inevitable that contemporary
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literature would influence those in government. As Scanlon notes 42, scholarship on the
reading public in later medieval England falls into two camps, one regarding that public
as courtly, the other as ‘middle class;’ Green proposes the ‘courtly’ thesis, 43 Coleman
the ‘middle class’ theory. 44 Scanlon counters that the answer is both, that ‘the expanding
social opportunities for the educated and literate members of the lesser gentry and urban
patriciate provided a public wide enough to support a vernacular literary tradition. But
those opportunities were produced mainly at court by the nobility. The ‘middle class’
this social shift produced assumed its role precisely by entering courtly culture and
making common political cause with the nobility.’ 45 Scanlon suggests a view of the
literature of the period as ‘a site of accommodation between the court, and the sub-noble
groups that were coming to share its power.’ The effect was to make the vernacular poet
‘a new, specifically lay, source of textual auctoritas.’ 46 Langland’s poem provided him
with a vehicle with which to assert his authority as surely as if he had been standing at the
pulpit or marketplace - though with less of the risks since his identity is concealed.
Furthermore, the ambiguity and conflicting layers of meaning that can be successfully
accommodated by a work of literature, gave him an opportunity to make a bridge of a
wide variety of dialogues between the rigid dogmas of theology and law.
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The fact that over fifty versions of at least three versions of the poem survive
today attests to its wide circulation. Given the well-known letter of John Ball, one of the
leaders of the 1381 Peasants’ Revolt, to the peasants of Essex urging them to ‘stondeth
togidre in Godes name, and biddeth Peres Ploughman go to his werk … and do wel and
bettre, and fleth synne,’ 47 it is clear that the poem – or at least the B text – was commonly
known and had had a powerful impact by then. Its influence is clear on other poets too.
Whilst it has been shown that Langland has not been greatly influenced by those earlier
alliterative poems that he can be shown to have known 48 – most clearly Wynnere and
Wastour and possibly The Parlement of the Thre Ages – it is clear that there are many
poems of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century that were profoundly influenced
by his work: in fact, so much so that The Crowned King, Pierce the Ploughmans Crede,
Mum the Sothsegger and Death and Liffe have all been categorized as poems of the
“Langland tradition.” 49
Twentieth century criticism in the work of, inter alia, Fish 50, Iser 51 and the
reception-theory of Jauss 52 emphasizes the importance of the reader in the author – work
47
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– public triangle to show how the new reader’s own history plays an important role in the
development of new structures of meaning within the text. Following the work of
Bakhtin, Jauss emphasizes the literary work’s ‘dialogic character’ 53 proposing that
‘a literary work is not an object that stands by itself and that offers the same view
to each reader in each period. It is not a monument that monologically reveals its
timeless essence. It is much more alike an orchestration that strikes ever new
resonances among its readers and that frees the text from the material of the words
and brings it to a contemporary existence.’ 54
Mann points to the constant interaction that this produces between literature and life
creating a ‘network of allusion.’ 55 Although she is aware that this ‘remains a purely
literary phenomenon,’ her argument is that ‘to find something repeated in another book
carries something of the same evidential power as finding it confirmed in experience.’ 56
She focuses on Chaucer’s reference at the end of Book I of the House of Fame to Virgil
or Claudian or Dante as sources for a detailed description of hell as evidence that
Chaucer focuses the question of literary truth on these ‘non-existent’ experiences
not only, I think, because of his concern with the kind of belief that literature can
51
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command, but also because of his awareness of the priority [sic.] of books over
experience – his interest in the way that they prepare us to recognize experiences
when we have them, to give them a predetermined shape and name.
The logical extension of her argument is that ‘to see literature performing this preparatory
role with experiences that people have never had, makes it easier to see it performing the
same role with the ones that they do have.’ 57

I suggest that for the audience of Piers

Plowman, Langland’s use of the same terms and ideas being discussed in the law courts
prepares the expectations of that audience as to the ways in which justice should be
administered, and self-referentially provides itself as example.
That same public considering his understanding of the role of the king in relation
to the ‘commune’ and to justice in the poem was also responsible for the writing of the
laws and administration of government in society.

It should not be forgotten that one of

parliament’s particular roles was its function as a High Court, and that the Chancellor,
Treasurer, Judges, King’s Serjeants and Barons of the Exchequer would all receive
personal summonses to attend parliament to provide the body of legal expertise needed to
deal with high court cases and draft agreed legislation. Since the personnel of the various
central courts were all trained together, accommodated together and then moved between
the administrative posts as needed, it was natural that ideas from one branch of a clerk’s
education and experience would influence his approach to his next position.

For

example, in discussing the fact that it was ‘more or less an established convention’ that
chancellors and keepers of the privy seal should be drawn from either Oxford or
Cambridge university, Musson and Ormrod suggest that it was the training in civil and
canon law received by John Thoresby, who was chancellor between 1349 and 1356, and
57
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by his nephew John Walkham, successively Keeper of the Rolls and Keeper of the Privy
Seal in the 1380s that ‘may well explain the affinity between certain procedures observed
in the ecclesiastical courts and the new processes associated [in the chancery court] with
the sub pena writ.’ 58

It is my contention that a similar crossover links literature, law and

theology so that the use of the language of the courtroom at the key narrative points of
the poem would instantly register with contemporary readers.
There are, of course, fundamental dangers involved in discussing the message of
Piers Plowman. The most obvious of these is that this is a poem of which there are three
versions known, ever since Skeat named them, as the A, B and C texts, but that there is a
possibility of their being several more versions than that. 59 Most critics believe these
versions represent successive versions of a single poem being revised by one man 60 but
they may have had multiple authors. I have worked from the version of the B-text edited
and introduced by George Kane and E. Talbot Donaldson because it is the B-text that is
most widely known, since this was the version of the poem printed by Robert Crowley in
1550 (although he knew of the other versions of the poem), and the version of the poem
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represented in the most extant manuscripts. 61 B is a complete revision which adds a
further 4000 lines and eight passus to the A text. The C text revision adds less but
involves much re-arrangement. The editorial and textual difficulties in providing a true
version of the B text from the extant manuscripts are detailed by Schmidt in the
introduction to his version, and I do not propose to repeat them here since textual analysis
is beyond the scope of this project; suffice it to say that my reading of the poem is
dependent on the accuracy of the work of its editors.
A less obvious, but equally important, danger is in falling into the belief system
marked by what Benson respectfully describes as “the Langland myth,’ 62 i.e. the possible
history of the poem and its author created by the Victorian editor W.W. Skeat in
constructing a biography for Langland from small vignettes of information about the
poem. Benson argues that “the most serious objection to the Langland myth is not that it
is necessarily untrue, but that it is reductive. It offers a narrative of poet and poem that
obstructs other interpretive approaches.” 63

More possibilities for opening up the

meanings in the poem are opened by following the line opened by Anne Middleton’s
discussion of public poetry in the reign of Richard II which suggests that Langland’s
writing uses a ‘common voice’ which ‘assigns a new importance to secular life, the civic
virtues, and communal service.’ 64 Her suggestion is that there is no single authorial voice
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but a dialogue between competing voices which she categorizes as a series of opposites –
lay versus clerical, popular versus learned, vernacular versus Latinate. 65 Benson follows
this line, but adds the categories of poor/rich and male/female and prefers to speak of ‘the
blurring and overlapping of such categories’ 66 so that he can refer inclusively to ‘poor as
well as rich, female as well as male’ (his emphasis). The most useful and detailed
illustration of the possibilities of this approach can be seen in Lawton’s “The Subject of
Piers Plowman” 67 which is detailed in chapter one when I examine the question of
Langland’s own authority. Lawton argues convincingly that there is no single unified
subject of the poem. I have borne his argument in mind when thinking about the poem as
a whole, especially when considering the possibilities of meaning for a particular
exemplum – see for example in chapter one (p31-2) on considering the importance of the
‘leene lunatic.’ Lawton’s idea of the shifting subject works well in conjunction with
Tolmie’s explanation of the poem as an elaborate, Wittgenstein-like, ‘language game,’ in
which the frames of reference for those subjects are constantly being reconstructed and
restated, and I have found these two frameworks particularly useful in thinking about the
poem as a place for processing and revisioning ideas.
The difficulties of approach connected to the poem are no smaller than the
difficulties encountered in researching the workings of the law courts and the drafting of
statutes in this period.

There is no medieval version of the Hansard record of

Parliamentary debate to which contemporary lawyers can turn for help with questions of
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statutory intent, so when we read De Natis there is nowhere to turn for help in
deciphering whether it was declaratory of the common law or enacting that law itself.
The courts themselves have answered questions arising from the statute inconsistently;
for example, in the seventeenth century 68 the statute was thought to cover the case where
only one parent was a subject but this argument was rejected by both the courts and
Parliament on the Act of Anne 69 in the following century. Clive Parry points out:
If any warning against the drawing of hasty deductions from the scanty precedents
down to the seventeenth century is required, it is provided by the entirely
misleading picture of the law of alienage given by Littleton. The mediaeval [sic]
lawyers followed up the implications of the alien’s inability to hold land by
denying him a real action. This led Littleton, following the natural instinct of the
property lawyer to regard his department as the whole law, to deny him both real
and personal actions. But it is doubtful if this ever was the law. And, even if it
were the common law, it was not the whole law. 70
Parry goes on to explain the long history of the foreign merchants in England that
Littleton had simply ignored. The example is illustrative not only of the danger of
relying solely on the precedents to be found in the records, but also of relying on previous
work on or by the theorists. In the first part of this project therefore, whilst I have
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worked primarily with Littleton’s ideas, I have also sought similarities in the work of his
contemporary theorists.
Without Hansard or fourteenth century court reports, in order to gather together
the snatches of information that might shed some light on the thinking behind the drafting
of statutes or the deciding of cases, the modern enquirer is left to piece together evidence
from the Year Books 71, the Calendars of chancery records and the enrolments of
commissions of assize and gaol delivery on the dorse of the patent rolls, the plea rolls,
assize rolls, gaol delivery rolls and Ancient Indictments and the administrative documents
of the courts from that period. Neither being nor claiming to be a legal historian myself, I
am reliant on the work of other scholars I know to be working from slim evidence
themselves.
Samuel Thorne’s introduction to volume III of his translation of Bracton’s De
legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae, 72 ‘Of the laws and customs of England,’ identifies
the many problems in providing a complete text from old legal manuscripts and again,
their intrigues are beyond the scope of this project. I do not propose to repeat them in
detail here but rather to note that the many inconsistencies, additions and revisions in the
manuscripts pertain not only to the accuracy of the laws described but also to the writer
of the text itself (who may or may not have been Henry of Bratton) which inevitably
affects the authority of the work and the assumptions that can be made about it.
Nonetheless, despite all these difficulties, I do believe that on the basis of the
evidence that does survive in the legal records of the period, and the extant versions of
71
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the B-text, it can be shown that Langland’s poem claims for itself authority as a public
space in which to discuss the basis for the authority of the law, and to set forth ideas of
kingship that profoundly influenced the development of the common law of subject
status.
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Chapter 1: A claim for poetic authority

In order to enter the contemporary debate about the authority of particular social
structures and institutions, Langland must first claim authority for his poem. From the
opening of the Prologue to Piers Plowman, it is clear that this is a poet working on a
grand scale. Langland opens with a dreamer, a visionary who introduces his audience to
“alle manere of men, the meene and the riche, / Werchynge and wandrynge as the world
asketh,” (I.i. 18-19). It is an ambitious vision, a vision incorporating the whole world and
all types of people, and the fact that Langland manages to give it cohesion is a poetic feat
in itself. That cohesion stems from his ability to move apparently seamlessly through the
vocabularies and linguistic structures of all the earthly sources of authority he depicts, to
create a vision that is rooted in the structures of the past even as it presents a new
approach to the future. It is in managing the discourses of those linguistic structures that
he proves his worth, and claims a new kind of vernacular authority necessary for his
poem to have real life application, an authority based on the fact that his poem is itself an
anthology of different sorts of authority.
Langland’s choice to write his poem in English implies a belief in the power of
and the place for a vernacular authority. The fact that there is no extant evidence of any
official attempt to provide authorized commentaries and translations of authoritative
works (such as that sponsored by the French King, Charles V) suggests that this was not
common amongst anyone except the Lollards. The full implications of this choice are
beyond the scope of this project but the fact remains that Langland’s poem provides a
commentary of authoritative works as it grapples with contemporary issues of religious
and earthly authority and tries to find sense in them: it is truly a translatio auctoritatis –
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a translation of authority into the vernacular.

Minnis has suggested that the relationship

between Latin and the vernacular ‘allows for a concept of vernacular culture which
transcends language to encompass acts of cultural transfer, negotiation, appropriation,
and indeed resistance.’ 1 I believe it is this ‘negotiation’ and ‘appropriation’ that forms the
basis of Langland’s poetic structure and leads to the authority of his text. The fact that he
uses Latin, the official language of theology, as well as English, suggests that he was not
valuing one language over the other but rather seeking to find an authority for his own
text by appropriating the advantages of both to create a new kind of vernacular
authority. 2 By entering into the debates being held in the main institutional structures of
authority – the courts, the church, the political arena, and the schools – Langland puts his
poem in the place of social commentary and exegesis, and claims authority for himself by
doing so.

The need to establish authority: the problem of the narrator as unreliable witness
The first problem to overcome in claiming authority for the poem is the fact that,
from the opening of the poem, the narrative has instantly undermined the poet’s voice by
characterizing its dreamer narrator as an unreliable witness: “I shoop me into shroudes as
I a sheep were, / In habite as an heremite unholy of werkes.” (B.I.2-3). The echo of
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Matthew 7:15, “Beware of false prophets, which come to you in sheep’s clothing” warns
the reader that the narrator may himself be such a false prophet, while the fact that he
dresses like a hermit is also problematic. Hanna’s work on the hermetic tradition and the
rules of their lives details the ways in which Will’s lifestyle and “tools” 3 correspond with
the prayers proposed by two of the liturgical ordines by which a bishop might consecrate
a hermit, 4 and Hanna uses these correspondences, along with the fact that Will dresses
like a hermit, to assert that he is one. If, for now, we accept this line of reasoning, it
remains unclear what Will’s designation as a hermit would mean.

Jones points to

Langland’s use, in Passus 10 of the B-text, of such ‘unrealistic’ models as Antony,
Egidius and Paul the First Hermit, and the ‘miraculous provision that sustained the desert
fathers,’ as evidence of Langland’s desire to approve only of those hermits who fit his
transhistorical ideal, while excluding from favor those who fail to meet his ideal
standards. 5 Certainly, in the opening lines of the poem, Langland includes with approval
‘Ancres and heremites that holden hem in hire selles,
Coueiten no3t in contree to cairen aboute
For no likerous liflode hire likame to plese.’ (B.Prol.28-30),
but he appears rather to conflate the two, suggesting that the hermits he considers holy
are those who remain in their cells, and do not engage in many of the normal practices
Jones details of the hermits of the late fourteenth-century.

The ‘borwynge’ and

‘beggynge’ done as a practical alternative to waiting for miracles was a necessary norm
3
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but provokes his disapproval. Since Will is clearly not confined to a cell, were he to be a
hermit, in honesty he would have to exclude himself from those in the ideal tradition
towards which he unrealistically leans - the “holy eremites” who are included in the Ctext version of Truth’s pardon in Passus IX. He would therefore have to place himself
instead in that group of ‘lewede’ hermits explicitly excluded after the detailed description
of their failings (C.IX.188-212).
Perhaps subconsciously seeking to defend Will, it is not surprising therefore that
critics have not all agreed with Hanna’s assertion. Wittig, addressing Hanna’s argument
in an article provocatively titled ““Culture Wars” and the Persona in Piers Plowman,”
states that Hanna’s argument seems too “loose” to him because “the behavior Hanna
presents as appropriate for eremitic life was also urged as appropriate for all Christians”
while the ordines Hanna relies on for the second part of his argument “simply list the
contents of the “primer,” the standard prayer book for the literate.” 6 As the title of his
essay foregrounds, Wittig’s argument is that Hanna has been overcome by his own
preoccupations and is looking to see “how he [Will] could have taken advantage of a
hermit’s state to substitute writing poetry for manual labor, his own discourse for that of
his masking vocation.” (185) This seems reasonable, and puts Wittig in line with other
critics, such as Jones and Godden, who have turned their attention to the positioning of
hermits in the poem, and have not seen Will as a hermit but rather explicitly marked out
the ways in which his way of life both differs and overlaps with that of the hermits he
describes. 7

6

Joseph Wittig, “Culture Wars and the Persona in Piers Plowman” YLS 15 (2001):173

7

Malcolm Godden, “Plowmen and Hermits in Langland’s Piers Plowman.” RES 35 (1984): 129-63. See
particularly his discussion of the position of the known fourteenth-century hermit Richard Rolle at p162.

29

In discussing Will’s authority, we must also consider the implications of Will’s
being “yclothed as a lollare” and living “amonges lollares of londone and lewede
Ermytes” (C.V.2 and 4). A useful and succinct summary of the recent scholarship on the
derivation of the word loller, including the important work by Wendy Scase detailing the
“new anticlericalism” of the Wycliffites 8 and Langland’s (possibly original) use of the
term “loller” to cover the sort of satiric representations of religious vagabonds contained
in the idea of the gyrovagus is also included in Wittig’s essay 9 and I do not propose to
repeat it here.

Most importantly, Scase sees Will with a group of “annual priests,

pardoners and others who offer intercession for souls as a living” saying that they are
each as bad as the other because “they all obtain alms under false pretences in exchange
for spiritual services of doubtful value.”(145) It is this last claim that Wittig disputes on
the basis that there is no evidence in the text to suggest that Will’s prayers are worthless.
He summarizes what critics can agree on:
“”loller” seems to be an English adaptation .. of the Dutch word “lollard.” … Like
the Dutch word, it is derogatory and seems to apply to a range of objectionable
types:
One who externally displays a devotion which is regarded as both
excessive and hypocritical;
One who wanders about begging sustenance instead of doing useful work
and who hypocritically attributes this way of life to religious devotion;
One who manifests a religiosity which seems deficient or deviant.” 10
Clearly none of these implications is good! If Will is as dishonorable a character as
Scase proposes, perhaps it is worth remembering that this is the sort of text in which the
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words of a lunatic are not necessarily outweighed by the aungel of hevene who follows
him, and a goliard may be the one speaking truth to power (B.Prol.123-142a). Fedotov
has unpacked the ambiguity of the figure of the holy fool and proposes a political role for
him as a challenger of authority hiding behind real or assumed madness. 11 This idea has
been convincingly expanded by Lawton (see below), 12 so that Galloway suggests that:
perhaps for culturally contiguous analogues we should be looking less at the
literary tradition of foolish narrators than at those supposedly humbly penitent
early fifteenth-century heretics who claim they cannot read their own abjurations
because they were laymen or because their sight was poor.., both possibly
calculated postures of ignorance that would allow them to avoid betraying their
faith by their own mouths (and also, possibly, with an edge of witty self-parody of
their lay “ignorance” in so tricking the ecclesiastical authorities). 13
For those unconvinced by the argument that Will is feigning his faults, there is the
proposition of Wittig who, ever protective of Will 14, argues that dressing like a loller and
living amongst them does not necessarily make him one. The more appealing approach
is to judge Will on the basis of the defense he puts up for his life, to judge him by his
actions, which seems in keeping with the urging of Resoun and Conscience at the end of
his defence, not to talk about the perfect state of his mind but to get on with his good
works (C.V.102-108). Inevitably such an approach self-referentially foregrounds the text
itself and its own creator, leading back again to Middleton’s parallel discourse.
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Most related to the development of this project, and most convincing given the
importance of the question of salvation in the narrative, Aers reads Will’s comparison of
himself with ‘lewede ermytes’ and ‘lollares’ as part of a conversion narrative. He sees
Will’s internal conversation with Reason, in which he defends himself by remembering
his youth, his education, his clerical status and his ascetic mendicancy, as the moment
when Will realizes that although he can reason with himself, he cannot satisfy
Conscience (C.V.89-91).

Aers argues that this is ‘an intense event, a moment of

conversion’ 15 as Will confesses to having been a waster, ‘a spilletyme’(C.V.28): “and so
y beknowe / That y haue ytynt tyme and tyme myspened.” (C.V.92-93).
acknowledging that he has wasted God’s gift of time, and so life.

Will is

However, he

simultaneously shows the virtue of hope (C.V.93 – 101), inseparable with faith (as Will
shall discover when he meets with Hope/Moses and Faith/Abraham), the two theological
gifts that lead the recipient to Christ. Aers points out that Will is able to draw on his
education in holy writ to recall two of Christ’s parables concerning the kingdom of
heaven and the salvation of mankind. 16 By doing so ‘he is being drawn, by the graces he
prays for, into the divinely given narrative of salvation history.’ This understanding of
Will’s conversion makes Will’s previous wrongdoing important as part of his history of
sinfulness to be compared with his future with God. It means that all opening details of
the flawed narrator are a part of Langland’s emphasis on salvation through Christ. It also
foregrounds the poet, Langland himself, as the one illustrating the conversion from a
position of understanding and grace, allowing him to example the sinful version of the
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later saved self, even as he claims the authority that comes from that conversion and the
resultant knowledge and experience.
Lawton has importantly raised the question of whether or not we need to be
asking these questions of the subject of the poem at all. In ‘The Subject of Piers
Plowman,’ 17 he argues against critics from the school of New Criticism seeking to find
unity and integrity in the poem. Doing the opposite of Bowers’ attempt to find “a sense
of unity and authorial purpose,” 18 Lawton sees Piers Plowman instead as a ‘dialogic
poem constructed from the discourses of Langland’s day – social, political, theological
and academic,’ 19 and looks at many different functions of the subject: he considers the
subject as narratorial voice(s), ‘abandoning a presumption of continuity’ 20 in the
relationship between author and dreamer; he considers the subject as open persona,
suggesting that the persona can be considered ‘an embodied universal – or, better still, as
set of sometimes conflicting universals’ 21 reflecting through his anxieties and faults the
anxieties and faults of his society; he considers the subject as actant, both narrator and
subject of that narrative with the subject responding “differently in different discourses,
according to the semantic role offered by whichever is the dominant context at a given
time.” 22 The proposal is that ‘it is not the treatment of a persona we see primarily here,
but the trying on of the different subjectivities that the different discourses confer – and ,
17
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finally, the refusal of all” 23; he considers the subject as discourse, using an examination
of the discourse of penance in late fourteenth-century Europe to show how the dialogic
quality of Piers Plowman recontextualizes a monologic discourse so mediating ‘the one
contemporary discourse that sets out authoritatively to mediate subjectivity’ 24 both
challenging and de-authorizing it in the process; he considers the subject as proxy
providing a thinly ‘veiled justification’ 25 of the poet’s work in an elaboration of the holy
fool ideas of Fedotov; and, finally, considers the subject as a ‘resolutely marginal’ 26
figure needing to remain on the outside of governing discourses in order to examine them
freely.
As Lawton himself emphasizes, whichever of his subjects we might choose to
examine, the one thing that we should not expect to find is unity. I propose instead that
there is evidence enough in the breadth of accurate reference to all authoritative
discourses of society whether social, academic, political, theological or legal - but
particularly legal and theological - for Langland to claim that his text has something
pertinent to add to the conversation. In his fluid use of legal terms and understanding of
legal practices and customs, he shows himself perfectly at ease with all theories and
practices of law, from the precise wording of the pleadings of writs (e.g. B.II.74 27) to the
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rules of parliamentary procedure by which bills and petitions were submitted.28
Likewise, his understanding of the Bible is underwritten with knowledge of the saints’
writings, penitential handbooks, homilies and so on. It would be a hard task to argue that
his poem is merely peppered with this knowledge when Langland’s engagement with its
main issues is at the heart of the poem. In Lawton’s words, ‘he tampers with, reshapes,
or transforms everything … he touches,’ 29 and as Alford describes, fully to understand
Piers Powman “we must go to school not only with medieval grammarians, ..but also
with medieval logicians, lawyers, theologians, philosophers, political thinkers.” 30
Langland is neither tinkering nor decorating, he is immersing himself fully in the cultural
discourses of his time and engaging with their main ideas. The poem shows Langland’s
engagement with the four main institutional sources of contemporary authority: of course,
the church, but also the law, the political community, and the schools.

1. Establishing locus standi: Langland’s legal authority
The key to Langland’s authority in discussing legal issues is his easy command
and apparently effortless creative use of legal terms. Of course, it is not surprising that a
Christian poet should use legal terminology. As Alford states:
so intertwined historically are the vocabularies of law and theology that medieval
writers found it impossible to explain certain doctrines of Christianity without
recourse to legal terminology. The Bible is largely responsible for this
intermingling. Not only does it describe the history of mankind as a judicial
process – crime, punishment, pardon – but quite naturally it also employs the
words of the law itself….. Thus in his choice of vocabulary (if indeed he really
28
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had a choice, Langland was simply using the words best suited by tradition to his
subject matter. 31
Nonetheless, it is the creativity and fluidity with which he uses that vocabulary that
commands respect. Alford notes that “not until Piers Plowman do we read about lawyers
– or their clients or cases or appeals.” 32

Langland is so familiar with the terms of the

law courts and the structure of formal documents that their inclusion in the poem is as
much a part of the fabric of the poem as his alliterative line. His ease of reference
demonstrates a mastery of both legal technicalities and legal theory that gives him a
natural authority to talk about the law. Alford describes how law is at the heart of
Langland’s thinking:
It is not a matter of … simply inserting a legal expression here and there, like
Chaucer’s reeling summoner and the irrelevant cries of questio quid juris with
which he litters the conversation; on the contrary, ..[the] use of legal forms and
terminology generally grows naturally – as the summoner’s disconnected cries do
not – out of a profound faith in law as the tie that binds all things, in heaven and
earth.
The law is used not merely as a descriptive tool but is part of the fundamental structure of
Langland’s vision.
At the same time his deep understanding of the practice of law, and the concerns
centered around it, allows for some of his most creative poetic descriptions: take for
example his comment about the mercenary nature of the advocates at the bar: “Thow
myghtest better meete myst on Malvene Hilles / Than get a ‘mom’ of hire mouth til
moneie be shewed.’ (B.Prol.211-216). The need for professional pleaders to navigate
through the complex web of rules developed by the fourteenth century was a common
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cause of satire, but Langland uses the alliterative line and vivid imagery to join the idea
of the emptiness of the advocates’ words with the contemporary concern that advocates
were simply educated mercenaries who were motivated to argue cases for monetary gain
rather than in the pursuit of justice.
As Langland is entering the discussion of contemporary laws, he is making a
claim for locus standi for his poem, for its right to be heard in that discussion, for his
poem’s place.

Middleton carefully unpacks the narrator’s self-defense against the

charges put by the authority figures of Conscience and Reason in the autobiographical
passage at the opening of Passus V of the C text to show how the defence acts both as a
critique of the anti-vagrancy legislation of 1388 and an assertion of Langland’s poetic
authority33.

She argues that, by both mimicking and dismantling the terms of the

legislation, Langland claims poetic authority for his vernacular poem, and also its author.
The requirement that every worker, servant or pilgrim traveling outside their local vill
carry an official letter patent (in theory signed by the King but in actuality signed by a
local official in his name) indicating that they traveled with permission and planned to
return to their home, in Middleton’s estimation marks the replacement of the local
landlord rights of prior legislation with the overarching power of the textual
“administrative state.” She argues that what Will is claiming for his poem is a textual
authority that parallels and challenges that authority. In particular, Middleton shows how
the beginning of Passus V in the C text places the poet outside the reach of secular law,
by remaking the idea of the ‘lollar’ not as idling non-laborer but as authoritative social
commentator.
33
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Middleton’s focus is on parliamentary legislation which is, of course, the most
public of legal texts. It is by nature also the most theoretical since it is the direct result of
a debate over the purpose of that law. Furthermore, given parliament’s intent to use the
legislation to enforce a particular behavior, parliamentary legislation is the most likely to
be well documented and to produce textual artifacts so, as Andrew Galloway comments,
it is not such an imaginative leap from the idea of the creation of legislation fulfilling a
philosophical purpose to the creation of literary texts for the same purpose. He describes
Middleton’s work as “cultural-legal-literary history, with the emphasis of close-reading
within social context placed evenly on all of these terms” 34 and his criticism of her
argument is not so much criticism as a note of intention to expand upon Middleton’s
‘resulting narrative of legal history,’ with arguments that constraints of space and focus in
the original work inevitably left unaddressed. By way of example, he posits the general
pardons nominally issued by Richard to all of his subjects as ‘just as much administrative
“fantasia” as the vagrancy letters’ Middleton describes, these pardons ‘positing more
explicit claims to a statist, royalist, and flexibly discriminatory textual community.’ (119)
Galloway points to the comparison between the priest in Piers Plowman identifying the
deceptively inclusive pardon and those who saw that Richard’s issuing of a pardon “in
these terms was no pardon at all.” 35 The line between literary fiction and theoretically
factual record becomes ever less distinguishable.
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Middleton and Galloway are claiming literary authority for the literary texts of
this period based on their mimesis and citation of other authoritative discourses, the
language of statute being an obvious starting point. Middleton points out that Langland
gives Will authority to explain the law in his own terms, and with his own referents,
whether or not they be outside the mainstream social and economic structures; the result
is that his description of what the law should be and should facilitate becomes a part of
the frame for the rest of the poem’s argument. Within the poem’s boundaries, Langland
has appropriated legal discourse and also its grounds for authority whilst at the same time
revisioned those grounds. Galloway describes this revisioning as “the inversion of the
sense of “the subject of the law”” (120), a battle between competing documentary
subjects. Most importantly for the purpose of this project, they are subjects fashioned by
Langland and presented according to his choices, leaving them thoroughly in his control.

Are the correspondences between the C text and 1388 Cambridge Statutes truly
enough to evidence authority?

Critics following on from Middleton have pointed to the details of her evidence
not adding up to the impressive whole of her theory.

It is true that many of the

correspondences Middleton finds between the C text and the 1388 Cambridge Statutes
could arrive from the fact that they share a widely-discussed subject of great importance
to their time. Wittig takes issue with the three bases for Middleton’s claim that the
Passus V encounter is based closely on the 1388 Cambridge Labor statutes, 36 but I
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suggest that the degree of closeness and our twenty-first century certainty is not of great
importance if these ties lead us to a broader consideration of the poem’s impact. His
strongest point against Middleton’s argument is to ask “if Langland wanted to portray
Reason as “trying” Will for violation of the 1388 Statute, would not Reason have
demanded that Will produce such a letter?” (since this was the newest and most
demanding stipulation of the legislation). This point is developed in a response to his
argument by Wilsbacher, 37 who sees instead the Cambridge Statutes as part of ‘an
existing textual environment concerning itinerant labor,’ an analogue to the CV episode,
by proposing (in accordance with Middleton’s own observations of the legislation’s
timing (236-40)) that the failed petitions to the Good Parliament in 1376 and the
unsuccessful re-presentation of the petitions in 1377 ‘indicate that the political and social
debates over vagrancy had moved beyond the manorial concerns of 1349 well before the
decisive parliamentary action of 1388.’

This would allow for the possibility that

Langland could have been responding at any time in the mid to late 80s to this unofficial
discourse, not necessarily to the demands for personal documentation of the 1388
Statute 38. Wilsbacher also points out that his argument carries a political logic, since the
1388 codification of vagrancy was a move by both the Lords Appellant and Richard to
appeal to a politically expedient cause and strengthen their camps in the process, so it is
likely that the ideas codified had been in circulation for some time and attracted enough
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support to warrant their passing into statute. This certainly makes sense, but does not
itself negate Middleton’s argument. Given that the petitions were drafted in the latter
half of the seventies and continued to be worked on and presented for over ten years, it
may be that one of the possible contacts Middleton details did indeed allow Langland
access to the statutes’ early drafting. 39 Langland may have intended all that Middleton
suggests but released his poem before the documentary requirement was added to the
final version of the statute. If this were the case, it would have been strange for him to
include in his poem something that he did not believe would be prescribed by the statute.
Wittig further suggests that the examination in Passus V is an internal
‘examination of conscience, rather than an allegorical civil “trial”’ 40 as Middleton has
proposed. His evidence for this revolves around a reading of the beginning of the scene
“For as y cam by Conscience with resoun y mette” (C.V.6). Noting the MED’s entry for
“comen v.” “4a. “(e) ~ bi (to), to get at (sth. Or sb.); come by, acquire; (f) ~ bi, to grasp
or understand; solve a problem, find an answer. ..,” Wittig takes “come by” as a phrasal
verb and examines the only two other occurrences of “come by” in the poem to show that
in both of the other cases the object governs how the verb is understood. He therefore
proposes that the same should apply to Conscience. Up to this point I am in agreement.
However, he goes on to argue that since “”Conscience” is not a place one would come
past, or to” the correct translation of line 6 is “For, as I acquired conscience, I met with
Reason.”

I see nothing to prevent another reading of this line: Wittig has no trouble

personifying Reason in the same line so why cannot Conscience likewise be a personified
character who can therefore be ‘come by’ or ‘alongside’? Wittig finds corroboration for
39
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his reading of an inward encounter in line 11, “Romynge in remembraunce thus resoun
me aratede” positing that the use of ‘romynge,’ which he translates as ‘moving in a
desultory fashion,’ affects the following ‘in remembraunce’ to combine for a complete
translation of “in my desultory reflections.” However, there are no grammatical clues
either to confirm or deny this, and an equally possible translation might be to take ‘in
remembraunce’ as an adverbial phrase acting on ‘romynge’ to mean “moving in a
desultory fashion whilst remembering.” In fact, logic supports the latter, since if the
ensuing debate were the result of his reflections, it would only be after having begun that
reflection that he could either come by or acquire Conscience and Reason. The fact that
Will defends himself towards the end of the scene by using his inner certainty of what
Christ would wish him to do (”For in my Consience y knowe what Crist w[o]lde y
wrouhte” (C.V.83) ) does not prove that the whole scene has taken place inwardly,
merely that he is using all arguments available to him to make his case. I agree with most
critics that this is a trial of Will’s Conscience, but I do not see evidence that Conscience
and Reason are acting any more internally than they have in the preceding passus beyond
the usual effect of personification/allegory.
Furthermore, this does not seem to me to be an important support for Middleton’s
macro-argument for Langland’s claim to authority, for, as Wilsbacher points out, locating
the debate internally does not allow Will simply ‘to escape the external social and
political realities which seem to underwrite so much of the poem.’ 41

Middleton

envisages the 1388 statutes directly stimulating Langland to a presentation of Reason and
Conscience that defends his authority and argues for his self-worth. Without some clear
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alternate autobiographical event to refer back to, it is hard to see how a text so engaged
with the social conditions of its time could not be influenced by those events or
realistically intend not to reflect upon them. Such a position would suggest a dissociated
unselfconsciousness on the part of the narrator that is not reflected anywhere else in the
poem: as Lawton describes, the subject of Piers Plowman can be characterized in many
unstable and shifting ways 42, but never as unselfconscious. The result is that the degree
of closeness of the relationship between the text and the 1388 Cambridge Statutes is
debatable, but Middleton’s larger point about Langland’s claim for authority remains
convincing, backed up as it is so fully by the surrounding evidence of his skill with legal
discourse.

2. Langland’s political and poetic claim for authority in the community.
Langland’s text is so rooted in his contemporary legal world that, as Machan
points out, 43 it is not literary works of the period but documentary records such as court
rolls and guild records that bear closest resemblance to Piers Plowman in style. In the
nineteenth century, Jusserand took the connections he saw between the poem and
contemporary parliamentary issues to suggest that the poem “would almost seem a
commentary on the Rolls of Parliament.” 44 Today, Giancarlo illustrates instead how
‘there are some crucial poetical issues at stake in the question of Langland’s political
42
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engagement with contemporary institutional forms.’ 45 Given that Langland was writing
at a time of social unrest, in which access to knowledge was itself political, his choice to
write a vernacular poem addressing the social and spiritual institutions of his day could
never be apolitical.
In his study of the poem’s parliamentary setting and questions of the public voice,
Giancarlo illustrates how Langland is putting forward neither simply a topical poem with
recognizable referents nor an argument for one parliamentary faction or another, but is
instead asking ‘a profounder set of questions about who gets to speak, both in and for a
community; and indeed, about what can count as a community, and about how it can be
“represented.”’ 46 Giancarlo reverses Jusserand’s claim and seeks “to look at some of the
rolls and records of parliament as a commentary on Piers Plowman.” 47 He illustrates
convincingly how the trial of Meed in Passus II-IV should be seen in a specifically
parliamentary context, particularly since the charges put to Meed are framed not in the
terms of an individual tort case that might be adjudicated in the usual courts, but instead
in the terms of a political accusation against ‘an enemy of “the community” in an
institutional sense.’ 48 In keeping with that, he points out that the King does not threaten
the possibility of tort judgment but rather summary banishment, a parliamentary threat:
“Excuse þe 3if þou canst, I can no more sei3e, / For conscience acusiþ þe to cunge þe for
euere.” (B.III.173-4).

Similarly, Meed does not respond to the accusations that

Conscience has put to her about her behavior, but instead defends herself with a political
45
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argument about the conduct of the French wars. Giancarlo suggests that it is only by
comparison with the parliamentary rolls and the parliamentary accusations against Alice
Perrers in 1376 - of intentionally misleading the King and mismanaging royal interests that the modern reader can understand what would have been a clear reference to the
contemporary reader and see why Meed should be putting her response in terms of selfdefense to political treason.
In Giancarlo’s reading of this episode, Langland is using the overlap between
parliament’s position as “the peak of the legal pyramid” (to use Leon’s phrase 49) to
discuss concerns about access to justice which, according to the legal historian, Alan
Harding was one of the main topics debated in parliament. Harding comments that:
If the series of parliamentary petitions, statutes, and judicial commissions are
taken together, local justice and not taxation is seen to be the first great subject of
political discussion between the king and the people at large … The plaints and
bills produced by litigation became the new means of political communication
flowing now from localities to government. 50
Giancarlo’s unpacking of Meed’s trial, Peace’s bill against Wrong and the communal
nature of Meed’s punishment enables us to see how Langland found ‘a speaking voice
through the poetical representation of political representation, through a deliberative
imagining of a deliberative and argumentative body.” 51 Just as parliamentary sessions
might involve rowdy debates with many voices, so too Langland’s text uses many voices
to enter the conversation. I propose that Langland is using his poem as a conduit to
reason, and that we should take as his purpose Reason’s statement in Passus IV of the C
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text that he seeks to “withouten mercement or manslauht amende all reumes,’ i.e. to
debate reform without violence or, to use Giancarlo’s phrase, ‘to speak for the
community, from the community.’
Steiner 52 argues that it is the diversity of the opening scene that persuades the
reader that the “the dreamer sees the whole world because the poetic field encompasses a
total vision, whose lens is both critical and wide.” For her, Langland’s authority is based
in the poetic display evidenced by the innovative vernacular Prologue which proves his
capacity “to create an aesthetic precisely by extending literary forms to political thought.”
The topic of Steiner’s essay is “diversity” as political statement, but I suggest that what
she is identifying is also a statement of Langland’s own authority. Steiner argues that the
alliterative line helps ‘construct human diversity as an aesthetic object’ because
the alliteration of the Prologue insists upon the accumulation of dissimilar parts
into a whole and the simultaneous breakdown of the whole into its dissimilar
parts. Take, just for example, the lines, ‘‘Barons and Burgeises and bond[age] als
/ I sei_ in þis assemblee, as ye shul here after; / Baksteres and Brewesteres and
Bochiers manye’’ (217–19). Alliteration here gives the effect of a multitudo
diversorum, because it seems to generate random combinations of people, while
at the same time building rhythmically toward a total vision, from plurality to
unity and back again. 53
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Steiner illustrates how the work that has been done on the ‘sundry folk’ of Chaucer’s
General Prologue by Mann - on the contrast between the ‘produced effects’ of the text
and real society – and by Wallace - on Chaucer’s preoccupation with ‘associational
form’ 54 to represent his philosophical position (that ‘humankind is a political animal, not
an aggregate of atomized individuals’) - combines to the effect that ‘the political work of
the “sundry folk” is not their sundriness but the kinds of associations they form and tell
stories about within the Canterbury Tales.” In contrast, she believes Langland’s poem
“demonstrates not the politics of a literary work but the politics of literary form, its
capacity to create new topics of political thought.” 55 What we are seeing is the many
ways in which the broad scope of Langland’s vision, and the many narrative settings
allowed by the structure of the poem, allow him to enter into several different
conversational realms simultaneously, so enabling him to comment on many different
players in the political scene and establish a place for his work within that scene.

3. “Grammar, the ground of al” (B.XV.372): Adopting the school and grammatical
models.

a. Linguistic and stylistic authority

The extraordinary number of quotations and almost quotations from the bible and
other religious tracts has led to much debate about the level of Langland’s education,
54
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usually from scholars quick to point out ‘errors’ in the quotation. This criticism has itself
been roundly attacked by Langland’s defenders who find purpose in every change.
However, the most obvious evidence of Langland’s stylistic abilities is the fluidity
of his movement from one stylistic realm from another to advance his narrative purpose
whether from the bible to parliament, or from a sermon to judgment. It is evidenced also
in the code-switching that occurs with neither narrative nor structural purpose but rather
for the self-conscious rhetorical flourish it provides. Machan 56 argues that the fact that so
many speakers in the poem ‘change languages so pervasively at so many syntactic points’
is explained by the collapse of the Latin-English diglossia; he believes that since the
complex instances of code switching depended on ‘forethought and linguistic
sophistication,’ they are ‘unlikely to be casual and unintentional.’ 57 Lexical inadequacy
is an unconvincing explanation, since ‘if a speaker perceives that one code lacks a given
word or concept, it is far easier simply to borrow the appropriate material-as Langland
does on many occasions-without the added difficulty of syntactic accommodation.’58
The conclusion is that the complex code switching is ‘self-referential and pragmatic: the
switch occurs both for the sake of its own ingenuity and for the rhetorical emphasis it
56
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creates.’ 59 Machan demonstrates how the switches ‘foreground Langland's linguistic
competence and not the putative competence of individual characters’ 60 by contrasting
Langland’s use of language switching with Chaucer’s adoption of a northern dialect for
John and Allen in the Reeve's Tale, where the dialect is used consistently for every
utterance by them and only them; Machan suggests that in this way, ‘while one is aware
of Chaucer's linguistic abilities, within the reader's response the dialectal portions remain
identified more with the characters than with the author or even Oswald the Reeve.
Although borrowing alone might have sustained this kind of stylistic motivation and
would have been, in any case, considerably easier for Langland,’ 61 Machan points to the
moment in Passus IV when we see Reason switching fluidly between Latin and English
and inviting the King’s confessor to translate his words into English:
For “Nullum malum the man mette with inpunitum
And bad Nullum bonus be irremuneratum.”
Lat thi confessour, sire Kyng, construe this [E]ngl[sy]sed, (B.IV.143-5)
to show how ‘in its very difference from an observation in the far simpler syntax of a
completely Latin or English quotation, .. Reason's utterance simultaneously attests to his
intelligence, Langland's skill, and the virtuosity of Piers Plowman, with the code
switching itself contributing to the pragmatics of the situation.’ 62

For the purposes of

establishing Langland’s authority, the code-switching shows how he can manipulate a

59

Ibid., 376.

60

Ibid.

61

Ibid.

62

Ibid.

49

rhetorical device to further his narrative while drawing attention to the quality of his text
and his own abilities and education.
Minnis has detailed the ways in which authority was ‘‘translated,’ appropriated,
disposed, exploited, and … challenged’ by Middle English literature 63 by showing how
the apparatus of literary theory had developed to include all kinds of texts, sacred or
secular, and bring commentators much closer to their authors. 64 The shift in focus for the
thirteenth century exegetes, from the divine author of the Scriptures to the human authors
through which he communicated, allowed the fourteenth century scholastic philosophers
and theologians to produce a universal interpretative model. Minnis shows how
Scriptural authors were being read literally, with close attention being paid to
those poetic methods believed to be part of the literal sense; pagan poets, long
acknowledged as masters of those same methods, were being read allegorically or
‘moralized’ – and thus the twain could meet.’ 65
The result for Langland is that his poetic vernacular text dealing with complex
theological arguments usually dealt with in Latin could expect to be subject to the same
level of commentary and debate as the authorities with which his text engaged.
Langland’s own engagement with his sources in Piers Plowman shows him to be
working within a tradition of manipulation of source texts in the medieval educational
curriculum. Mann highlights a ‘notable feature of the medieval educational curriculum –
namely, the way in which it was continually renewed and updated by the production of
new texts which followed the old models but recast them into different verse forms,
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brought in new material, or provided replacements which fulfilled similar functions to the
originals.” 66 She paints a picture of a fluid educational environment in which standard
texts and ideas were constantly being placed in different groupings and reexamined in
different forms, where students were encouraged themselves to experiment with these
relationships as part of their learning process, and demonstrates how the memorization
and repetition of the proverbs of Cato and later writers made these texts ‘part of
everyone’s mental furniture.’ 67
Mann uses her understanding of these learning patterns to examine the sequence
in the debate of the four daughters of God in Passus XVIII of Piers Plowman when
Mercy argues that Mankind can be redeemed on the basis that “venym fordooth venym –
and that I preve by reson.’ Just as venom will destroy venom so shall Christ’s death
destroy death and his guile destroy that of the Devil:
“And right as thorugh gilours gile bigiled was man formest,
So shal grace that al bigan make a good ende
And bigile the gilour – and that is good sleighte:
66
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Ars ut artem falleret. (XVIII 159-61)
Although the Latin phrase is taken from a famous hymn by Venantius Fortunatus
(“Pange, lingua”), the English recalls a proverb that is the moral of Chaucer’s Reeve’s
Tale: “A gylour shal himself bigyled be” (4321). This is a proverb represented in “Cato”:
Qui simulate verbis nec corde est fidus amicus,
tu quoque fac simules: sic ars deluditur arte. (I.26)
[If anyone dissembles in his speech and is no true friend in his heart, see that you
dissemble too; so guile is beguiled.] 68
A Middle English translation of Cato renders this into the familiar form: “So gyle with
gyle shal gyled be.” Mann demonstrates how Langland’s use of the Middle English
translation of the Cato enables him to move from the un-Christian sentiment of Cato’s ars
deluditur arte, through the Latin of Fortunatus, to the Christian ars ut artem falleret,
which will coincide with the eye-for-an-eye Old Testament law Christ quotes later in the
same passus:
The Olde Lawe graunteth
That gilours be bigiled – and that is good reason:
Dentem pro dente et oculum pro oculo. (B.XVIII 339-40)
It is clear that Langland is using the reworking techniques Mann has identified in
the common educational primers as his tools in order to rework the ideas surrounding the
redemption.

Most importantly, her work illustrates that this would be recognized as

quite normal to the medieval reader. The effect of this reworking is theorized by Tolmie,
who argues that “the whole text of Piers Plowman can be seen as an exercise in moving
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contested words – treuth, mede, werche, Dowel – through a series of language games,
showing how their meanings are generated separately in each one.” 69 She points out that
‘so various are the contexts in which the same words must be used that their meanings are
necessarily fragmented. Verbal meaning thus often comes down to choosing between the
autonomous meanings generated by different language games and their particular groups
of speakers.’ Tolmie compares the development of language in Piers Plowman with
Wittgenstein’s language game, 70 in which language acquisition is a process of training
rather than of explanation, and where ‘verbal meanings are determined by their uses in an
enormous range of discrete language games, each one of which must be encountered and
existentially inhabited in order to be fully meaningful.” This means that each language
game is inherently connected to what Wittgenstein describes as ‘the form of life’ 71 of the
speaker. For Tolmie, this attachment of meaning to the form of life of the speaker
explains the shifting meanings of Reason, because Reason’s role changes from passus to
passus. Thus, when Reason takes on the role of advisor to the King in passus IV
(B.IV.44-195) he is part of a language game of advising, which he then abandons when
he takes on the passus V role of sermonizer (B.V.11-59). The shift allows the advising
Reason of passus IV cleverly to contain Lady Mede and overcome Wrong, even though
the sermonizing Reason of the next passus is as unconvincing as he was previously adept,
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encouraging the crowd to repent to prevent natural disasters (and bad weather!) rather
than for personal salvation.
Reason was so very reasonable in passus IV that the strident tone of the Reason of
passus V is less objectionable until the reader stops to consider the shift between
passuses. Tolmie argues that viewing each episode as a separate language game with a
separate purpose allows the reader to ‘refresh’ his vision of Reason and reassess the
limits of Reason’s power, as well as to understand how at each point in the journey Will
is separate from his interlocutors which is why his quest does not advance cumulatively.
Tolmie’s linguistic theory and Mann’s work on the medieval educational
curriculum and its reliance on the refreshing of old texts with new form emphasize ‘the
union of the clerkly and the experiential’ 72 and allow for a freedom of choice for the
reader which suggests a comfort on Langland’s part with the idea that the poem could be
conceived to have many different readings, and was intended to be on a par with the sort
of text reworked and revisioned in the universities, texts imparting moral wisdom.73
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Her argument is that “although scribal punctuation favours ‘metrical’ performance, correcting caesural
unruliness, it also preserves, accommodates, or struggles with uneasy syntax, suggesting Langland’s
authorization of multiple performances, multiple interpretations.”73 Kane had earlier argued that “Langland
identified the caesural pause, in its essentially grammatical character, as a function of meaning” evidencing
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point to insert a parenthetic statement or a presumptive subject or object, to enable parataxis, or to
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Cannon has identified the ways in which “Langland’s literary practices are deeply rooted
in grammar school texts and practices.” 74 Building on Simpson’s work 75 detailing the
various ‘discourses of education’ that Langland uses throughout the poem, Cannon notes
the many different educational kinds represented in the third vision, specifically linking
Study to the grammar school, Clergy to ‘the institution of university theological
learning,’ 76 and Imaginatif to the ‘vis imaginativa of the scholastics.’ 77 He suggests that
the crossing of institutional boundaries that Zeeman has detailed 78 is ‘particularly
noticeable at the level of form, where the language of university debate often introduces
Will’s encounter with a particular figure (‘”Contra!” quod I as a clerc, and comsed to
disputen’, B.VIII.20), but the encounter itself more typically unfolds as a lengthy and
uninterrupted scene of instruction.” 79 Cannon’s argument is that, although there are what
he describes as “aspirational references to a sophisticated academic style” in the poem,
the pedagogic style displayed is that of ‘the basic texts of the grammar school,
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particularly the Distichs of Cato in which an authoritative wisdom is dispensed, at length,
by an authoritative figure.’ 80 Thus, at the craft level of reference and style, Langland is
claiming a particular kind of vernacular authority for the poem.
But this was not something new and shocking. As Lawton notes in reference to
Cursor Mundi, for many texts of this period, ‘the activity most germane … may well be
compilation more than authorship’ 81 as authors combined their skills in translating or
paraphrasing the biblical texts with their skills in exegetical commentary.

What

distinguishes Piers Plowman amongst such texts is the sheer range of sources and the
strong sense of the author’s framing hand.

b. Use of the recognized conceit of the grammatical metaphor
In addition to the linguistic prowess outlined above and his comfort with the
revisioning of his poem, Langland claims further authority for his poem through his use
of the popular contemporary conceit of the grammatical metaphor. The idea that a
literary text would be exposing an underlying theory of the natural order of things
representing the divine will would not have been new to a medieval reader. Quite the
contrary, as Alford explains in the ‘The Grammatical Metaphor,’ 82 even the terms of
Latin grammar used to describe the structure of the English language resonated in the
medieval period not only with their technical application to a grammatical concept but
also as a metaphor for functionally equivalent offices. A simple example offered by
80
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Alford is of the ‘prepositio’ which could refer both to a preposition and to the office of
one ‘put before’ others in a position of authority. In its simplest form, Alford notes, the
grammatical metaphor ‘is hardly more than an extended pun, an elaboration of those
double meanings built into the language itself’ but in its more complicated form it was a
useful satiric tool and lent itself easily to satire of the church and courtroom. 83
Although the metaphors based on grammatical terminology were easy devices for
punning, it was those based on grammatical theory that contained a deeper philosophy
because medieval thought equated the processes of grammar with the processes of nature.
Alford sums up this position by quoting John of Salisbury:

“While grammar has

developed to some extent, and indeed mainly, as an invention of man, still it imitates
nature, from which is partly derives its origin. Furthermore, it tends, as far as possible, to
conform to nature in all respects.” 84 Salisbury is continuing the Thomist theme of the
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reflection of God in human institutions, but this was taken even further by speculative
grammarians. 85 The result of all of this work trying to base grammatical rules on extralinguistic premises such as logic or ‘the nature of things” was the expansion of the
grammatical metaphor, to incorporate at a deeper level of meaning a conceptual doubleentendre matching the verbal double-entendre of the terminology itself. This allows for a
flow of grammatical or linguistic ideas into questions of logic or ‘the nature of things’
that is compounded by the overlapping of terminology. Alford gives well-known details
of the use of grammatical distinctions in the solution of philosophical and theological
problems. Since the medieval reader was commonly encouraged to seek metaphors with
real life application in the Latin grammars, and of course the Bible, and of course law,
they would expect the same in Langland’s text since he was dealing with precisely the
same issues.
Furthermore, Langland’s style illustrates his own belief in this pairing of language
with nature, as he uses it to frame his narrative. Alford finds many examples, noting that
Langland emphasizes the verbal nature of creation (“Dixit, et facta sunt” (B.IX.33), finds
proof of the Trinity in the fact that God uses the plural form of the verb at the creation
(“For he was singular hym-self and seyde faciamus” (B.IX.35)) and is concerned that
there are many names for God – a problem he solves with the answer that all terms can
refer to the same individual: “kny3te, kynge, conquerore may be [one] persone.”
(B.XIX.27).
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Most significantly, Alford shows that Langland uses the grammatical metaphor to
explain some of the poem’s most important ideas: the search for moral perfection is
compared to the positive, comparative and superlative degrees of an adjective or adverb
(Dowel, Dobet and Dobest) which are defined in their relationship by way of the
grammatical concept of “infinites”:

“Dowel and Dobet aren two infinites, / Whiche

infinites, with a faith fynden oute Dobest.” (B.XIII.127-8); the Christian man being ruled
by love is compared to a transitive verb ruling its object ex vi transitionis (“Kynde love
coveiteth noght no catel but speche. / With half a laumpe lyne in Latyn, Ex vi
transicionis,” (B.XIII.150-1)); and syntax is compared with right social order (C.IV.335409). Alford argues that examples like these show Langland’s respect for language and
“his faith in its validity as a guide to truth” which is, after all, the main purpose of the
poem – to show the path to the truth. They also show how the grammatical structure of
language was commonly considered a reflection of a ‘natural’ order of things ordained by
God.
It should not be a surprise therefore to find that Langland’s legal theory appears to
reject the populist or voluntarist arguments for the basis of legal authority, but rather
considers the law simply another extension of the same pattern of temporal life matching
a divine order. He assumes that his reader will accept that the structure of language itself
falls into that pattern which allows for a consideration of his own text as a further
revelation of that divine order.
Moreover, it can also be argued that by entering his poem in the vernacular into
the legal and political arenas, Langland was advancing access to justice and the debate
that much more by effectively translating into English the issues of the Anglo-Norman
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parliamentary rolls and the Latin of the Bible and Church texts.

Given that I shall be

looking at the use of reson in a written poem, it is interesting that the term was also
commonly used to denote a proverb or saying or written sentence of the type that might
be engraved or embroidered upon something and used for inspiration. Along this same
strand of thinking was the use of reson to mean a sentence or proposition in logic or a
main clause in grammar. It itself signified meaning or signification, as in ‘rime or
resoun,’ where it meant sense. Langland’s poem could be said to be carving out a place
for itself where the fullest interpretations of resoun might be found, and, by extension
therefore, making the poem itself a conduit to the ‘natural law.’

Conclusion
If we accept that Langland’s adroit handling of the language and teaching
methods of his contemporary institutions of authority allow him realistically to demand a
place for his poem in the debates of his day, we will have come a long way from the view
of Langland’s nineteenth century editor, Thomas Whitaker, and his famous complaint
that Langland ‘often sinks into imbecility.’ 86 However, it is my belief that perhaps the
poem was so very popular in the Middle Ages precisely because its readers understood
that it was what Salter described as the ‘almost impossibly ambitious attempt to come to
terms with the social, political, and intellectual forces which were powerfully changing
the medieval world.” 87 The broad sweep of Langland’s vision allows him to illustrate his
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mastery of classical rhetorical devices as he manipulates the linguistic structures of the
religious, legal and social institutions upon which his poem comments. In doing so, he
gives his poem authority and relevance, and establishes it, and its author, as a new kind of
vernacular authority.
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Chapter 2: Right, Reson and upholding the law in Piers Plowman

When Christ harrows hell at the climax of Passus XVIII of Piers Plowman,
Langland dramatizes his words to Lucifer in terms of a legal transaction for the souls he
is freeing (B.XVIII.349-351):
‘So leve it noght, Lucifer, ayein the lawe I fecche hem
But by right and by reson raunsone here my liges:
Non veni solvere legem set adimplere.’
This is a narrative crux of the poem; Will’s journey was at first to know how to live well
but having discovered this he extended his quest in search of an answer to the bigger
question of who will be saved. It is now that Christ answers him: Christ’s ‘liges’ will be
saved, ‘by right,’ and ‘by reson,’ in order to fulfill ‘the lawe.’
However, this answer is not as clear cut as it might seem. Christ argues that he is
not freeing these souls “ayein the lawe” but why does Christ feel bound to obey the law?
As the omnipotent deity, surely he can free anyone he wants. Furthermore, though it may
be natural to expect Christ to be referring to biblical laws, is he referencing the laws set
out in the Bible or the whole body of canon law that had by then developed around and
considerably beyond them? And what about the common law? This becomes a part of
the argument of the next line, since Christ there frames his argument in terms of
‘raunsone’ and of ‘liges,’ which are both terms taken directly from the common law in
criminal actions and civil property disputes, as well as from the common law writ of right
procedure. Furthermore, the latter is the only contemporary legal process allowing for
the sort of champion Christ here claims to be. Christ’s argument is pulling in two
different and competing jurisdictional directions, but appears to be pleading the case in
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both simultaneously. Precisely which of these bodies of law is Christ fulfilling? And is
it possible for him to fulfill them all or indeed any of them? Christ bolsters his argument
with his emphasis on ‘right’ and ‘reson,’ but, again, this leads to questions: what does
‘right’ mean in this context? What ‘reson’? And why does Langland emphasize that
Christ needs them working both individually and in conjunction with each other in order
to fulfill the promise of the law?

Clearly Christ is arguing that he is acting with legal

authority. But what are the grounds for that authority and what is Langland attempting to
achieve by putting his argument in these terms?
In order to answer these questions it will be important to establish the meaning
and symbolism of each of the terms that Langland has chosen and the religious, legal and
cultural implications of the ways in which he has used them. This chapter aims to
examine the legal framework Langland uses to portray the harrowing of hell, in order to
see what relationship there might be between his poem and its contemporary legal
culture.

Why are the terms in Langland’s text so slippery?
Seen as a language game 1, the most important feature of the redemption passage
in the harrowing of hell sequence in Passus XVIII is its framing in legal terminology.
Alford and Seniff have noted that bearing in mind literary production at the time of Piers
Plowman was mostly by authors trained for a life in the Church or in the law - or in a
mixture of both – “it is hardly surprising that the writings of the period, both secular and

1
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religious, should be pervaded by legal influence in one form or another.” 2 Alford goes
on later to say:
so intertwined historically are the vocabularies of law and theology that medieval
writers found it impossible to explain certain doctrines of Christianity without
recourse to legal terminology. The Bible is largely responsible for this
intermingling. Not only does it describe the history of mankind as a judicial
process – crime, punishment, pardon – but quite naturally it also employs the
words of the law itself….. Thus in his choice of vocabulary (if indeed he really
had a choice), Langland was simply using the words best suited by tradition to his
subject matter. 3
However, this explanation is too determinist, given Alford’s own highlighting of the fact
that “not until Piers Plowman do we read about lawyers – or their clients or cases or
appeals.” 4 In these examples, Langland is introducing a new vocabulary for his
argument, not selecting from language traditionally in use. Since he has shown his skill
and comfort in handling many genres of writing, we can assume Langland is choosing his
words carefully and framing the discussion in legal terms purposefully.
It is the debate at the beginning of Passus XVIII between the Four Daughters of
God - Mercy, Truth, Righteousness and Peace - that first frames the harrowing of hell in
legal terms. Langland develops the debate to have Mercy tell Truth,
“That man shal man save thorugh a maydenes helpe,
And that was tynt thorugh tree, tree shal it wynne,
And that Deeth down broughte, deeth shal releve.’ (XVIII.139-141)
Mercy sees balance in all things, so Mankind is to be saved by a man and a woman
working together; a tree was the site of the fall and shall now be a site of the redemption;
2
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and, Death, that brought down mankind, shall now be overcome. However, Truth looks
only to a reading of the Old Testament for direction, and replies emphatically that
Mercy’s answer is ‘but a tale of waltrot!’ for Job states that no-one gets out of hell, so she
will not believe anyone who tells her differently. In response, Mercy explains that it is
her experience and her ‘reson’ that has given her hope:
“Thorugh experience,’ quod he[o], ‘I hope thei shul be saved.
For venym fordooth venym – and that I preve by reson.’
Her faith in God’s justice, rather than his law alone, gives her confidence that just as
venom will destroy venom so shall Christ’s death destroy death and his guile destroy that
of the Devil.
Most significantly, she argues that she can prove it ‘by reson,’ and sets out her
reliance on God’s grace to produce a positive outcome:
“And right as thorugh gilours gile bigiled was man formest,
So shal grace that al bigan make a good ende
And bigile the gilour – and that is good sleighte:
Ars ut artem falleret. (XVIII 159-61)
In Mercy’s view, the same grace that led to Man’s creation will lead to his salvation, and
the Devil shall be shown the effect of his own actions. Mercy’s answer transforms the
harrowing of hell into a question of fair play in the game of salvation - which ties in later
with Christ’s own Old Testament explanation to Lucifer that
‘The Olde Lawe graunteth
That gilours be bigeled – and that is good reason:
Dentem pro dente et oculum pro oculo.” (XVIII 339-340)).
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Peace then arrives with a legal document, a patent letter of authorization which relies on
the Scriptures in the form of a quote from Psalms (4:9) to show that it will have lasting
validity. This document is meant to show that God has
‘forgyven [mankind] and graunted me, Pees, and Mercy
To be mannes meynpernour for everemoore after.” (XVIII.183-4).
However, Righteousness is not convinced by a mere document and suggests that Peace is
either raving mad or drunk. Like Truth, she cannot move away from an absolutist
approach to the law, and reminds Peace of the details of the law God gave to Adam and
the consequences of Adam’s transgression. Righteousness lays out explicitly the terms of
the contract between God and Man (XVIII.190 – 199), using the emphasis of the
alliterative line to highlight those terms (‘if that thei touchesse a tree and of the fruyt
eten’), and the punishment they promise (‘sholden deye downrighte, and dwelle in peyne
after’) in the event the contract is broken (‘freet of that fruyt, and forsook….The love of
Oure Lord and his lore bothe’). Righteousness views Man’s punishment as just because
it was always the understood consequence of breaking the law (‘That hir peyne be
perpetual and no preiere hem helpe. (XVIII.199)’). She focuses on the details of the law
God set out for Adam and Eve to emphasize that they knew what they were doing when
they ‘freet of that fruyt.’ She cannot imagine a change in that situation because there is
no framework for it in her understanding of God’s law, as witnessed by herself and
Truthe. Whatever the patent may say, she cannot imagine a mere document overcoming
the weight of her own experience.
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In contrast, Peace is working within a different frame. She turns to the idea of
learning through experience to argue that God gave Man the opportunity to sin and suffer
so that he might understand joy better:
Woot no wight what werre is ther that pees regneth,
Ne what is witterly wele til “weylawey” hym teche. 5 (XVIII.215-6)
Peace proposes that Man’s fall is a lesson that will come to an end once Man has learned
its point through bitter experience.

In her retelling of the story, there is room for

development, for a revisioning of the story of the fall into the story of salvation, and so
room for Man’s restoration in a way that is not possible within the strict narrative frame
argued by Righteousness.

Right or ransom? The significance of the debate of the Four Daughters of God
The idea of the virtues being the daughters of God is a development of Psalm
84:11 that personifies the four virtues and places them together: “misericordia et veritas
occurrerunt iustitia et pax deosculatae sunt” (Vulgate) [Mercy and truth have met each
other; justice and peace have kissed (Douay-Rheims translation)].

However, by

Langland’s time the idea had been expanded in sermons and treatises, much like the
Jewish midrash, to include an elaborate debate before God between the four sister Virtues
about the fall of Man and the possibility of his redemption through Christ. Owst 6
explains: “Writers of pulpit manuals and treatises, from the thirteenth century onwards,

5
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were accustomed to illustrate each “branch” of Vice or Virtue, …with … vivid little
sketches of contemporary men and women and their ways. Thus grew up a natural
tendency to identify topic with illustration and blend them into one.” So too, the sister
Virtues’ debate was merged with the ideas from commentaries and theological
speculation about the redemption. The Devil’s role in Christ’s death is not specifically
mentioned in the New Testament, so its whole formulation is the result of theological
philosophizing and comment - with the result that there is no individual text either to call
a source or to limit the boundaries of speculation.
Augustine dealt with the redemption most fully in De Trinitate, book 13, chapters
11 – 16, emphasizing the justice of God in the way that He has dealt with Man:
“Quadam justitia Dei in potestam diaboli traditum est genus humanum.” 7 [By the justice
of God humankind was given into the power of the Devil.] In Augustine’s scheme, God
has the power to free Man as He pleases, but He chooses to give an example to Man by
treating even the Devil, who has defied Him, justly:
placuit Deo, ut propter eruendum hominem de diaboli potestate, non potential
diabolus, sed justitia vinceretur; atque ita et homines imitantes Christum, justitia
quaererent diabolum vincere, non potentia. 8 [It pleased God that, in rescuing Man
from the power of the Devil, the Devil should not be overcome by power but by
justice; so that likewise Man, imitating Christ, might seek to overcome the Devil
by justice not power.]
Augustine explains the justice of the redemption by saying:
Quae est igitur justitia, qua victus est diabolus? Quae, nisi justitia Jesu Christi?
Et quomodo victus est? Quia cum in eo nihil morte dignum inveniret, occidit eum
tamen. Et utique justum est ut debitores quos tenebat, liberi dimittantur, in eum
credentes quem sine ullo debito occidit. 9 [Therefore, what is the justice by which
7
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the Devil was conquered? What, if not the justice of Jesus Christ? And how was
he conquered? Although he found nothing in Him was worthy of death,
nevertheless [the Devil] killed him. And indeed it is just that the debtors who
were held should be sent away free, those who believe in Him whom the Devil
killed without any debt.]
Augustine understands the redemption in terms of justice and power. It was just that God
should give the Devil power over Mankind as a result of original sin; the Devil is not an
equal adversary but rather another one of God’s creatures. However, when the Devil
abuses his power by unjustly killing the innocent Christ, it is only just that God should
take back Mankind and free it from the power of the Devil. This is the theory often
referred to as ‘the Devil’s rights’ theory.

However, it should be noted that it is

problematic to refer to the Devil’s rights as if the Devil had some claim to mankind
beyond that he obtained as a consequence of the fall, since that would position God and
the Devil as equals. Marx highlights that Augustine does not refer to the ‘iura diaboli’ in
his discussions about the redemption, but when referring to the devil’s rights uses the
phrase ‘potestas diaboli.’ 10 He points to a passage from book 4 of the De Trinitate (PL
42.899-900) in which Augustine explains the Devil’s power in terms of ‘jure’ (right or
justice), ‘tanquam jure integro’ (‘as it were by absolute right’), and ‘velut aequo jure’
(‘as it were by just right’):
‘Morte sua quippe uno verissimo sacrificio pro nobis oblato, quidquid culparum
erat unde nos principatus et potestates ad luenda supplicia jure detinebant,
purgavit, abolevit, exstinxit…. Ita diabolus hominem, quem per consensionem
seductum, tanquam jure integro possidebat …. in ipsa morte carnis amisit….
Quocirca etiam ipso Domino se credebat diabolus superiorem, in quantum illi
Dominus in passionibus cessit; quia et de ipso intellectum est quod in Psalmo
legitur, Minuisti eum Paulo minus ab Angelis (Psalm viii.6): ut ab iniquo velut
aequo jure adversum nos agente, ipse occisus innocens eum jure aequissimo
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superaret, atque ita captivitatem propter peccatum factam captivaret (Ephesians
iv.8), nosque liberaret a captivitate propter peccatum justa, suo justo sanguine
injuste fuso mortis chirographum delens [Colossians ii.14], et justificandos
redimens peccatores.’ 11 [By his death, the one most true sacrifice offered for us,
he purged, abolished and destroyed whatever faults there were by which
principalities and powers held us by right so that we should pay the penalty
(imposed on us). Thus the Devil, in that very death of the flesh, lost humanity
whom he possessed as it were by absolute right, as one led astray by his own
consent. The Devil believed that he was superior to the Lord himself because the
Lord yielded to him in his sufferings. This is to be understood about him from
what we read in the psalm, ‘You have made him a little lower than the angels’. In
this way Christ himself being innocent and put to death by the evil one acting
against us as it were by just right, might overcome him by a most just right, might
make captive that captivity which was brought about through sin, and might free
us from the captivity that was just because of our sin, destroying the handwriting
of death and redeeming those sinners who were to be justified by his own just
blood unjustly shed.’
In highlighting this passage, Marx emphasizes that Augustine uses the term ‘ius’ not to
mean ‘an absolute, inalienable right over and above the power of God and something that
God was obliged to respect’ but rather something that appears ‘to depend solely on
humanity being in a state of sin.’ By removing mankind’s sin, Christ’s death destroys the
basis of the Devil’s rights over mankind and so frees them from his possession.
There is another important theme in Augustine’s formulation of the redemption,
that of the reconciliation of mankind with God. Once he has described how the Devil
was conquered, Augustine explains further:
Hoc est quod justificari dicimur in Christi sanguine (Romans v.9). Sic quippe in
remissionem peccatorum nostrorum innocens sanguis ille effusus est. 12 [It is
because of this that we are said to be justified in Christ’s blood (Romans v9). For
it was in this way that innocent blood was poured out in the remission of our
sins.]
Here the justification leads to the forgiveness of sin and hence the reconciliation of
mankind with God. It was only the sin that was separating God and mankind so once that
11
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has been forgiven, they can be reconciled. There is no mention of the Devil in this
transaction because he is irrelevant to it.
However, Augustine’s writing also fits with another formulation of the
redemption, the so-called ‘ransom theory’ arising from Matthew 20:28: sicut Filius
hominis non venit ministrari sed ministrare et dare animam suam redemptionem pro
multis. (Vulgate) [“Even as the Son of man is not come to be ministered unto, but to
minister, and to give his life a redemption for many.” (Douay-Rheims translation)].
Greek theologians such as Irenaeus, Origen and Gregory of Nyssa had asked to whom
that ransom should be paid, and answered that since the Devil had possession of mankind
justly as a result of the original sin, in order to free mankind and do justice to the Devil,
God had to offer Christ as a ransom. 13 Their view was that God was tricking the Devil
because, although Christ’s performing of miracles had convinced the Devil that he was
worth more than mankind, the Devil did not understand that Christ’s divinity meant that
he could not be held by the Devil. In this theory, there is also an implicit assumption that
God has respect for the Devil’s ‘right of possession’ of mankind, separate to his rights of
power over them arising from the original sin, since God insists on treating the Devil
‘justly’ in removing mankind from his possession, even after Christ’s suffering and death
had negated the consequences of the original sin.

Book 13, chapter 15 of the De

Trinitate, explains:
In hac redemptione tanquam pretium pro nobis datus est sanguis Christi, quo
accepto diabolus non ditatus est, sed ligatus: ut nos ab ejus nexibus solveremur,
13
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nec quemquam secum eorum quos Christus ab omni debito liber indebite fuso suo
sanguinne redemisset, peccatorum retibus involutum traheret ad secundae ac
sempiternae mortis exitium 14 [“In this redemption, the blood of Christ was given
as the price for us, by the acceptance of which the Devil was not enriched but
bound, in order that we might be loosed from his bonds and in order that he might
not draw with himself to the ruin of a second and everlasting death any of those
enmeshed in the webs of sin whom Christ, being free from all debt, redeemed by
the pouring out of his own blood which was not owed.”] 15
The use of the vocabulary of ‘the ransom theory’ -‘redemptio’ and ‘pretio’ – was a focus
of attention for late medieval commentators who felt that this confused the two theories.
However, Marx argues convincingly that ‘the Augustinian formulation is ambiguous: as
redemption is used here it seems to refer to the redemption in its widest sense, not just the
freeing of humanity from the Devil. The blood of Christ was the price of the redemption;
that is, the death of Christ was the means whereby humanity was reconciled to God and
freed from the power of the Devil.” 16

In this reading of Augustine, the redemption is

primarily concerned with the reconciliation of mankind with God and only secondarily
with the defeat of the Devil.
Aers takes up an understanding of Augustine’s focus being the reconciliation of
mankind with God, and emphasizes the Christology at the heart of this idea. 17 He points
to Augustine’s observation that he wrote De Natura et Gratia to “defend grace, not as
opposed to nature, but as that through which nature is liberated and controlled,” 18 in
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combination with his argument in Nature and Grace that “if righteousness comes about
through nature, then Christ died in vain” to show the importance to Augustine of Christ’s
role in the redemption. Augustine goes on to say that if, as Christians believe, Christ did
not die in vain, then humanity is justified and redeemed by “the mystery of Christ’s
blood.”

19

For Augustine, the sacrament of Christ is at the heart of Mankind’s

redemption: “the words of God [Scripture] make it perfectly clear that, apart from
community with Christ, no one can attain eternal life and salvation.” 20 Aers reads
Augustine’s City of God as a state of mind to be expressed both internally, in the turning
of a mind to God, and externally, by a mind being ‘indifferent to the customs, laws, and
institutions of the earthly city in which it lives,’ involving ‘not inward emigration but
dissent.’ 21

Acts that tie the faithful to God are “acts of “compassion” involving

neighbors and self, inseparably collective and individual, offered to Christ, the
community’s “great Priest” (X.6) [Augustine, The City of God against the Pagans 22].
They constitute and build up the city that is the Church, the body of Christ.” 23 In Aers
understanding of Augustine, the Devil is truly insignificant in the redemption. He is
merely the jailer who the penitent must see past to turn to Christ, before Christ leads him
down the path of salvation. Until the sinful understand that there is more to life than the
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earthly concerns of the rule of self and submit themselves to be guided by Christ in their
actions, they are a part of the “kingdom of death” (CG XXII.29).
Accepting Aers’ reading would place Augustine firmly on the side of the “devil’s
rights theory” through his foregrounding of the role of Christ and minimalizing of the
power of the devil. As many writers have investigated 24, it was the work of Anselm, Cur
Deus Homo, that provided the first treatise on the subject of the redemption along with
significant changes in the accepted understanding of its working. Anselm points out the
logical fallacies in three strands of the ‘Devil’s rights’ theory: firstly, the suggestion that
God would deceive anyone misrepresents his divine nature:
Nam etsi veritas non omnibus se manifestat, nulli tamen se negat. Ergo, domine,
nec ut falleres nec ut aliquis se falleret, sic fecisti; sed ut faceres quod et
quomodo faciendum erat, in vertiate per omnia perstitisti. [Though truth does not
reveal itself to everyone, it denies itself to no one. Therefore, O Lord, you acted
thus neither to deceive nor induce deception in others. But that you might do
what had to be done in a particular manner, you stood firm in the truth at all time]
(Meditatio Redemptionis 42-45; Opera 2.3.85); 25
secondly, man cannot put rules on God and suggest that he is governed by any law other
than his own so there can be no ‘right of possession’ over any of God’s creatures:
An aliqua necessitas coegit ut altissimus sic se humiliaret, et omnipotens ad
faciendum aliquid tantum laboraret? Sed omnis necessitas et impossibilitas eius
subiacet voluntati. Quippe quod vult necesse est esse, et quod non vult
impossibile est esse. Sola igitur voluntate, et quoniam voluntas eius semper bona
est, sola hoc fecit bonitate. [Did some necessity force the Most High thus to
debase himself or the Most Powerful to struggle so hard to accomplish some end?
Is not all necessity and impossibility subject to his will? Surely, what he wishes
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must happen, and what he does not wish is impossible. Therefore, it was by his
will alone.... for there was no compulsion for God to save the human race in this
manner.] (Meditatio Redemptionis 59-64; Opera 2.3.86.); 26
and lastly, there is an impossible legal dualism implied in a bargain between God and
the Devil:
Cum autem diabolus aut homo non sit nisi dei et neuter extra potestatem dei
consistat: quam causam debuit agere deus cum suo, de suo, in suo. [Since the
devil, or man, can only be God’s creatures, and neither may exist outside the
power of God, how should God engage in a lawsuit on behalf of one of his own,
concerning one of his own, and against one of his own?] (Cur Deus Homo 1.7;
Opera 1.2:56-57). 27
Instead of Augustine’s ‘Devil’s rights theory’, Anselm understands the defeat of
the Devil in terms of righting the insult to God which was the effect of the Fall. The
great ease with which Mankind turned away from God must be matched by an equally
great difficulty in order to right that wrong. Thus, the death and suffering of Christ, in his
mortal form the most worthy of all mankind, is the only price high enough to atone for
original sin:
Si homo per suavitatem peccavit: an non convenit ut per asperiatatem satisfaciat?
Et si tam facile victus est a diabolo ut deum peccando exhonoraret, ut facilius no
posset: nonne iustum est ut homo satisfaciens pro peccato tanta difficultate vincat
diabolum ad honorem dei, ut maiori non possit? An non est dignum quatenus, qui
se sic abstulit deo peccando, ut se plus auferre non posset, sic se det deo
satisfaciendo, ut magis se non possit dare?” [If humanity sinned with ease, is it no
proper that it make satisfaction with difficulty? And if humanity was conquered
by the Devil so easily that it could not more easily dishonour God by sinning, is it
not just that humanity, in making satisfaction unto God for sin, should experience
the greatest possible difficulty in overcoming the Devil, to the honour of God? Is
it not worthy that humanity who has thus separated itself from God by sinning so
that it could not separate itself further should give itself to god in satisfaction to
such an extent that it cannot give itself more?] 28
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In this formulation, the defeat of the Devil is an integral part of the redemption because it
is so closely related to the dishonoring of God manifested in the Fall. The justice of
God’s treatment of the Devil is not related to any right of possession, or any other right
that the Devil might be thought to have had, but rather is a fair punishment for the Devil
for his part in the fall. The Devil’s treason means that it is only right that he should have
mankind removed from his power:
Cum autem diabolus aut homo non sit nisi dei et neuter extra potestatem dei
consistat: quam causam debuit agere deus cum suo, de suo, in suo, nisi ut servum
suum puniret, qui suo conservo communem dominum deserere et ad se transire
persuasisset, ac traditor fugitivum, fur furem cum furto domini sui suscepisset?
Uterque namque fur erat, cum alter altero persuadente se ipsum domino suo
furabatur. Quid enim iustius fieri posset, si hoc deus faceret? [However, since
neither the Devil nor humanity belongs to anyone but God, and neither exists
without the power of God, what cause ought God to try with his own creature
except to punish his own servant [i.e. the Devil] who had persuaded his fellow
servant [suo conservo, i.e. humanity] to desert the common lord and to come over
to him and as a traitor, took a fugitive, as a thief, took a thief with what had been
stolen from his own lord? For each one was a thief, since one stole himself from
his lord when the other persuaded him. For, what could be more just than for God
to do this?] 29
For Anselm therefore, the Devil is a servant of God, a jailer who must follow God’s laws
alongside all of God’s creatures. His treasonous deception and theft is therefore subject
to the same punishment meted out to anyone breaking God’s laws. He holds mankind in
hell by God’s permission only and that permission can be removed at any time that man
has been reconciled with God.
The contemporaneous writing of Hugh of St. Victor (d.1142) includes his
description of the redemption in De Sacramentis, book 1, part 8, De Reparatione
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Hominis 30 and, in many respects, Hugh views the redemption in a similar framework to
that of Anselm: the Devil is permitted to hold humanity because of the original sin so
mankind’s captivity is just, but, at the same time, the Devil holds humanity unjustly
because of his part in the original sin:
…quia diabolus nunquam meruit ut hominem sibi subjectum premeret, sed homo
meruit per culpam suam ut ab eo premi permitteretur ….Juste ergo subjectus est
homo diabolo quantum pertinet ad culpam suam: injuste autem quantum pertinet
ad diaboli fraudulentiam. [..while the Devil never served to hold humanity subject
to him, humanity, because of his sin, deserved to be allowed to be held by him
(the Devil). Therefore, humanity was justly subject to the Devil because of its
own sin; however, the Devil because of hi deceit, held humanity unjustly.] 31
Contrary to Anselm, however, Hugh sees Mankind as being subject to the power of the
Devil and in need of a patron by whose power the Devil can be brought to trial. The need
for satisfaction in order to free Mankind follows from this thinking:
Si igitur homo talem patronum haberet cujus potentia diabolus in causam adduci
posset, just dominio ejus homo contradiceret; quia nullam diabolus justam
causam habuit quare sibi jus in homine vindicare debuerit. Patronus autem
nullus talis inveniri poterat nisi solus Deus, sed Deus causam hominis suscipere
noluit, quia homini adhuc pro culpa sua iratus fuit. Oportuit ergo ut prius homo
Deum placaret, et sic deinde Deo patrocinante cum diabolo causam iniret. [If
humanity had such a patron by whose power the Devil could be brought to trial,
humanity might with justice oppose the dominion of the Devil, since the Devil
had no just cause by which he should lay claim to a right over it. However, no
such patron could be found except God alone, but God did not wish to take up
humanity’s cause because He (God) was still angry with human kind because of
sin. Therefore it was necessary that humanity first placate God and then, with
God acting as patron, humanity could take up its cause against the devil.] 32
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Hugh does not suggest that the Devil has any rights of possession over Mankind but does
see his power over Mankind as dependant on a state of sin. For Hugh, more than
Anselm, the redemption is an act of Mercy on God’s part so the concepts of justice and
Mercy are inextricably linked.
In a separate commentary, Adnot. In quosdam Psalmos David, Hugh describes the
Virtues’ debate before God. 33 That it was a common subject for commentary at this time
is clear from the fact that it can also be found in sermons attributed to St. Bernard 34,
Werner von Ellersbach (Abbot of St. Blasien) 35, Peter Comestor 36 and Stephen of
Tournay37 as well as in an English tract on Vices and Virtues 38, and two pieces of French
dramatic verse. Most extensively, the same allegoric expansion is developed in Robert
Grosseteste’s Chasteau d’Amour written in Anglo-Norman sometime between 1230 and
1253 39 and translated into Middle English in whole or in part in at least four versions, the
closest of which was known in its English translation as the Castle of Love. The central
theme of the Chasteau is the redemption with the first part of the story told through the
allegory of the debate of the four daughters of God. Marx has shown that the early work
of Sajavaara claiming that Grosseteste conceived the redemption in terms of the ‘Devil’s
rights’ does not explain those parts of his thinking indicated by his other writings and
33
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sermons contained in his Dictum 10 (or Sermo 44) 40 where Grosseteste uses Anselm’s
master-servant analogy for the relationship between God and the Devil. Even though he
describes Christ as a buyer paying a price to God for humanity’s freedom and then also to
the Devil for humanity’s release, he is not following the ransom theory of Gregory of
Nyssa et al because the ransom is paid to God, not the Devil, in order that Mankind might
be reconciled with God, which is consistent with Augustine and the patristic writers’
formulation of the death of Christ being the price of redemption.

The result is that in

Dictum 10, Grosseteste appears to be blending both patristic and Anselmian strands of
theological explanation of the redemption.
In the Chasteau, the redemption is understood again in the terms of the masterservant relationship where God is the king, Christ his son, and the four virtues his
daughters. The main source for this version of the redemption is the Latin Rex et
Famulus sermon 41 but Grosseteste adds the need for Mankind to find someone to take up
his cause. Man is a servant who has disobeyed the king, and the Devil is his jailer. Since
Man has lost his freedom he cannot plead in court but needs a patron (patronus),
someone who is free, to plead for him and give satisfaction, an idea which may have been
drawn from the writings of Hugh of St. Victor mentioned earlier. However, there is an
important difference from Grosseteste’s main sources, and from Hugh of St. Victor,
which is Mercy’s plea that Mankind should be released because he was deceived into the
fall. This idea was a part of the justification for the redemption in the writings of
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Gregory of Nyssa, Irenaeus and Augustine while those texts following in the Anselmian
tradition took it one step further to argue that the deception nullified the Devil’s rights of
possession. Since Mercy’s speech suggests that she sees no further reason why Mankind
should not be returned to God, Grosseteste is following the later view:
Kar oez donkes ma preere,
Pur cel dolent, cheitif prison,
Ke venire peust a rancon,
Ke en mi ses enemis
Avez en grief prison mis,
Ki par premesse li trairent
Par unt trespasser li firent,
La premsess li fauserent
Kar fauseté lur seit rendu
E le prison a mei rendu (Chasteau, ll 260-270) 42
[Therefore, now hear my prayer for this pitiful wretched prisoner so that he, whom you
have placed amongst his enemies in terrible prison, might have the benefit of ransom.
His enemies betrayed him with a promise whereby they caused him to sin; they perverted
the promise for him because they always sought falseness, and their falseness may be
repaid and the prisoner returned to me.]
This is consistent with Christ’s response to the Devil’s later claim that he has rights over
Mankind because of the original agreement that Mankind should come under his power
as a result of original sin. Christ counters the Devil’s claims with the Anselmian view
that the deception of the Devil at the fall negated the agreement then so he never held
Mankind by right but only at God’s will:
Li covenanz fu bien tenu,
Meis tu primes le enfreinsistes,
Kant en traison li desistes:
‘Tu ne murras pas pur tant
Einz serez cum Deu sachant”?
De le fet fustes Acheson,
Ores esgardez donc reson,
Veus tu del covenant joir
Kant covenant ne veus tenir? (Chasteau ll.1040-48)
[The covenant was well maintained, but was it not you who broke it first when you in an
act of treason said to him, “You will not die because of this but will be wise like God?”
42

Quoted and translated by Marx, 68-69.
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You were the cause of what happened. Now then you see the reason. Do you want to
enjoy the benefits of the covenant when you are not able to maintain it?]
In a further following of Anselmian theology, the ransom to which Mercy refers is not to
be paid to the jailor Devil but to the King, i.e. God. Significantly, the Devil plays no part
in this transaction since the ransom was the price of reconciliation of Mankind with God
alone. The pseudo-Bonaventuran Meditationes Vitae Christi offered a description of the
four daughters of God debating the significance of Christ’s birth and death in similar
terms.
In Langland’s framing of the debate of the four daughters of God, just as in the
Chasteau, Mercy argues for the redemption on the basis of the Devil’s deception of
humanity at the fall, and Peace’s role is expanded to include a prophecy of the
redemption, and a reworking of the idea of the purpose of the fall being that having
experienced evil Mankind might better understand good.

Langland then proceeds to

follow the Augustinian ‘Devil’s rights’ theory of the redemption through Lucifer’s claim
that the only way Christ can take humanity is by overpowering him because he holds
Mankind by right:
If he reve me of my right, he robbeth me by maistrie;
For by right and by reson the renkes that ben here
Body and soule beth myne, bothe goode and ille.
For hymself seide, þat Sire is of heuene,
If Adam ete þe Appul alle sholde deye
And dwelle wiþ vu deueles; þis þretynge dri3ten made.

(B.XVIII: l276-281)

His argument is that since the law that God set down to Adam and Eve was that if Adam
were to eat the apple then all people would die and he, Lucifer, would have possession of
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their souls, then a strict adherence to God’s own decree will not permit him from taking
back those souls by force alone (ll B.XVIII.283-4). His second strand of argument is that
since he has had possession of man’s soul for seven thousand winters, he has the rights
associated with long possession:
‘And siþen I was seised seuene þousand winter
I leeue þat lawe nyl no3t lete hym þe leeste.’ (B.XVIII.1283-4)
Both of these arguments can also be found in the Chasteau and Hugh of St. Victor’s
debate between God and the Devil.

However, Gobelyn points out to Lucifer the

Anselmian view that
‘God wol noght be bigiled … ne byjaped.
We have no trewe title to hem [the souls], for thorugh treson were thei dampned.’
(B.XVIII.291-2).
The same rebuttal of any claim to rights over mankind the Devil might claim is taken up
by Christ when he enters Hell which suggests that Langland was arguing against the
patristic ideas of the Devil’s rights of possession and the requirement that God treat the
Devil justly. The theological problems arise when Langland uses the weak form of the
Devil’s rights theory alongside the more modern formulation of Anselm.
What is clear from looking at the different strands of redemption ideology is that
there were major theological differences about the harrowing of hell. As Richard Firth
Green explains so fully, 43 Langland provides no coherent theological dogma of the
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covenant because there was no agreed dogma on which he could rely. 44 Langland
appears to follow the “Devil’s rights” theory of the covenant while orthodox theologians
of his time were following Anselm’s rebuttal of this theory some three hundred years
previously.

Green suggests that the reason for this literary use of pre-Anselmian

soteriology may be that an active God who will go into battle on behalf of mankind is
psychologically more appealing than a God who neither gives nor respects rights 45;
while that God may never break his word, he will also let mankind battle alone with the
devil, neither party having any more rights than the other to his notice. A God who
confronts the Devil for man’s soul is certainly more dramatic; in Piers Plowman, that
drama is acknowledged by Will’s witnessing of the harrowing of hell, and then rushing
dramatically to Mass when he awakes from his dream on Easter morning, overwhelmed
with a new understanding of the importance of Christ’s role in his redemption.
This is a problem going back to the covenant itself. As McGrath illustrates, “any
covenant theology runs the risk of diminishing God’s spontaneous graciousness and of
making God appear under an obligation to man.” 46 Nevertheless, it is natural for humans
to want something to reassure them that salvation is possible for them, and a promise, a
“troth,” from a trustworthy God is suitably comforting, even as logic simultaneously
demands that an omnipotent God is not fettered in any way. Clearly, the two positions
are diametrically opposed - and as they sit at the heart of the religious questions Langland
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is addressing, it is not surprising that there are problems in some of the legal metaphors
he is trying to negotiate.
So does mankind have rights to salvation or not? Langland seems to think so, for
Pacience tells Haukyn: “Forthi al poore that pacient is, may [asken and cleymne], / After
hir engynge here, heveneriche blisse” (B.XIV.260-261). This is what the dreamer spends
the central part of the poem trying to understand when he looks at the idea of baptism as a
contract. Green puts the dilemma clearly:
Dowel, the argument runs, is either possible for sinful humanity or it is not. If it
is not, how can God justly enter into a contract whose fulfillment is impossible?
If it is, how can God justly deny salvation to the virtuous unbaptized, since those
who respect a contract that is not even formally binding on them might be argued
to be more virtuous than those who are legally obliged to respect its terms? The
first horn of this covenantal dilemma threatens to undermine the importance of
good works, the second the sacrament of baptism. 47
Eventually, again, the legal problem comes down to a religious question unclear in the
Bible. Is it faith or good works or a combination of the two that is needed to get into
heaven, or are these irrelevant as predestination has already chosen those whose names
are written in the book that will evidence the ultimate contract on the Day of Judgment?
Is the only way to be sure of salvation to throw oneself on God’s mercy? Marx sees the
Anselmian tradition as the historical theological context for all of Langland’s choices but
is there another framework that might provide a more cohesive answer?

A legal frame for the redemption
Since Langland has chosen a legal vocabulary through which to portray the
redemption, can the redemption be explained in contemporary legal terms? Green has
shown the logical and legal impossibility of having mankind both as party to the dispute,
47
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the plaintiff who is championed, and the object of the dispute, the fee in demand, and he
also shows in great and clear detail many more legal problems – both logical and
procedural – that arise because “weak forms of the devil’s rights theory, in which
Lucifer’s title to humanity is shown to be unfounded (B.18:286-92), stand alongside
strong forms, in which Christ is reduced to trickery in order to outwit his opponent.”48
As Alford has shown, the common law theories of property rights are not much help
either: 49 Viewed through the lens of the laws surrounding feudal rights, because of the
original sin, Man, through his agent, Adam, has put himself in the analogous position of a
serf in bondage to the Devil because of the biblical law in John 7:34 that “Whosoever
committeth sin is a servant of sin.” Under this relationship, whilst he can deal as a free
man with others, against the Devil’s claims, Man has no rights at all: he cannot buy his
freedom because everything he owns belongs to his lord; he cannot appeal to a court of
law for his freedom because the appeal would not be against the Devil but against the law
that put him in bondage in the first place. Thus the legal analogy demands a third party
to intercede if man is ever to be freed, and that third party must be God since only a free
man, i.e. someone not descended from Adam, or someone not a servant of the Devil
because of some other sin, would have locus standi, the right to bring an action, to be
heard in court.

As Alford puts it, by this theory ‘the Incarnation became a legal

necessity.’ 50

48

Ibid., 362.

49

“Literature and Law in Medieval England.” PMLA 92 (1977): 943-946.

50

Ibid., 944.

85

However, although Christ has theoretical locus to pursue his legal title to man
(now reduced to the status of property), under the common law he would fall foul of the
land law tenet of ‘seisin’ or ‘possession,’ which stated that the person in possession of a
property had a proprietary right to it unless anyone could prove an older right. Since the
statute of limitations on this right prevented anyone challenging a title predating the reign
of Richard I in 1189, just two hundred years previously, legal custom would leave
possession with the Devil, since he had possession of mankind for seven thousand years.
Strict adherence to the rights enshrined in the letter of the law would not enable Christ to
regain his property.
It would only be with an appeal to the King’s sense of justice, his ‘reason,’ in the
court of equity that Christ might have purchase.

Birnes suggests that Langland is

referencing the ‘new’ law of equity to reflect the developments in the law during the
reigns of Edward III and Richard II. He argues that “Christ, as the bringer of the New
Law, demonstrates that Lucifer’s trickery constituted an injustice under the Old Law, and
the New Law, equity, because it concerns itself with the spirit of justice, can remedy the
injustice and release man from Hell.” 51
However, Alford points out that the contemporary law on deceit which deemed a
claim invalid if possession had been obtained through fraud allowed the plaintiff only to
recover damages and not possession, so does not fit the circumstances of the redemption.
Furthermore, the principle of good faith on which that law was based was not a feature of
the English civil law but rather of the canon law which followed the Roman law principle
that time ran on a transaction only “if the possessor had acquired under a justus titulus …
51
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and was in good faith at the beginning of his possession.’ 52 Langland’s construction of
the redemption passage therefore seems neither to be following a particular theological or
legal framework. How then can Christ be saying that he comes to fulfill the law?

The need for ‘right’ and ‘reason’ to fulfill the law
Christ argues that he will ransom his lieges by ‘right’ and ‘reason.’ Although the
MED shows that right and reson were used in common parlance in conjunction with each
other, it is clear from Langland’s use of them separately at the heart of his poem that their
individual meanings were important. Reason appears in Langland as ‘Reson’ but the
most common forms found in the Year Books also include raison and reason.
Furthermore, ‘ratio’ is often translated as reason 53. The Oxford English Dictionary and
Middle English Dictionary show that reason’s primary meaning is the intellectual faculty
and its use, sensible judgment, good sense, logical consideration and speculation. Its
connection to wisdom and good judgment can be seen in the phrases ‘in (of) his resoun’ –
in his mind, and its opposite ‘oute of resoun’ – out of one’s mind with fury, beside
oneself; in ‘resoun willeth’ - reason requires and ‘resoun wil excusen’ – good sense will
excuse; and, ‘in his resoun’ – in his wisdom. 54

In the same vein therefore, ‘ayen(es)

resoun’ meant foolish, unreasonable or wrong or madly or senselessly.
Reason was also used to denote an action or proceeding agreeable to reason, that
which is reasonable. It includes an understanding of that which is right, proper or
52
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customary. Thus to ‘ben no resoun’ was to be wrong, foolish or unreasonable while to
‘bringen to resoun’ was to bring someone to behave reasonably, to ‘heren resoun’ – to
take a reasonable view of something. Importantly, this meaning includes the idea of
doing right or justice. So to ‘don resoun and right’ was to treat (sb.) properly, to do right
by them and ‘bi resoun min ouen,’ meant by virtue of my own sense of right. In this
vein, to ‘don resoun’ was to do justice and to ‘haven resoun’ to obtain satisfaction for a
grievance. To ‘haven (right and) resoun’ was another way of saying to have justice,
common parlance separating the two terms as Langland does.
Another use of reason was as an account or a reckoning: to ‘asken (don, setten) to
resoun’ was to call to account or question; to ‘don resoun’ meant to render an account
and to ‘putten to resoun’ to call to account; to ‘yeven resoun’ was to account for one’s
actions to somebody. In this same line of thinking ‘resoun’ could also be used to indicate
income or revenue, or compensation or payment for services rendered. Thus it could be
used to indicate a miller’s measure and it is similarly appropriate as an underlying theme
when Christ uses it at the harrowing of hell, for he too is demanding a reckoning or
accounting.
More generally, resoun might be used to mean speech, talk or discourse so that
‘setten a resoun’ meant to engage in talk, to be ‘ful of resoun’ was to be argumentative
and to ‘yelden resoun’ was to offer a defense. A reason might be a story, narrative or
tale, or an account or report. It might also be a riddle or a proposal, plan or scheme or
indicate a petition or request. In medicine it was a recipe for compounding a medicine.
These many significations of ‘resoun’ are reflected in the number of changing
ways in which Langland uses the term throughout the poem. When Anima tells Will that
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“It were ayeins kynde,’ .. ‘and alle kynnes reson
That any creature sholde konne al, except Crist oon.’ (B.XV.53),
he acknowledges that there are many kinds of reasons and many ways of construing the
term. Importantly, as we shall see, it is Christ alone, who can expect to know everything.
Most simply, Langland uses Reson simply to mean argument: in Passus II Holi Chirche
warns Will against Mede saying that he will only need to ‘put forth thi reson’ for turning
away from her when ‘Leaute be Justice / And have power to punysshe hem [Mede, Fals
Fikel-tonge, and Lieres].’ (B.II.48-49); and similarly, in Passus X, Dame Studie refers to
clerkes who ‘bryngen forth a balled reson’ in trying to work out the nature of God.
Likewise, sober, serious arguments are described in Passus XV as ‘sadde reson.’ 55
It is only late in the poem, in Passus XV, that Anima quotes Isidore of Seville’s
Etymologies to explain that
‘whan I deme domes and do as truthe techeth,
Thanne is Racio my righte name – “reson” on Englissh’;
i.e. Reason is the soul’s capacity to make moral judgments. However, by this point in the
poem, that has not been consistently apparent. At the beginning of that same Passus, Will
had been raving in ‘that folie’ of trying to ‘knowe what was Dowel’ ‘Til reson hadde
ruthe on me and rocked me aslepe.’ Here reson brings about an end to his raving and a
return to order. This use of ‘reson’ as order is a frequent theme: For example, Holi
Chirche enumerates the three things that men need to live saying that she will ‘rekene
hem by reson’ 56 so that Will can declare them later. Nevertheless, just a few lines later
Holi Chirche reminds Will of the gospel teaching to render to Caesar that which belongs
55
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to Caesar and to God the things that are God’s (Mt. 22:21) ‘For rightfully Reson sholde
rule yow alle’ (B.I.54). This is not so clear as it could be glossed both as ‘it is right that
you should all be ruled by Reson i.e. the letter of the law’ and also as ‘you should be
ruled by the letter of the law in so far as it enforces what is right i.e. moral.’ In this
instance, the personified Reson could require that the additional element of morality to be
added to questions of order and judgment. Likewise, in line 94, Holi Chirche says that
‘Kynges and knyghtes sholde kepe it by reson’ but again it is not clear what the pronoun
now refers to which impacts the meaning of reson. If the ‘it’ refers back to Treuthe
which is the main subject of Holi Chirche’s speech, the many aspects of Christianity that
can be described as Christian truths are possible referenced subjects, and moral
judgments can be added to the meaning of the phrase i.e. the kings and knights should act
according to Christian teachings. Alternatively and more specifically, the subject of the
previous use of the ‘it’ pronoun is the Gospel of Luke’s claim of the divinity of God so if
this is the referenced subject the Kings and knights would be guarding against nonbelievers. The situation is only complicated by the following lines: Holi Chirche goes on
to say that they should
‘Riden and rappen doun in reaumes aboute
And taken transgressores and tyen hem fast
Til treuthe hadde ytermyned hire trespass to the ende.’
which could reference either a general duty to maintain order in the kingdom or a more
specific duty to uphold Christianity throughout the realm. Is Langland referencing order,
Christianity, the divinity of God or biblical law, or all of the above in his ‘reson’?
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In Passus III, Conscience separates the concepts of right and reson in describing
the actions of the good King David in the Bible when he praises werkes that are done
both ‘with right and with reson’ behind them. 57

‘Reson’ has taken on the role of

representative of the civil law while ‘right’ represents the moral code or canon law. The
ideas are related but separate. Conscience then says:
I, Conscience, know this for kynde Wit it me taughte –
That Reson shal regne and reaumes governe. (B.III.284.)
The term Reson seems to have switched back to denote a moral judgment that was not
included before. Similarly, when Will is speaking to Scripture in Passus XI, he argues
that
though a Creisten man coveited his Cristendom to reneye,
Rightfully to reneye no reson it wolde.’ [Even though a Christian wanted to
renounce his Christianity, there is no reason that would allow him to renounce it]
(B.XI.125-6).
This implies that Reason would be making a moral judgment, but Will then extends his
argument with a legal metaphor that bases itself firmly in civil land law:
For may no cherl chartre make, ne his c[h]atel selle
Withouten leve of his lord - no lawe wol it graunte.’ (B.XI.127-8)
The comparison of the lapsed Christian with the villein who has left his manor cleverly
conflates civil and biblical laws through its emphasis on the similar result in both, i.e. that
neither Christian nor villein can escape his debt because he will be followed by Civil law,
in the form of Reason, and divine law, in the form of Conscience:
‘Ac Reson shal rekene with hym and rebuken hym at the laste,
57

B.III.239.
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And Conscience acounte with hym and casten hym in arerage,
And putten hym after in prison in purgatorie to brenne
For his arerages rewarden hym there right to the day of dome.’ (B.XI.131-2)
Contrastingly, ‘reson’ next appears in the discussion between Haukyn and
Pacience now representing the letter of divine law, a sort of divine formalism. Pacience
says that at their day of reckoning,
the poore dar plede, and preve by pure reson
to have allowaunce of his lord; by the lawe he it cleymeth.’ (B.XIV.108)
At this point, reson appears to represent the arguments made by Jesus that the poor shall
inherit the kingdom of heaven (Matthew 5:3, Luke 6:20), ie. now to refer to biblical law.
Alford suggests that the best way to make sense of all of these meanings is to
understand the idea of reason within the concept of ‘Truth.’ He points to Augustine’s
understanding of divine or natural law as “truth” in De vera religione: ‘Transcending our
minds a law appears and this is called Truth.’ 58 He notes that since the Bible itself used
the term veritas often to signify justice – see for example Romans 2:2: ‘Scimus enim
quoniam iudicium Dei est secundum veritatem in eos qui talia agunt’ (Vulgate) [For we
know that the judgment of God is, according to truth, against them that do such things] 59
– by the medieval period, Augustine’s understanding that veritas referred to justice had
become a commonplace. It appears with this reference in the letters of Gregory VII and
Urban II and has a prominent place in Gratian’s Decretum and hence in canon law.
58

J. –P. Migne, ed., Patrilogiae … Cursus Completus, Series secunda (Latina), 34:147 quoted by John
Alford, “The Idea of Reason in Piers Plowman”, Medieval English Studies Presented to George Kane:
202; cf for a description of Aquinas’ use of the same idea see Ibid., 202, n15.

59

Douay-Rheims Translation.
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Moreover, the link of Christ with the law and truth was prominent because of
Augustine’s understanding of Christ’s words in John 14:6 ‘ego sum veritas’ [I am the
Truth]. The result of this understanding of the concept of truth is that it is ultimately a
function of the intellect rather than a command of the will since the natural law is an
instinctive function of the intellect 60. Only an understanding of reason as the revealer of
natural law and divine order makes sense of all of reason’s meanings. It is both that
which is understood and that which understands. Man’s reason is what enables him to
understand God’s grace.
Aers unites these ideas in his work on Augustine’s Christology and the symbolism
of Langland’s allegoric use of the parable of the Good Samaritan by showing how
Langland emphasizes the importance of grace in his retelling of the parable. When Will
is in conversation with Faith and Hope (in the forms of Abraham and Moses
respectively), confused as to whether he should follow the law of the Old or New
Testament, they see a man
‘wounded, and with theves taken.
He myghte neither steppe ne stande, ne stere foot ne handes,
Ne helpe himself smoothly, for semyvif he semed,
And as naked as a needle, and noon help abouten.’ (B.XVII.55-58)
Faith and Hope are appalled by the condition of this man and hurry by him since the
teachings they have been impressing upon Will cannot help this man. The man is only
half-alive, ‘semyvif’ (the “semivivo relicto” of Luke 10:30), and his inability to help
himself is emphasized by his immobility and nakedness. It is only Christ the Samaritan
who sees that without immediate treatment, ‘rise sholde he nevere,” and knows what to
60

See chapter 3 for a full explication of this idea.
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do. He immediately washes his wounds, lays him in his lap and takes him to a farmhouse
called lex Christi, (the law of Christ), where he pays for his treatment and promises more
payment on his return before hurrying “to Jerusalem the righte wey to ryde.” (B.XVII.81)
Aers illustrates how within the allegory,
“the Samaritan is both Jesus Christ and, as most exegetes also observed, “keeper”
[custos], the keeper of the weak. He comes as the essential mediator and
reconciler, bringing oil and wine for the endangered man: respectively pardon
given for the reconciliation of mankind and the “incitement to work fervently in
spirit,” or “the anointing of the chrism” and “sanctification” through the blood of
Christ’s passion…. This model for thinking about salvation and sin is profoundly
Christological, with a strong sense that the consequence of sin undermines the
natural, God-given powers of the soul and their due fulfillment, paradoxically,
once more, through the gifts of grace.” 61
It is important that the result of Will’s bearing witness to the Samaritan Christ is that he
follows after him, drawn to offer his service freely and so, finally, to find himself on the
road to redemption, the very model of a man drawn to Augustine’s City of God.

Aers

shows how Langland’s portrayal of the parable and then the harrowing of hell in these
terms emphasizes that only when the biblical law is understood within the context of
God’s grace and the salvation offered through Christ, will mankind be redeemed. It is
Mercy that is at the heart of the redemption story, Mercy at the heart of justice.
Aers’ reading of Augustine and his exegesis of the parable of the Good Samaritan
explains the emphasis created by Langland’s choice of a legal framework for the
harrowing of hell. Will has been seeking advice from all quarters as to how to find
salvation, aware that his instinctive understanding, his human reasoning or ‘kynde’
Reson, can only get him so far. He knows enough to know that he needs divine help and
seeks it through Holy Churche. He receives all that the earthly church can offer him in

61

Aers, 90-91.
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the form of instruction on the Old Testament law, on the life of Christ, on the Trinity
(from Abraham/Faith), on the new Testament command of love (from Moses/Hope) but
is still lost. He is semyvief because, despite his baptism, he is still separated from God by
the inherited iniquity of the Fall. As the debate of the four daughters of God reveals, a
rigid understanding of the law of the Old Testament leaves him suffering eternally. It is
Christ who brings salvation, in the form of ‘right’ and ‘reason.’ What Will’s own reason
could not show him, is, paradoxically, revealed through his turning to Christ instinctively.
Christ’s example inspires Will freely to turn and follow him, and so take the first step
towards redemption. Christ’s Mercy allows all of the meanings of ‘riht’ and ‘reason’ to
come together to save Mankind. An understanding of the grace of God, expressed
through Christ’s harrowing of hell, allows for Mankind to be dealt with justly. Just as
Man’s birthright is to inherit the sinfulness of the Fall, so too is it to inherit the possibility
of salvation in Christ.

Thus to redeem Mankind, Christ relies simultaneously on the

‘riht’ of the biblical law, of his place in the Trinity, of the justice of his Mercy and his
love, of Man’s birthright, as well as the ‘reason’ of the proper order, of justice, of a
reckoning for Mankind, of Man’s understanding of a renewed relationship with God, on
an unequivocably legal understanding of ‘reason.’
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Chapter 3: Reason in the courtroom: the origin of legal authority?

In order to see the issues Langland is working with in the poem through his
necessary framing of the redemption in legal terms, we must consider the authority of the
law, as well as, and in the context of, that of the poem. This chapter investigates the
theorists’ explanation of the basis for legal authority and compares it with the fourteenthcentury practitioners’ reality in the courtroom; it moves from an examination of the
practitioners’ approach to the theorists’ explication of the authority of the canon and
common law. It then examines the implications of legal practitioners’ understanding of
the relationship between ‘right’ and ‘reason’ for Langland’s framing of the redemption in
those same terms in Piers Plowman.

Legal authority in the courtroom
Given that there was relatively little written substantive secular law until the
fourteenth century, it is perhaps not surprising that there should have been little written
theorizing about it.

There is no fourteenth-century equivalent of Hansard or the court

reports, so the best the modern enquirer can do is collate judges’ comments from the rolls
and administrative documents of the courts. As I shall illustrate, this soon creates a
picture of judges who appreciated that upholding the law in a particular case might cause
an injustice or make a nonsense of the original intent of the drafters of the law, but who
nonetheless tried to find a way to act justly within the confines in which they found
themselves.
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The problems of interpretation were made all the more considerable for these
judges because they had such little precedent to work from. In the first part of the
century, Edward I’s legislation was still within living memory and the best Judges, like
Hengham, could interpret the statutes from memory: Hengham famously dismissed a
pleader attempting to rely on the Statute of Westminster II by saying: “Do not gloss the
statute, for we know better than you; we made it.” The next generation of judges,
however, were the first to be relying on a tradition of professional knowledge while, by
the time of Edward III, study of the statute itself was the only place from which the
intention of the law maker could be inferred. It was also the reign of Edward III that saw
the definition of what constituted a statute.

Plucknett convincingly repudiates the

doctrine of Coke that there was a fundamental distinction between a ‘statute’ and an
‘ordinance,’ to show that legislation passed by the council of magnates, and by
parliaments, was equally valid as law. 1 The effect of all of this was to muddy the waters
even further for the Judges, so that they felt at liberty to give themselves great leeway in
the application – or not – of a statute, most famously refusing to apply one on the grounds
that not even its maker would wish to put it into effect! At the other end of the scale,
contrary to the wording of the statute De Donis Conditionalibus, the courts decided to
interpret it as acting retroactively.
Interpretation became stricter in the years of 1340 and 1341, times of
constitutional crisis, but there was still great difficulty in negotiating the relation of
1

T. F. T. Plucknett, “Statutes and their Interpretation in the First Half of the Fourteenth Century.”
Cambridge Studies in English Legal History. Ed. H.D.Hazeltine (Cambridge UP, 1922). Tout gives two
useful examples of this when he notes that ‘two mere ‘household ordinances’ made by Edward I with the
council that happened to be with him, were universally called the “Statute of St. Albans” and the “Statute
of Woodstock” while, at the other end of the scale, “the administrative measures to enforce that rates of
wages before the Black Death were much more based upon the so-called “Ordinance of Labourers’ than on
the subsequent “Statute of Labourers.”” (Thomas. F. Tout, Chapters in the Administrative History of
Medieval England, 6 vols. (Manchester UP, 1920 – 33)).
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statutes to the common law and local custom, not to mention the increasingly obvious
need for a court of equity that arose from the new rigor in interpreting the law. Whereas
the modern lawyer can turn for authority to parliamentary legislation, the many types of
secondary legislation and the law reports, the fact that in the fourteenth century judges
were still debating whether they even needed to follow statutes shows how the early
common lawyers were still creating doctrine, and had yet to establish the idea of legal
precedents as a source of authority. Instead, they looked to a more fundamental type of
authority, ideas of right and wrong inevitably based on the teachings of the bible.
Legislators would use divine law as justification for enactments, while judges would talk
about ‘natural’ law which included distinct ideas of morality.
The paucity of details in the extant sources makes it difficult to know where to
start in developing an understanding of an individual’s philosophy.

However, an

examination of the records for the arguments of Sir William Shareshull 2, Chief Justice of
the King’s Bench from 1350 – 1361, bears particular fruit because of his historically
useful habit of reflecting colorfully on his personal and learning experiences in deciding a
case, many of which reflections have become part of the record. 3 Furthermore, because
of the frequency of these utterances, it has been possible to verify their accuracy from
outside sources 4 and establish that he had an excellent memory. Taking any comment or

2

For a biography of Shareshull see Bertha Haven Putnam, The Place in Legal History of Sir William
Shareshull, Chief Justice of the King’s Bench, 1350 – 1361. (Cambridge UP, 1950).

3

These quotes allow a glimpse of his personality whether in the polite but friendly terms with which he
addresses colleagues such as Cantebrigge: ‘Sir, jeo croy bien, car ceux Justices ne fuerunt auxi sages come
vous estes’ (Y.B. 6 Edw III, Pasch. pl.16.), or the sharp and scornful comments he makes to Pulteney: ‘It
will go to the winds, as does the greatest part of that which you say’ (R.S. Y.B. 17 Edw III, Mich. pl. 75
(p350). For many more colorful quotes from Shareshull see Puttnam 117.

4

See especially Chap 2, Professional Career in Puttnam. One example of many provided in the chapter is
the entry in RS Y16 Edw III (pt ii, Trin. Pl. 3 (p6): ‘When you [Pole] and I were apprentices and Sir W. de
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idea out of its time and context carries translation risks which is why I have looked for
the arguments of other lawyers, such as John Stonor, whose approaches are wellevidenced in surviving records. 5 Stonor was pleading in 1311 and made Judge by 1320
so he is older than Shareshull and may well have played a part in his training since
Puttnam shows that Shareshull’s student days probably lasted from 1305 – 1321. 6 These
years were spent observing the serjeants and judges of common pleas, one of whom
would have been Stonor.

Another judge of the same period about whom there is

relatively good extant information was Roger Hillary, who was about the same age as
Shareshull, from the same part of England, and was a close associate both as pleader, as
judge of common pleas and on circuits of assize. There is evidence of he and Shareshull
claiming rights of common through a tenancy in Walsall, and so tearing down a fence
together in Bloxwich in 1309. 7 While it is likely that they roomed together in London, it
is certain that they would have been seated in court together in ‘Le Crib’ – the section of
the court of common pleas set aside for apprentices-at-law after Bereford succeeded
Hengham as Chief Justice in 1309. 8

Since both men had similar experiences and

training, it is worth bearing in mind that it is likely that they might share ideas and added
weight should not be given to an idea solely because they both adhered to it. There is a

Herle and Sir J. Stonore were serjeants…’ From this, Haven Puttnam is able to confirm that the case in the
common pleas to which Shareshull referred must have been argued between 1311 when Stonor began to
plead and August or October of 1320 when Stonor and Herle received their first appointments to the bench.
5

Cf: Kingsford, C.L. Ed. The Stonor Letters and Papers, 1290 – 1483, Camden Soc. 3rd se. (1919) .

6

This would correspond with the sixteen years Fortescue specified as normal in De Laudibus Legum
Angliae6 some two hundred years later.

7

Staffordshire Historical Collections, Staffordshire Record Society x, 6-7 (case in King’s Bench)

8

It is Bereford whom Puttnam posits as a possible influence over the early studies of a young Shareshull
during his period of disgrace from 1290-1299.
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similar link between Shareshull and Stonor. Puttnam points to a case in which Shareshull
was arguing as a serjeant and Herle said ‘jeo die pur les joesnes qe voilont la nouel Leys
apprendre’ 9 (I say this for the young men who wish to learn the new laws’) as evidence
that Shareshull may have been trained under Herle in some of his early years at
Westminster.

She goes further to suggest that Shareshull’s agreement with the

fundamental principles of law as stated by Stonor, and his various references to his
apprenticeship days when Stonor was serjeant, suggest that he was also trained by Stonor
and that had this been the case, “it is possible that on their own appointment to the bench
[Herle and Stonor, in 1320] they had recommended to chief justice Bereford the
promotion to be serjeant-at-law of a promising apprentice.’ 10 The result is, again, that
agreements on approaches to the law and decisions on points of law are perhaps therefore
more likely, though that does not negate the weight of their agreement since all three
were independent and outspoken. In the course of his career, this led to Shareshull’s
being imprisoned from early December 1340 until May of 1342 on a charge of
maladministration by Edward III before his reinstatement as a Justice of common pleas,
and later, in March 1357, his excommunication by the Pope, for refusing to appear when
summoned to answer for a sentence he had delivered against Thomas Lisle, the Bishop of
Ely, for harboring a man who had slain a servant of Blanche, Lady Wake. Clearly, he
was not a man afraid of controversy.

9

Y.B. 5 Edw III, Trin. pl.48

10

Puttnam, 20; Puttnam also finds geographical support for her theory from the many connections between
Shareshull and Oxfordshire and the fact that Stonor’s house was there near the Buckinghamshire border, so
he may have advised the Purcells to use Shareshull in a large Buckinghamshire, Oxfordshire and
Staffordshire land case.
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A study of the arguments of these three men and their contemporaries in court
illuminates not only their decisions on specific points of law but also their approach to
the controversial legal issues of the day. Most importantly for the purposes of this
project, all three were concerned by the apparent distinction between law and justice
which did not balance with their personal legal doctrines. In 1345, Shareshull found
against an argument based on a previous decision of Bereford and Herle JJ saying: “One
has often heard speak of that which Bereford and Herle JJ did in such a case … but
nevertheless no precedent is of such force as that which is right” (‘mes nepurquant nulle
ensaumple est si forte comme resoun’). 11

Earlier, Bereford CJ had himself ignored

precedent in Whiteacre v Marmion when it was put to him that “One who was the King’s
nephew has before now advantaged himself of this law” to which he is noted to have
replied by quoting Sir Henry de Berth: “Our judgments are founded, not on precedents,
but on reason.” (non exemplis sed rationibus adiudicandem est.) 12 These two examples
show the judges relying on the terms ‘resoun’ and ‘ratio’ interchangeably. Their concern
at the inadequacies of the law to provide justice are apparent in comments such as that of
Stanton J who, relieved at the reaching of an agreement between the parties before him,
says “Well, it is for me that you are agreed, for this Court is relieved of much trouble.
For in justice, although you have good faith on your side, the law of the land would have
served you nought.” 13 Similarly, we see Stonor trying to find an explanation for a case in
which what was ‘right’ and what was lawful seemed opposing:

11

Y.B. 18 & 19 Edw 3. R.S.376-378.

12

Y.B. 8 Edw. 2. ff 273-4; 7 Edw. 2, S.S. xxxiv – xxxvi.

13

Y.B. 4 Edw. 2, S.S. 87.
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We see, on the one hand, that according to good conscience and the law of
God it would be contrary to what is right, if the plaintiff speaks the truth, that
by such a fine, which is void, he should be disinherited; and on the other hand,
it is a strong measure, having regard to the law of the land, to take an
averment which may annul the fine; wherefore we wish well to consider it. 14
A few years later, in 1343, he made a distinction between law and equity by saying: ‘et
jeo vous die bien qe Audita Querela est done plus dequite qe de comune ley, qar ore tarde
il ny avoit pas tiel suyte, et par cas la suyte est done forsqe al primer.’ 15
The clearest statement of his beliefs of the origins of law is found in a response to
Hillary’s 16 assertion that law ‘est volunte des justices’ – ‘the will of the justices.’ ‘Nanyl’
says Stonor, ‘ley est resoun.’ 17 Pike translates this as ‘right’ in this instance but in his
introductions to Y.B. 18 & 19 Edw III, p.xxvi, n.I and Y.B. 20 Edw III, pt.ii, p.lxxiv. he
translates it as reason. Shareshull repeatedly uses phrases such as ‘contrary to reason’
and ‘against law and reason’ 18 and it appears from their context that despite the
conjunction, he views the terms as linked entities. That this was a long held view for
Shareshull is evidenced by the fact that in pleadings many years before he became a
judge he argued that it would be ‘against reason’ 19 were a writ of trespass to be set aside
against all but one of the defendants due to an error in form and for that one defendant

14

R.S. Y.B. 13 Edw. III Mich, pl. 51 (p96).

15

R.S. Y.B. 17 Edw. III Pasch, pl. 24 (p370). “I tell you plainly that Audita Querela is given rather by
Equity than by Common Law, for quite recently there was no such suit, and possibly the suit is given only
to the first.’

16

Robert Hillary, contemporary of Shareshull and fellow student in ‘Le Crib’ (the section of the court of
common pleas set apart for the apprentices-at-law), appointed to the Irish bench in 1329 and later becoming
Chief Justice of the Court of common pleas.
17

R.S. Y.B. 19 Edw. III, Hil. Pl. 3 (p378).

18

See for example, inter alia, R.S.Y.B. 13 Edw III, Hil. Pl. 19 (p114); 16, Mich. Pl. 22 (342).

19

Y.B. 6 Edw III, Mich. pl. 7.
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then to be held liable for all of the damages. In this case, his pleadings request a
judgment contrary to a strict interpretation of the law. His opponent, Shardelow, simply
asserted that the law by its nature could not be unreasonable and pled in rebuttal: ‘It will
not be against reason, for it is law.’ 20 The basis of their argument over the correct use of
the word ‘reason’ was not the particulars of the plea they were arguing but their own
legal philosophies. Although they may have felt compelled to take a formalist line in
their decisions, they appeared to have all shared a legal philosophy of the law as a
‘natural’ system of justice trying to do what was ‘right.’
Whatever the fifteenth-century theorists might argue, it is an important feature of
the Year Books and legislation that explanations are given both for the developing
substantive law and the old customary law that overtly absorb moral arguments. Both
legislators and judges widely use the idea of a ‘divine’ or ‘natural’ law and explain
decisions in terms of ‘conscience’ and ‘reason.’ The theorists may be explaining the
authority of the law in terms of popular consent but the judges and practitioners are
considering their duties to their clients under the umbrella of moral judgment of right and
wrong. The judges can be seen trying to do justice. The competing factors in any
decision are evidenced in Bereford CJ’s comments in disallowing a technical plea to a
voucher in Gaunt v Gaunt: “Reason requires that you warrant him, and the law is
founded on reason, and good faith demands it.” 21 The first factor is reason, and the
second, good faith, but this is not faith in the written law of statute or precedent but rather
in the divine nature of justice.

20

Ibid.

21

Y.BB. 3 Edw. 2. S.S. 80; 2 & 3 Edw. 2, 33; 18 Edw 3, 308; 18 & 19 Edw. 3,60.
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At the heart of these opposing approaches is the question of the source of the
law’s authority. Although European medieval civilians and canonists had been discussing
theories of the origins and authority of law for a very long time, this was not true in
England until the fifteenth century, apart from some discussion in the work of Bracton
and Ockham at the middle of the thirteenth century. Thus, it is to the writing of the early
fifteenth-century lawyers that we must turn for an understanding of fourteenth-century
theory. As Norman Doe illustrates 22, these theorists – Bishop Reginald Pecock, writing
between 1443 and 1456 about the canon law, and the common law writers, John
Fortescue, writing between 1463 and 1471, Thomas Littleton (1422-81?) and Christopher
Saint German (1460? – 1540?) - examined two opposing sets of fundamental ideas about
the nature and authority of law. The ‘positivist’ theory of the law considers the law as an
autonomous device dependent on human will, composed of precepts and prohibitions,
with the sole purpose of dealing with dispute and injury. It is of human origin because its
power comes from the people’s consent to it and its goal is to order society in the way
that the majority of people choose. A law has power because of society’s consent to it,
irrespective of its moral quality. On the other hand, the same literature emphasizes the
connection between law and morality through the expression of the law in moral terms,
so the law is not only subordinate to morality but also incorporates morality into the
development of its substantive law. The common practice of explaining legislative and
judicial decisions in moral terms is widely evidenced in both the Year Books and
contemporary legislation.

22

Norman Doe, Fundamental Authority in late medieval English law. (Cambridge, Cambridge UP (1990).
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Positivism and naturalism are in direct opposition: the one has as its basis human
will, with authority relying on common consent, so usage and enactments shape the law –
the law is ‘posited’ by the legislature; the other relies upon a divine morality for its
authority, accepting rules as laws so long as they conform to an outside and abstract idea
of right and wrong. The distinction between these two theories of the origin of legal
authority reflects the reality of the practice of law in the fourteenth century. Legal
activity was divided between two distinct jurisdictions and sets of procedures, those of
the common and those of the canon law. Naturally, there was little problem with the
canon law having as the basis for its authority a direct relationship with the divine will.
The tensions arose rather in the common law where both theories were in place and the
judges were struggling to know which to apply at any given time.

The authority of canon law
The authority for canon law derives from its claim to be fulfilling God’s will on
earth. Taking the laws set out in the Bible as its starting point, medieval canon law was
well-established in a host of additional rules and ‘canons’ which included creeds,
doctrinal statements and theological discussions aiming to fill in the gaps of those
situations not clearly explained, or in come cases even covered, by the Biblical laws. In
the middle of the twelfth century, these rules and canons were collated by Gratian, a
Bolognese monk, in his Decretum, which attempted to categorize the canons within a
hierarchical scheme of authority descending from God to the Pope, his earthly
representative. The argument was that whatever the Pope decreed should be followed on
two theologically inconsistent grounds: firstly, the Pope was infallible since he was
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acting out the will of God on earth; secondly, and perhaps more pragmatically, if the
Pope erred only he would suffer the spiritual consequence while the obedient would be
spared.

The reasoning was that if the Pope’s decrees led to earthly injustice and

suffering, such suffering was nothing when compared to eternal damnation. Gratian’s
Decretum could not cover every situation and many cases arose on which clarification
was sought from Rome; the answering letters, called ‘decretals’ provided a body of
additional law. By the fourteenth century, canon law was contained in a series of legal
rules, the Corpus Iuris Canonici, literally a body of written laws. It was based on its
Roman model and made up of Gratian’s Decretum (c.1140), the Decretals of Pope
Gregory IX (1234), the Sext (1298), and the Clementine Decretals (1305-14). To these
the Extravagantes of Pope John XXII (1316-34) and the Extravagantes Communes
(c.1300-1480) were added later. The aim was for a clear set of rules establishing God’s
justice on earth.
The biggest conflicts involving the canon law were not doctrinal, but were
contained in the question of where God’s jurisdiction should end and the King’s begin on
a practical, day-to-day basis.
local assemblies.

Ecclesiastical matters were originally dealt with in the

In the shire court both the Bishop and the sheriff presided, with

spiritual matters dealt with first. However, this ended with William I’s attempt to prevent
the income generated by the corrective business of the Church from falling with the
hundreds into lay hands by ordering that pleas at the lowest level – to archdeacons and
bishops - should not be heard in the hundreds court, although the sheriff could still use
his power to compel appearance at the ecclesiastical hearing. By the end of the twelfth
century, canon law had established a transnational system for the Church, with
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archdeacons at the bottom of the hierarchy dealing with criminal courts for moral and
disciplinary offences.

From there, appeal was to an Episcopal ‘court of audience.’

Bishops had consistory courts to hear matrimonial and defamation cases, and appeal from
there was either to the Chancery Court of York under the Archbishop of York or to the
Court of the Arches under the Archbishop of Canterbury in London. After that, appeal
was to the pope, either to papal delegates or to the papal audience court itself, known as
the Rota. This court consisted of doctors of law from all over Europe and sat in the
palace of Avignon having been formed by Pope John XXII in 1331. 23
Since the canon law of the western Church was taken to apply to all Christians,
and nearly all people in England were, or were assumed to be, Christian (the Jews having
been expelled in 1290), in theory canon law governed all the people in England.
However, the degree to which canon law might be enforced, at least in the physical
world, depended upon the cooperation of secular forces. In the abstract, neither the King
nor anyone else in England would dispute the authority of the Church over spiritual
matters, but papal authority was a different matter since some popes laid claim to matters
that could be considered temporal. Conflicts of jurisdiction arose since there were two
systems of law operating over the same physical territory, and inevitably politics became
involved. Kings did not want to incur the wrath of the church, but neither did they want
to cede jurisdiction and the potential income from fines etc. The church needed secular
authorities to force people to appear before their courts and uphold their own authority
with imprisonment, and it was really this that prevented there being too many
23
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jurisdictional battles between church and state; most disputes were between private
litigants in particular cases. 24 The pleader would publish a royal writ of prohibition
seeking to prevent the case being heard in an ecclesiastical court; the response would be
the setting in motion of the process of excommunication of the pleader.
It was Edward I who kept authority ultimately within his secular jurisdiction by
establishing a procedure whereby it was the king’s judges who decided whether or not a
cause was spiritual. This was a result of repeated complaints by the bishops that writs of
prohibition were being made as a matter of course as soon as an application was made.
Edward’s solution was encapsulated in the writ Circumspecte agatis (1285) and the
Articuli cleri of 1315. These gave the church jurisdiction over all family matters, and
wills, sexual offences, defamation and breach of faith, but left the King’s courts with
complete control over all temporal property, including some of the land owned by church
institutions. An example of this division in practice was that the appointment of clergy to
a benefice was in the power of the bishop, but the right to nominate a clerk for the
position (“advowson”) was considered a temporal right and so within the jurisdiction of
the King. Church land was only removed from the King’s jurisdiction if it had been
given ‘in free, pure and perpetual alms,’ without any feudal service involved; any dispute
over this was to be settled by an assize ‘utrum’ under the King’s jurisdiction. Most
importantly, in case of conflict, the common law prevailed, even when, and perhaps
24

The first and perhaps most famous dispute was that between Henry II and Thomas Becket, the
archbishop of Canterbury over the immunity from secular criminal jurisdiction claimed by the clergy. A
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especially when, it limited papal authority. For example, the parliament of Edward III in
1351 and 1353 passed two Statutes of Provisors to prevent the pope’s practice of taking
over church livings to use as rewards, often for absentee foreigners. The argument was
that the kings and nobles of England had endowed the benefices to “the Holy Church of
England,” and so they were protected by the common law. These statutes also provided
for harsh punishment for removing any case that belonged in the King’s courts out of the
kingdom, including actions in church courts in England 25. Furthermore, whilst the courts
recognized the pope as Bishop of Rome, since he was not a bishop to whom the courts
could send writs, papal excommunication was treated as invalid since without the
communication by writ a party would have no regularized means of communication.26
The best that can be said of this relationship between the church and state is that it
maintained an uneasy peace in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, a peace that would
only deteriorate until the severing of the Church of England from Rome in 1534.
Despite the severance from Rome, however, there was still a need for an
adherence to moral principles of justice, so it is not surprising that various canonist
principles can be found at the heart of the law of equity. Plucknett attributed the rise of
the Chancery court in the fifteenth century to its focus on the doctrine of “good faith,”
saying that “the old canonist idea of good faith …easily became transformed into
conscience and thence into a formal system of legal philosophy.” 27 The chancery began
simply as an administrative office responsible for writing the charters, letters patent and
25

Statute of Provisors 1351, 25 Edw III, stat. iv; Statute of Provisors 1353, 27 Edw III, stat. i. The
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letters close (i.e. writs) that were issued under the great seal but, during the course of the
fourteenth century, developed a second branch that was considered the ‘court of
conscience.’ This was a tribunal that allowed a plaintiff to set out the full details of his
case, and request that consideration be given to circumstances that would not be
admissible under the common law through the exercise of the king’s right of discretion.
There was no jury, but rather the chancellor, as president of the court and keeper of the
King’s grace, gave judgment when he felt that he had enough evidence to make a
decision one way or another.
Chancery business was split between the ‘Latin’ side and the ‘English’ or ‘equity’
side. The Latin side divided its time between matters de cursu (‘of course’), the day to
day administration of legal procedures over which it had immediate jurisdiction - such as
the authority to issue writs or carry out certain administrative judicial processes -, and
matters de gratia (‘of grace’) which involved the exercise of royal discretion, usually in
common law cases where the king’s prerogative rights were under threat such as in cases
involving the disposal of estates held in chief of the king or the misuse of documents
issued under the great seal. It was here that the King’s grace, his Mercy, was to be
administered.

It was on the English side that the chancery’s role as the ‘court of

conscience’ became the most developed, since it was here that cases involving ‘uses’ or
trusts of succession were heard. Under the terms of a use, it was only the trustees, the
‘feoffees to use,’ who had legal title to the land in trust, and therefore rights enforceable
in the common law courts, so beneficiaries under the use, ‘cestui qui use,’ could only
look to the prerogative courts to uphold their interest since it was a right in conscience
alone. Since the earliest surviving records of chancery proceedings date only to the late
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1380s, legal historians are still debating precisely when and why this line of argument
was particularly assigned to the chancery court, but it is clear that, by that time, the
exercise of royal grace in this way was considered an essential part of the king’s duty to
provide justice to his people. 28

The authority of the common law
The basis for the authority of the common law is not so easily described since late
medieval thinking was comfortable with the two conflicting theories of law, ‘positivism’
or ‘populism,’ and ‘naturalism,’ that created a natural tension in the legal discourse of the
period.

a)

The populist theory
After the Romans withdrew from England in the fifth century, the earliest forms

of justice in England were based on the custom of the people, communal justice or ‘folkright’ (folcriht).

The ancient assemblies were not presided over by a judge or

representative of the king but by a local ealdorman who acted as chairman for those who
attended. Historians have found it very hard to trace the transition from this local
communal justice to the vesting of authority into an individual since it appears to have
been particular to each area and to be identified with the personalities of particular
individuals. It may be that some ealdormen were members of earlier royal families or
had their position from traditions of chieftainship; there does not seem to have been any
28
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political theory of authority but rather the practical fact of power and leadership. What is
clear is that the rights of a churl and the rights of a lord were considered to be different,
which is why there was a separate system of courts alongside the counties and the
hundreds set up with jurisdiction over seigniorial issues, but it was only as a consequence
of the move from communal to personal authority that a single king would be able to
assert jurisdiction over the whole kingdom. When England became a single kingdom in
the tenth century, the king had already divided the land into boroughs, hundreds and
shires under the control of his reeves whose duty was to ensure that all men were
protected by the customary law and the ‘doom-book’ (Alfred’s code). Even in those
cases where parts of the jurisdiction had been passed to a lord’s control, the king
continued his supervisory control and could relieve a lord who abused his role or his
position. Thus, the idea that justice was the king’s prerogative had a basis in fact even if
it was not yet being theorized in these terms. Certainly the term, “the king’s peace”
covered civil and criminal complaints and brought so many cases before King Cnut that
he had to limit appeal to his court to claims that had already been heard in the hundred.
Furthermore, the king as a feudal lord was expected to do justice to his tenants - although
it was not until William I that all land was considered to be held from the king.
Fortescue described the English system of law-making by the king and parliament
as ‘dominium politicum et regale,’ government by the community and the king together
consenting to the creation of laws. By this he combined the ideas of feudal practice with
the populist theory of consent, theorizing that both parliament and the king were treated
as elected. The continental theorists Pierre D’Ailly (1350-1420), Jean Gerson (13631429) and Nicholas of Cusa (d.1464) also believed that popular consent was the source of
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secular authority. 29

Fortescue describes how Henry II was made King by common

consent of the realm of England in open Parliament: ‘communi consensus procerum et
communitatis regni Angliae instantiam et requisitionem ipsius Stephani, in publico
parliamenti ordinatum atque conclusum est quod Henricus … fierat rex.’ 30

The

difficulty in the theory arises from the fact that he also describes how the king is
appointed by God. It was commonly conceived that all power came from God 31 but
Fortescue goes a step further to describe the king as ‘hanging’ from God, ex deo
pependi 32 and, in the case of Henry VI, having been set on the throne by God. This ties
in with Bracton’s earlier concept of the king as vicarius dei 33 though not with Ockham’s
description of kingship as a wholly temporal institution.
Feudalism had at its basis a consensual agreement between the lord and his vassal
over land tenure. As a feudal lord, the king was effectively entering into contractual
relationships with his tenants-in-chief which in turn gave him his governmental position.
It was only outside those contractual relationships that the king’s authority needed a
divine mainstay. Bracton’s description of the creation of laws as ‘approved with the
counsel and consent of the magnates and the general agreement of the res publica, the
29
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authority of the king or prince having first been added thereto’ 34 is a description of the
feudal relationship emphasizing its populist basis. It is on this voluntarist basis that
Fortescue builds his theory two centuries later arguing that law created under the
dominum politicum has the consent of the people as its authority.

The king could not

change the law, nor take his subjects’ property or detain them except by authority of the
law of the land and the ordinary judges. Likewise, he could not impose taxes without the
assent of parliament which in theory represented all classes of people in the realm. 35 Doe
gives numerous examples of instances from the custumals in which it is stated that the
usages of a local community were assented to by that community which show a clear
pattern of understanding that at the law’s basis was the will and consent of a
community. 36 There is need for neither God nor morality in that relationship. Fortescue
described law as ‘lex est sanccio sancta iubens honesta et prohibiens contraria,’ 37 a
sacred sanction ordering the virtuous and prohibiting the contrary, yet although the idea
of law advancing morality appears in theory, in practice law served the common profit
and was used to resolve ordinary disputes since spiritual claims would be heard in the
church courts.
The emphasis on the community’s consent allows the law to become separate
from morality. Thus a rule can become a law because it is used, or consented to,
34

Translated by Doe, 11, from Bracton, De Legibus, II, pp19. Doe further illustrates the similarities
between Bracton’s theory and those of the continental jurists of the period.
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regardless of its moral abhorrence: it is voidable but not void. But where does God and
morality fit into all of this? Fortescue does not seem to notice he has two conflicting
principles at work – or at least not to think it worthy of comment – but, as detailed above,
these two principles were causing confusion in the day-to-day practice of the law in
courtrooms.

b)

The Practitioners’ doctrines: rigor iuris and natural law
Within the view of the law as a ‘natural’ system of justice lies the idea that the

law’s authority does not lie solely within the custom or will of the community but is
subject to a superior ethical imperative of a divine morality. The Thomist view is that
natural law and divine law are the same: ‘ius naturale, id est, ius divinum.’ 38 Aquinas
was following on from St. Augustine’s definition of eternal law: “The eternal law is the
divine order or will of God, which requires the preservation of natural order, and forbids
the breach of it.” 39 According to this view, the common law is not autonomous but relies
for its authority on its conformity with morality so is judged both on its applicability and
on its adherence to an overarching set of ethical principles. Its purpose is to enact the
divine will on earth. Apparently not seeing the inherent contradiction in their views, the
fifteenth century theorists agree: Fortescue follows Aquinas’s Summa, restating that
‘natural law is nothing else but the participation of the eternal law in a rational creature.’

38
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Pecock agrees only calling natural law ‘the lawe of kynde’ which he sees as a meeting of
law and reason. 40
Langland is another who takes the Thomist view. He sets out the relation of law
and divinity in the Prologue when the Angel of Heaven tells the King:
O qui iura regis Christi specialia regis,
Hoc quod agas melius – iustus es, esto pius!
Nudum ius a te vestiri vult pietate. (B.Prol. 133-5)
(O you who administer the sublime laws of Christ the King, in order to do better what
you do, as you are just, be godly! Naked law requires to be clothed by you with a sense
of your duty to God.) 41
The angel is contrasting the view of law as a purely earthly institution subject to the will
of either the King or his people and the view of law as a reflex of divine justice. Of
course, it is unsurprising that a heavenly angel should be emphasizing the closeness of
the relationship between divine justice and law, but the angel also provides an incentive
to follow his argument; his emphasis is on the result that this will have:
Qualia vis metere, talia grana sere:
Si ius nudatur, nudo de iure metatur;
Si seritur pietas, de pietate metas. (B. Prol. 136-8)
(If the law is nakedly administered (lit. stripped bare) by you, then let (judgment) be
measured out (to you) according to the letter (lit. naked law). If goodness is sown (by
you), may you reap goodness. 42
The effect of the angel’s argument is to take as understood the fact that the approach of
rigor iuris is inherently unjust and open to abuse, but to argue against that approach, not
40
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because of the injustice it might do to the King’s unfortunate subjects, but because of the
effect it will have on him personally, i.e. that he will reap the injustice he sowed, whether
on the day of judgment or in the chaos of his land; in the Latin, this is underscored by the
play on measure and reap that is lost in translation. Clearly this is a reflection on the
nature and demands of kingship (see chapter 4) but also a comment that seeks to place the
law firmly within the ambit of divine justice. This is referred to explicitly in Passus VI in
the A and C text - and so in the Kane-Donaldson edition of the B-text – as the ‘lawe of
kynde’ which Hunger refers to as the overriding law when he instructs the dreamer to
care for ‘any freke that Fortune hath apeired’ before quoting from Galatians 6:2. Hunger
tells him to ‘Love hem and lene hem, for so lawe of kynde wolde: Alter alterius onera
portate.’ (B.VI.221-2). The quote is an oblique reference to the divine nature of natural
law since the instruction from Galatians to ‘bear ye one another’s burdens’ is completed
in the unquoted second half of the line by the explanation ‘and so you shall fulfill the law
of Christ,’ (something that shall echo later in the poem when Christ tells the Devil that he
has come to fulfill the law at the harrowing of hell).

Moreover, Langland views all

earthly jurisdictions as part of the same judicial process: he describes bishops ‘if thei ben
as thei sholde / Legistres of bothes lawes, the lewed therwith to preche.’ (B.VII. 13-14)
i.e. conversant with both the canon and common laws in order to teach justice. Thus, for
Langland, both the canon and common law’s authority stemmed from its relationship
with divine law and a separate set of moral principles. For Langland, all law is grounded
in the same law: it is the ‘natural’ or ‘divine’ order of things.
The move from the old legal systems of trial, oath and ordeal to a new system of a
body of laws brought with it a new culture in the courts. Emphasis was now placed on
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the documentary evidence brought before the courts. The move from an oral tradition of
law to a documentary culture had allowed the Anglo-Saxon kings to issue codes
declaring the law and containing instructions to reeves and lords. The kings used written
instruments to define or confer jurisdiction, such as charters of sake and soke - the right
to hold a court and compel attendance – or writs declaring rights to assemblies of the
shire. The real problem was the lack of uniformity. Although litigants had all had
recourse to trial by oath, ordeal or battle, the implementation of these varied by
geography and participant – so much so that the writer of the Leges Henrici Primi
(c1118) famously described the outcome of litigation as uncertain as a game of dice. 43
The same observer also noted that the advantage of the royal court was that it preserved
‘the use and custom of its law at all times and in all places and with constant
uniformity.’ 44 It would be this uniformity and the move to a documentary system of law
that would eventually enable the King to assert the authority of his law, the standard or
‘common’ law, over the use of local custom. There was a common medieval legal
maxim that the people would rather suffer a ‘mischief’ than an ‘inconvenience,’ i.e. some
injustice was better than the inconsistency or unpredictability that might arise from the
making of exceptions to a general rule. 45
As the common law was being developed in the fourteenth century, although
there were some procedures that could be begun without writ, the rules of the common
law were really hidden in the form of the recognized claims a plaintiff could put before
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the court, the language of the writs which begun those claims and the remedies that could
be requested by that writ. Thus the settlement of a claim rested upon a party being able
to make an acceptable claim by means of a correctly worded writ for an available
remedy. Milsom explains: 46 ‘[I]n the whole process the only substantive rules visibly at
work are those implicit in the canon of acceptable claims.’ It was therefore to the
Register of writs that the early common law student turned to learn legal practice rather
than to a stated body of rules derived from legislation or judicial decision. 47
The only way to make a claim was through a formal and correctly worded writ, so
the document by which a claim was made contained all its hopes of success or failure.
Since judges derived their authority from the King, whose authority was in turn contained
in the written laws, judges naturally tended to aim for a strict application of those written
laws, an approach described as ‘formalism’ or rigor iuris. This tendency towards a
reliance on formalism inevitably led to many problems as situations unforeseen by the
drafters of the statutes posed difficulties in exactly how the laws should be applied in a
particular case. It was in cases of difficulties that a judge’s legal philosophy or theory of
law would be crucial in directing his approach to the case.
The difficulty in pinning down the precise meaning of reason in Piers Plowman
reflects the problems that faced the fourteenth-century judges who found themselves
needing a philosophy of law to balance the injustices they paradoxically found
themselves perpetrating in attempting to uphold reason in the form of the law. At
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different parts of the poem, reason denotes good common sense, good order, the letter of
the law i.e. rigor iuris, and also morality - precisely the same shifts of emphasis that we
see in the legal theory over the foundations of the common law’s authority; since the
language itself was not providing a clarity as to which was the governing meaning or
authority at any given time, a practitioner without a clear legal doctrine in mind would
not know where to turn to enact justice.

Reason as the conduit to natural law
Most importantly for our purposes, it was morality itself that was considered by
legal theorists and practitioners alike as accessible to mankind through reason, revelation
and instinct. Fortescue proposes that there are three means of access to natural law:
Firstly, through human instinct through the idea that natural law is ‘that which nature
taught all animals’ and so is a part of man’s inherent understanding of the world;
secondly, through human reason, ‘ratio’; and thirdly, through reading the bible and
understanding the natural law as the law of the Old Testament and the gospels. Pecock
did not limit natural law to those laws set out in the scriptures. Rather he argued that
“[t]he more deel and party of Goddis hool lawe to man in erthe .. is grounded sufficiently
out of Holi Scripture in the inward book of lawe of kinde and of moral philosophie, and
not in the book of Holi Scripture clepid the Oold Testament and the Newe.’ 48 By this
view, natural law depends on reason for its revelation.

Similarly although Gerson

considered the lex divina to be revealed in many ways - partly through scripture, partly
through revelation to private individuals and partly through deduction from other laws –
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he considered natural law to be revealed through human reason not divine revelation.
Nonetheless, he also considered natural law to be contained in the teachings of the Old
and New Testaments.
The theorists’ understanding of reason as the intellectual capacity to determine
logically what is right and what is wrong naturally put it at the centre of their analysis of
the moral law. How that moral law might work in practice when combined with the idea
of rigor iuris in interpretation of the law did not trouble them. Since Pecock believed
reason was the means by which men gained knowledge of the law he was naturally able
to equate the rules of natural law with the requirements of reason. 49

Likewise

Fortescue’s ‘ratio’ was the means by which natural law and therefore justice was known
so it had an inbuilt moral function. 50 Both theorists take the non-contemporary legal uses
of reason, meaning the intellectual faculty and good sense, and extend that with their
theoretical use of reason, as the conduit by which the rules of moral law are known, so
that reason itself becomes the moral law. Saint German said reason was the law of
England’s ‘first ground’ and that ‘every law positive well made is somewhat of the law of
reason’ 51 while Pecock went a step further to say: ‘As for the lawe of the kyng of
englond, what is iugid bi iugis agens such constreyners, al is take to be law of resoun,
which thei callen her common lawe.’ It was an established part of Roman law that
application of the letter of the law would lead to injustice so a judge must seek the logical
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connection between rules in order to apply them equitably 52 so it is perhaps unsurprising
to see reason regularly cited in the Year Books as the foundation of the law – for example
per Fortescue CJKB: ‘[d]onq comon reason, qui est comon ley’ i.e. ‘common reason,
which is common law.’ 53
While the theorists directly connect reason with divine and moral law, the
practitioners of law do not define reason in expressly moral terms but as an abstract idea
of right. Reason is appealed to in the sense of its being good sense that can be used to
eliminate inconsistencies of result or overcome an impractical custom. While it has a
sense of justice in its application, its common use is for the more mundane such as the
allowance or disallowance of a particular plea, or control of delay or absurdity. Most
importantly, it is linked to a concept of justice that corrects imbalances between a
wrongdoing and its punishment, or between a loss and its compensation. Doe gives a
host of examples of uses of the term in cases from the Year Books 54 from which it can be
seen that in the law courts the term had two main strands of meaning: reason was an
authority by which a judge might enact consistency; reason was the application of good
sense. Practitioners do not therefore necessarily view reason as justice with an openly
moral center, but the two do have overlapping territory. Aquinas argued that men mark
‘the balance of justice according to the recompense of thing for thing’ 55 i.e. justice’s
purpose was to redress imbalance. Fortescue and Pecock agreed that the role of justice
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was to give to people what was owed to them, to apply a remedy for a loss. 56 It was in
these same circumstances that the practitioner applied reason, i.e. when there was some
imbalance between the loss and the remedy, or the wrong and its punishment.
We can see that Langland is making the same argument for the basis of legal
authority that the legal theologians would go on to make a few decades later, using the
same terms and references that the judges and serjeants-at-law were making in the
courtrooms. Conscience tells the King that the first men to have ‘mede / Of God at a gret
need,’ (B.III.244-5) will be those who ‘han ywroght werkes with right and with reson’
(B.III.239). This is yet another instance where Langland shows his mastery and ease
with the terms of current legal dialectics and adds his own voice to the debate coming
down firmly on the side of ‘naturalism.’
The need for right and reason working together comes from the natural law theory
that natural law is developed from the reasonable man’s intrinsic understanding of right
and wrong, which would have been sufficient to order man’s peaceful society had it not
been for original sin. St. Augustine incorporated the Stoic idea that it was sin that
brought about the need for a further set of laws, known as positive law. In theory,
however, positive law was only valid for as long as it conformed to natural law. As
Augustine put it – and Martin Luther King famously took up in the 20th century – “an
unjust law is no law at all.”

Aquinas went a step further saying in his Summa

Theologiae 57 that an unjust law was an abuse of law. The influence of this idea perhaps
explains why Fortescue is comfortable with a legal philosophy that emphasizes the
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derivation of authority for the positivist law in the consent and will of the community,
whilst simultaneously suggesting that it is nonetheless representing a divine order. As
Chief Justice of the King’s Bench Fortescue wants to put as much authority behind the
law as he can, and does not want to admit his system has room for unjust laws.
The result of all of these ideas for practitioners was that although they professed
to be working under a system of rigor iuris, the truth was that in reality most of them
operated under a sense that the positivist law must be applied rigidly in so far as it
conformed to their own instinctive or ‘natural’ sense of right and wrong. It is this that
makes their understanding of reson so important – it is the conduit by which God’s will
shall be revealed to them in the form of the natural law. Though not claiming to be
working with a divine authority, the practitioners are effectively working under the
doctrine expressed by Cicero a thousand years before when he said in his De legibus that
“Law is the primal and ultimate mind of God, whose reason (ratio) directs all things
either by compulsion or restraint’ (II.4.8). 58
The MED tells us that to have justice was to ‘haven (right and) resoun.’ What
did ‘right’ add to the phrase?

The meaning of ‘right’
The main meaning of ‘right’ is that which is morally right or in accordance with a
moral code but its secondary meaning is that which is just, justice or equity. It is in this
meaning that it is most commonly combined with reason. On its own ‘right’ can also
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mean a rule of conduct or a law; a judgment; what someone deserves; a due reward or
punishment. It can be a just claim or entitlement and also a prerogative or privilege or a
duty or obligation. Furthermore – and importantly for the purposes of this project, right
can also mean truth, accuracy or correctness so the phrase ‘of right and resoun’ also
means ‘truly’ or ‘in truth.’
For lawyers, the use of the term ‘right’ to denote morality is itself not without
confusion. Just as Christians were dealing with the ways in which the biblical law of the
Old Testament could be made consistent with the New Testament teachings of Christ, so
too, the fourteenth-century judges were trying to negotiate their way through the
conflicting authorities of custom, ‘old law’ and the newly enacted Statutory law to find
what was truly a right: to which customary rights did a man have a right? Each authority
brought with it additional, and sometimes conflicting, rights for a plaintiff which further
might, or might not, conflict with the judges understanding of moral right. What was a
judge to do in the case of a new common law which apparently overrode a local custom
that had been effectively enforced through years of usage? Both might be considered a
‘riht.’

There is evidence that Shareshull understood that both the common law and

general custom might be superseded by local custom if claimed by prescription, the
‘highest possible title.’ 59

After all, what could be more reasonable than a custom

effectively consented to for hundreds of years? As a judge, he often referred respectfully
to ‘old law’,

60

‘custom in old times,’ 61 and ‘old usage’ while recognizing that old

customs may have been modified by recent laws.

59
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Nonetheless, that local custom still had to pass Shareshull’s own test of
‘reasonableness’. That he held this belief on both sides of the bench is apparent in two
cases from the textile centers of Hereford and Gloucester, where the issue was the
legality of a local custom of determining the age at which a person had the capacity to
alienate land. Local custom dictated that this was at the point that he could count up to
twelve pence and measure an ell of cloth. Shareshull successfully argued as pleader that
there would be nothing specific to present to a jury such as the specific age 62; his
argument was accepted by the Chief Justice of Common Pleas, then Herle, who added
that the custom was inconclusive since a forty year old man might not know how to
measure an ell while a boy of six might.

Later, in deciding a Gloucester case 63,

Shareshull repeated Herle’s reasoning from the bench.
As detailed above, both Hillary and Shareshull were apprenticed for ‘instruction’
under Bereford so it is perhaps unsurprising that they held many similar views. Thus
where Bereford can be seen, years previously, arguing “We must maintain ancient, as
contrasted with modern, writs, whenever it is possible,’ 64 we later see Hillary asserting,
‘We will not and can not change the ancient usages,’ 65 and Shareshull adding, ‘we do not
wish to change our ancient course.’ 66 That said, there was no doctrine of precedence of
the sort that modern lawyers would recognize, but rather a desire for consistency and
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guidance.

It appears from the paltry evidence of citation that can be found in the

fourteenth-century year books that both judges and counsel simply quoted past cases
from memory and without precision. Puttnam gives many examples of references made
in both general and what she terms ‘specific’ 67 terms but none of these would be
considered accurate enough to the modern practitioner. It is true that identification of the
case referenced has sometimes been possible 68 but more often the reference is general
such as ‘I have heard a count for the king challenged on just this point..’ 69 or ‘the former
practice of the Court has always been ….’ 70 An interesting note on judicial independence
can be seen when Shareshull, acting as serjeant, comments in an action: ‘We have seen
such a fine levied and accepted’ and is met with Herle’s rejoinder from the bench that
that may be so but it had never happened before him! 71 Puttnam’s research identifies
‘twenty-five or more ‘old’ statutes quoted by Shareshull as revealed in accessible year
books and reports of eyres, and points out that given the paucity of record keeping at this
time this was undoubtedly not the total number that were referred to by him in the course
of his judicial work. Although Putnam shows that this does not reveal the wide range of
Shareshull’s knowledge for which she finds evidence, this does correspond roughly to the
list compiled by Richardson and Sayles from the year books and plea rolls of Edward I as
essential to contemporary lawyers. By way of example of the breadth of Shareshull’s
67
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reading, he refers to over a dozen of the fifty chapters of Westminster II, and he cites
chapter 1, De Donis, in at least twenty different instances, probably far more. Often too,
without a direct quotation himself, Shareshull takes part as judge in detailed discussions
by other judges and by pleaders of the implications of statutes or of documents like De
Prerogative Regis.

On the other hand, ‘not more than half a dozen citations by

Shareshull have turned up of the ‘new’ statutes, i.e. those enacted since 1326, many of
which he had helped to draft’ (p117). The overall inference from this is that although the
records do not accurately reveal the extent of Shareshull’s knowledge and referents, there
is enough evidence to show that he took pains to act in accordance with a general
precedent where possible, however imprecise or vague his methods might seem to
modern scholars. Shareshull was attempting to keep his judgments in line with the laws
created by precedent before him.
That said, Shareshull’s discussions of the usage of custom and prescription
usually do not outweigh the force of his belief that the most important element of the law
is ‘right:’ as noted at the beginning of this chapter, he overwhelmingly favored the
practical approach that ‘no precedent is of such force as that which is right.’ 72
Throughout the next two centuries when the importance and permanence of statutes and
precedent was being debated, this principle would be often repeated. It lead directly to its
famous use in 1610 when Sir Edmund Coke considered the issue brought about by
‘Bonham’s case’ as to whether an act of Parliament could be overridden by ‘right.’73
Coke said:
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Thomas Bonham was convicted and imprisoned by the Royal College of Physicians for practicing
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And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will control
acts of parliament, and sometimes adjudge them to be utterly void: for when an
act of parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or
impossible to be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such act
to be void; and, therefore, in ... Thomas Tregor's case [Judge] Herle said, some
statutes are made against law and right, which those who made them perceiving,
would not put them in execution.... 74
When James I questioned Coke about this in October of 1616, Coke responded that his
decision did not ‘import any new opinion’ but rather followed precedent. 75 Herle had
argued in common pleas when Shareshull was one of his colleagues: ‘It was law before
we were born, we do not wish to change it’; ‘Sues donque en Parliament de faire novel
Ley,’ 76 but all the judges are dancing around the fact that they use their sense of justice,
of moral right, to tip the balance against customary rights if those rights are at odds with
their personal moral code.
The important thing for the scope of this project is that the practitioners seem to
be agreed that custom and the new common law might jockey for position, but that both
were subject to the judges’ own test of right and reasonableness. The effect of this was

act of parliament to imprison without a licence noting that the College could not act as judge in a case to
which it was a party and that ‘reason requireth that same be taken strictly for the liberty of the subject,’ i.e.
that the provisions of the charter must be read strictly to prevent the loss of liberty.
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that reason, in either the form of the letter of the law, of good order or custom, must be
acting in concert with conscience, in the form of right or an overriding sense of ‘natural’
justice. At the linguistic level, both right and reason can be used to denote the law itself.
The one, the given rights under a moral law, and the other, the law it theoretically
revealed. This leaves the question of why we can only have justice if we have ‘right and
reson’ not just one or the other.

Justice demands ‘right and reson’ acting in consort together
In Christ’s harrowing of hell, Langland shows that the answer lies in a
combination of legal and religious theory. In the poem, Langland bypasses questions of
authority with the quote from Matthew 5.17, Jesus’s words to the Pharisees at the temple
telling them not to be afraid of the apparent change he is bringing: nolite putare quonian
veni solvere legem aut prophetas non veni solvere (Vulgate) [Do not think that I am come
to destroy the law, or the prophets. I am not come to destroy, but to fulfil.]
Christ’s argument is that the new order is based on old terms so combining the laws of
the New Testament with those of the Old. In Langland’s poem, Christ uses this to answer
the argument that Lucifer has given to his followers just a few lines previously when he is
rallying his troops in the same terms:
If he reve me of my right, he robbeth me by maistrie;
For by right and by reson the renkes that ben here
Body and soule beth myne, bothe goode and ille.
For hymself seide, þat Sire is of heuene,
If Adam ete þe Appul alle sholde deye
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And dwelle wiþ vu deueles; þis þretynge dri3ten made.

(B.XVIII: l276-281)

His argument is that since the law that God set down to Adam and Eve was that if Adam
were to eat the apple then all people would die and he, Lucifer, would have possession of
their souls, then a strict adherence to God’s own decree will not permit him from taking
back those souls by force alone (ll B.XVIII.283-4). It is no accident that it is Lucifer who
should be reliant on an argument whose merits are based solely on an adherence to the
sort of formalistic approach to the law that troubled the fourteenth century judges as a
regular source of miscarriages of justice; furthermore, such an approach allows no room
for the Mercy that has been emphasized by Peace as the key to true justice and salvation.
Lucifer’s second strand of legal argument is that he has had possession of man’s
soul for seven thousand winters:
‘And siþen I was seised seuene þousand winter
I leeue þat lawe nyl no3t lete hym þe leeste.’ (B.XVIII.1283-4)
Still treating man as property, Lucifer is relying on the tenet of land law that since he is in
‘seisin,’ or possession, of the souls, and has been for seven thousand years, he has a
proprietary right to them that no-one will be able to defeat. The letter of the law might
say this is so, but even a character such as Gobelyn is capable of seeing that his reliance
on the strict form of the law will be undermined by the trickery with which he originally
tempted Adam to the Fall. Gobelyn points out to Lucifer that ‘God wol noght be bigiled
… ne byjaped. / We have no trewe title to hem [the souls], for thorugh treson were thei
dampned.’ (B.XVIII.292). This is the realm of canon law which had at its heart the
concept of ‘good faith,’ i.e. that no-one should benefit from fraud, but it also falls into the
Anselmian formulation of the redemption in suggesting that the devils have no true title
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to mankind since the Devil negated the agreement with God when he deceived Man into
the original sin. Legally, therefore, the only way for Christ to claim title to man’s soul is
for him to temper the strict formalism of the Old law, the order or ‘reason’ denoted by
custom with the overriding principle of the New law of love and good faith and justice.
Only in this way can he do what is ‘right.’

Anselm’s treaty De veritate (ca. 1080)

proposed that the fact that the word veritas applies equally well to both words and moral
actions was not mere coincidence but rather determined by the fact that both are true by
virtue of the same principle i.e. that they are both displays of rectitudo or truth which
comes from God. Alford explains this:
When a proposition corresponds recte to the nature of things, or when the
individual will corresponds recte to the divine will, both are said to display
rectitude or truth. In essence, to do a morally right action is to tell the truth; to do
a morally wrong action is to tell a lie. Scriptural support for this view appears in
John 8.44, where the two meanings of “truth” come together: the Devil “stood
not in the truth; because truth is not in him …, for he is a liar, and the father
thereof.”” 77
It is important therefore that Christ is able to speak with right on his side since it contrasts
with the fact that Satan cannot.
Langland’s text puts at the heart of Christ’s triumph the ‘Old lawe” of the Bible
(both Old and New Testaments) and the power of right and reason in complementary
union. Thus Christ repeats Gobelyn’s argument back to Satan:
Although reson recorde, and right of myselve,
That if thei ete the appul, alle sholde deye,
I bihighte hem noght here helle for evere.
For the dede that thei dide, thi deceite it made;
With gile thow hem gete, ageyn alle reson. (B.XVIII.331-335)
77

John Alford, “The Grammatical Metaphor.” Speculum, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Oct., 1982):746.

132

Satan cannot rely on ‘reson’ in the form of a strict adherence to the law since he has
himself shown no respect for its premises. Christ is righting the wrong the done to man
by Satan and bringing justice for those who have died in faith. He relies on the Old
Testament teaching of Exodus 21:24 (‘Dentem pro dente et oculum pro oculo’) ‘a tooth
for a tooth, an eye for an eye,’ ‘the Olde Lawe,’ contrasting this good law with the tainted
bargain he is not respecting by saying that for ‘gilours’ to be themselves ‘bigiled’ is
‘good reson.’ Reason in the form of the letter of the law should only be upheld if it has
right at its foundation; it requires more than mere adherence to its terms but rather a
moral judgment. Christ uses the law of the Old Testament when it allows for justice and
therefore should be upheld, but Langland emphasizes that it is Christ’s Mercy and desire
for true justice that allow him to uphold a law that is truly just and not fall foul of harsh
formalism:
And I that am kyng of kynges shal come swich a tyme
There doom to the deeth dampneth alle wikked;
And if lawe wole I loke on hem, it lith in my grace
Whether thei deye or deye noght for that thei diden ille.
Be it any thing abought, the boldnesse of hir synnes,
I may do mercy thorugh rightwisnesse, and alle my wordes trewe. (B.XVIII.390)
Mercy is a part of justice that still allows the truth of the law to be upheld.

By

incorporating Mercy, Christ can both defeat Satan’s formalist argument and uphold
justice, and is therefore able to claim that it is both ‘by right and by reson’ (B.XVIII.351)
that he can free men’s souls. Through the concept of Mercy, Langland addresses the
problems of governing both equitably and according to the letter of the law. In Passus V,
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Repentance explains that God’s ‘Mercy is moore than alle his othere werkes’ 78 and goes
on to back this up with a quote from Psalm 144 and another from St. Augustine, so
invoking the authority of both the bible and one of its most revered explicators. Later,
Piers explains that Mercy is the key by which the sinful might enter Paradise. ‘Mercy is a
maiden there, hath might over hem alle; / And she is sib to alle synfulle, and hire sone
also.’ 79

Scripture repeats this in Passus XI after Will has shown how both civil and

canon law would follow the man who turned away from his debts as detailed above.
Scripture shows that salvation is nonetheless possible under both jurisdictions by adding
that: ‘may no synne lette / Mercy al to amende, and mekenesse hir folwe.’ 80 The
implication is that whatever the situation, humility before God and a reliance on his
Mercy can bring about justice.
The next Passus addresses directly the apparent conflict of laws between the
‘Olde Lawe, as the letter telleth, that was the lawe of Jewes’ with the account of the
stoning of the adulterous woman in chapter 8 of the Gospel of John.

Langland

acknowledges that the letter of the law clearly commands the Jewes to stone her, but
explains that Christ’s ‘curteisie’ enabled him to save her. As Schmidt comments, ‘Mercy
is not being represented as an arbitrary deflection of (strict) justice, rather justice is to be
seen as ‘law administered with Christian goodness.’’ 81 It is only with the meeting of
Truth with Mercy in Passus XVIII (just before Christ harrows hell) that holy law can
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truly be fulfilled. Mercy teaches Truth how Christ will save those in hell and proves it
‘by reson.’ It is Pees and Mercy together that are man’s surety.:
And that God hath forgiven and graunted me, Pees, and Mercy
To be mannes meynpernour for evermore after.’ (B.XVIII.183-4)
Thus, by choosing to frame his portrayal of the harrowing of hell in the language of the
courtroom, Langland illustrates how justice can move from the spiritual arena to the
earthly courtroom.

He enters firmly into the courtroom debate on the side of the

‘naturalist’ approach to law, showing that only when the religious ideas of Mercy and
Truth are brought into the decision-making process, when ‘right’ and ‘reason’ are
working together, will true justice be done on earth.
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Chapter 4: Christ’s ‘liges’:
‘… by right and by reson raunsone here my liges:
Non veni solvere legem set adimplere.’ (B.XVIII.349-351)
When Christ harrows hell at the climax of Passus XVIII of Piers Plowman,
Langland finally provides an answer to Will’s search to find out who will be saved. It
is Christ’s ‘liges’ who will be ‘raunsoned.’ It is significant that Christ uses the
language of civil property disputes to assert his rights over the people he calls his
‘liges,’ while at the same time asserting that he will be fulfilling the law. As this
chapter and the next illustrate, Christ’s approach to the freeing of his ‘liges’ presents
a two-pronged argument to Lucifer, arguing both through the Roman law idea of
personal status that the faithful are effectively unfree and his property, and also
through the contemporary idea of subjecthood, that his followers are by choice and
faith within a relationship of allegiance with him, and therefore owed the rights and
privileges that come with allegiance to a sovereign, in the form of his protection.
Christ is arguing not only that he is upholding the law in terms of fulfilling the
biblical prophecy of the conquering of death and doing justice as detailed in chapters
two and three, but also that he is keeping to his part of the social relationship that
makes him king and worthy of allegiance. Langland uses these terms at the most
important moment in the poem in order to emphasize the responsibilities of kingship:
Christ owes his ‘liges’ this battle with Lucifer to fulfill his part of their social
contract.
The responsibilities owed by both parties in that contract are an important part
of Langland’s theory about kingship. Central to Langland’s approach to kingship is
his understanding that the king was anointed by God as part of a divine plan to
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achieve justice on earth. His power comes from the allegiance of his people and in
return he guides and protects them. There is no room in this model of kingship for
slaves or bondship, only a mutual responsibility between parties that mirrors the
relationship between the divinity and the faithful. At the heart of the relationship is
faith, a human relationship rather than an economic one.
The previous chapters aimed to show how the state of English law inflects the
literature even when the issue presented appears to be covenantal theology. They also
illustrated how the questions of the basis of legal authority being faced in the
courtroom were so enmeshed in the language of the poem that it is impossible to say
which influenced the other more. This chapter and the next look at the influence of
the literature on the law, and demonstrate that Langland’s views on the nature of
kingship promoted ideas that played an integral part in the legal development of the
idea of citizenship and the role of the king.

Langland’s model of kingship
Langland’s first introduction of the king and his court in the poem is not
through the figure of the king himself, but rather of the corrupt clergy who ‘serven the
King and his silver tellen’ (B.Prol.92).

These are the clergy who work in the

chancery and exchequer courts, claiming the dues that arise to the king from
guardianship cases, lost property, and straying animals, or acting as stewards in
manorial households.

His argument is that these men are not looking after the

spiritual health of their parishioners as they should, but rather pursuing opportunities
for their own worldly advancement in London. There is an inference of weakness on
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the part of a king who enables their behavior by allowing corrupt officials to
appropriate his authority for their own gain. Langland extends the idea of corruption
to the church as an institution by suggesting that the cardinals responsible for the
election of the pope, the head of the earthly spiritual court, have lost sight of the
virtues of prudence, temperance, justice and fortitude set out by St. Peter. Having
laid out the reasons to doubt the spiritual court’s good faith, he falls short of accusing
the cardinals and the Pope of sin through the poetic sleight of hand of pretending that
he cannot comment on their behavior because he is not learned enough. Nonetheless,
the accusation stands. The constant shifting of position and layering of ambiguity is,
of course, consistent within the framework of a vision, itself within the frame of a
dream, and Langland uses it frequently in the poem to enable himself blamelessly to
explore multiple perspectives simultaneously. 1
Having shown the corruption of the papal court and introduced the ways in
which the king’s court corrupts the clergy, Langland provides more hope for earthly
justice in his description of the king himself. The king enters the vision leading the
knights, so emphasizing that his place in the social hierarchy depends on his
leadership of the nobility. The King and his retinue are followed by the source of his
power:

the might of the communes.

Whether this is truly the power of the

parliamentary Commons, as Giancarlo asserts, 2 or Donaldson’s more general
‘community,’ 3 the important point for the purpose of this project is that in both cases
1

See chapter 1.
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the assent of the community is paramount for the king to hold his position with
authority:
“Thanne kam ther a Kyng: Knyghthod hym ladde;
Might of the communes made hym to regne.
And thane cam Kynde Wit and clerkes he made,
For to counseillen the Kyng and the Commune to save.
The Kyng and Knyghthod and Clergie bothe
Casten that the Commune sholde hem [communes] fynde.
The Commune contrived of Kynde wit craftes,
And for profit of al the peple plowmen ordeyned
To tilie and to travaille as trewe life asketh.
The Kyng and the Commune and Kynde Wit the thridde
Shopen lawe and leaute – ech lif to know his owene”
[B.Prol.112-122]

The King’s role as guardian of his people is emphasized in the fact that the first duty
of Kynde Wit (native intelligence) and the clerkly advisors is to use their knowledge
to guide the King and protect the people. After protection, the King’s next obligation
to his people is to find food for them. 4 None of this is revolutionary but it is
significant that Langland is neither emphasizing the divinity nor power of the king,
nor the people’s duty to obey his laws, but rather he focuses on the responsibilities

4
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that come to the king along with his position.

These were responsibilities of

particular significance in the contemporary climate of discontent about the treatment
of laborers, and the raising of taxes to finance overseas wars, which all centered on
the relationship between the King and the people. 5 Langland emphasizes that it is the
community working together from King to plowman that creates a harmonious
society of law and justice with each person given due measure, ‘ech lif to know his
owene,’ within that stratification. Robertson and Huppé’s equating of ‘ech lif to
know his owene,’ with 1 Cor. x. 24: ‘Nemo quod suum est quaerat’ and St.
Augustine’s ‘amor sui,’ the opposite of true charity, which in turn led them to
interpret the lines that follow as flattery or satire, 6 was extensively countered by
Kean’s explanation of how Langland is setting out ‘a straightforward statement of
ideas which are essential to the plan of his poem’ 7 by repeating conventional
formulas that echo the work of Aquinas and Justinian’s Digest of Roman law.
Langland is not promoting social change but rather the importance of king and
commune working together at every level for a strong society. The king provides law
and order and, in return, the people, represented by the plowmen in this passage, work
together to provide for everyone’s needs. The role of the king and his lords is to
divide those provisions justly. Donaldson’s reading of the phrase ‘ech lif to know his

5

For details of the peasants’ discontents see The English Rising of 1381. Ed. R.H. Hilton and T.H.
Aston. Cambridge, 1984 and the work of Anthony Musson, Medieval Law in context. The Growth of
legal consciousness from Magna Carta to the Peasants’ Revolt. Manchester, 2001; also with W.M.
Ormond, The Evolution of English Justice: Law, Politics and Society in the Fourteenth Century.
London, 1999.
6

D. W. Robertson and B.F. Huppé, Piers Plowman and Scriptural Tradition (Princeton, 1951): 27.

7

P.M. Kean, “Love, Law & Lewte in Piers Plowman.” The Review of English Studies 15. No.59
(Aug, 1964) (Oxford, UP): 241-261.
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owene’ as ‘so that each man might know his place’ is not incompatible with a reading
of the passage that sees this idea not as one of oppression but as one of support and
right, i.e. not that each man is forced to remain in his place in society but that each
man can be assured of his right to that place in society along with the protections that
come with it. Kean’s understanding of ‘his owne’ as referring to the material things
that are ‘his own property’ is equally possible within this idea of rights and
protections. In a peaceful society of law and order, a man can feel confident that his
material possessions are safe or that he will be reimbursed if they are not. As
Aquinas illustrated in his Summa, 8 a peaceful society is built on man’s contentment
with his lot, an idea that Langland is emphasizing here as the proper result of the
king’s work.
The king and the people together with their natural reasoning shape the law.
As detailed in chapter three, the law is considered a product of divine justice revealed
to all men through reason, not simply the arbitrary whims of a powerful man. King
and commune are equal partners in the relationship; there is no suggestion that there
should be any form of bondage involved. Quite the contrary, since the king leads the
knighthood about whom there were distinct contemporary ideals of behavior as being
constantly protective of their charges, both in terms of their physical and moral wellbeing. Again, there is nothing new here: examples of these ideas can be found in the
numerous chivalric biographies and handbooks of chivalry from the medieval period,
which range in focus from Riamon Llull’s thirteenth-century emphasis on the
importance of a knight’s religious life to enable him to uphold a Christian society, to
8

Summa Theologica II.II, q.66 a. 2. ‘per hoc magis pacificus status hominum conservatur, dum
unusquisque re sua contentus est.’

141

the more practical advice of Geoffroi de Charny who details the knightly way of life
and its practical difficulties, for example cautioning against entering tournaments
before gaining sufficient skill in horsemanship! 9

Langland is placing his king

squarely at the head of a group who should be actively involved in the social relief of
the people.
Langland introduces ambiguity and a different perspective after this positive
introduction of the king by moving immediately to the ‘leene’‘lunatik.’ who kneels to
speak ‘clergially’ to the king and praises his rule thus:
Crist kepe thee, sire Kyng, and thi kyngryche,
And lene thee lede thi lond so leaute thee lovye,
And for thi rightful ruling be rewarded in hevene! (B.Pro.125-8)
The lunatic firmly defines the King’s role as leading the kingdom to justice, for which
he will be rewarded in heaven. Again, his emphasis is on the King’s responsibilities.
However, should ‘leene’ alert the reader that the lunatic’s words are equally empty
and thin on truth or is the lunatic simply an ascetic who does not indulge himself? If
the clergy are not to be trusted should no attention be paid to a man who speaks
‘clergially’ or does it indicate that he is learned? After all, as Kean has noted, his
speech mirrors Aquinas’ discussion on the proper rewards of kingship and the
following fable concludes with the ideas of Aquinas’ De Regimine. 10 Is this madman
who speaks like a spiritual advisor really a holy fool, the only one left speaking the
truth in a dystopic ‘feeld of folk’ where the other clergy are too busy working for

9

Cf Richard Barber, The Knight and Chivalry (London, 1970): 146.

10

Kean, 241-61.
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their own benefit to trouble about the community? As a clergyman, he is allowed to
address the King with the term ‘thou.’ Does that mean he is of equal standing as this
king? It seems unlikely that Langland should reference Aquinas so frequently in his
poem and not be aware that he is echoing his words now, and there is no suggestion
that Aquinas was anything less than earnest. Nonetheless, Langland leaves open both
the possibility that the lunatic is speaking the truth or that he is simply mad, perhaps
backing away from any criticism that may be implied by a real King who is not
governing according to these principles.
However, the lunatik’s message is backed up by an ‘aungel of hevene,’ who
descends to expand his message in learned Latin. The Angel quotes anonymous
Leonine verses from an early fourteenth-century sermon which warn the King that he
will not always be king and should bear in mind that his true reward will be in
heaven. To do justice on earth therefore he must act religiously by interpreting the
naked letter of the law in divine terms. 11 To be just is to be godly:
”Sum Rex, sum Princeps”; neutrum fortasse deinceps!
O qui iura regis Christi specialia regis,
Hoc quod agas melius – iustus es, esto pius!
Nudum ius a te vestiri vult pietate.
Qualia vis metere, tali grana sere:
Si ius nudatur, nudo de iure metatur;

11

For the significance of the inclusion of mercy in the administration of the law, see chapter three
above.
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Si seritur pietas, de pietate metas. (B.Prologue: 132-138) 12

Again the emphasis in this passage is on the King’s responsibilities, on his duty, not
only to his people to effect justice, but also, to God himself: as a good Christian, the
King must show mercy and rule religiously, but he must also have a sense of what is
owed to God by his earthly deputy.
It is only a ‘goliardeis, a gloton of wordes’ who counters this, ‘gloton’
underlining the contrast with the ‘leene’ lunatic. Like the angel, he too speaks in
Latin, but his emphasis is not on the King’s spiritual duties but on his earthly ones to
uphold the civil law. He angrily answers the angel saying: ‘Dum ‘rex’ a ‘regere’
dicatur nomen habere, / Nomen habet sinere nisi studet iura tenere.’ [Inasmuch as a
king has his name from (the fact of ) being a ruler [ultimately the word rex is from
regere ‘to rule’], he possesses the name (alone) without the reality unless he is
zealous in maintaining the laws.] His argument suggests that the responsibility of the
King is to the civil law, but the argument’s limitations are revealed in the commune’s
interjection of the absolutist Roman law that they advocate out of fear: “Precepta
Regis sunt nobis vincula legis!” (B.Prol.153) [The King’s bidding has for us the
binding force of law]. 13 A King who limits himself to the letter of the civil law and

12

‘(You say) ‘I am King, I am Ruler’; you may perhaps be neither in future. O you who administer the
sublime laws of Christ the King, in order to do better what you do, as you are just, be godly! Naked
law requires to be clothed by you with a sense of your duty to God. Sow such grain as you wish to
reap. If the law is nakedly administered by you, then let [judgment] be measured out [to you]
according to the letter. If goodness is sown [by you], may you reap goodness.’
13

This is a paraphrase of the Digest: ‘Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem’ (I. iv. I, Ulpianus)
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its inevitable inconsistencies and injustices may create an ordered society but not one
of justice but rather of repression. 14
Langland illustrates this with an example from a 1376 sermon by Bishop
Brinton of a troop of rats and small mice who are in the thrall of a cat. They plan to
put a warning bell around its neck but though they get the bell there is no-one brave
enough to attach it. A wise mouse suggests that they should just leave the cat alone
since even if they were to have killed it, another would come and take its place, and
the problem would begin again. Better to leave the cat his freedom to seek bigger
prey than to turn his attention to them. Furthermore, he comments, better that they
deal with the predictable cat than have the whims of a kitten to deal with:
For I herde my sire seyn, is seven yeer ypassed,
“Ther the cat is a kitoun, the court is ful elenge.”
That witnessth Holy Writ, whoso wole it rede –
Ve terre ubi puer rex est, &c.

(B.Prol. 193-6)

This last reference to Ecclesiastes 10:16, “Woe to the land where the king is a child”
is generally agreed to refer to the death of Edward III and accession of Richard II at
the age of ten - though typically Langland removes himself from the implied criticism
firstly by having it spoken by a mouse, secondly by placing it in a dream and finally
by disingenously telling others to interpret it because he dare not “(What this metels

14

Roman lawyers accepted that the law itself could not encapsulate justice which was why they placed
so much emphasis on the intent of the law and the underlying logic that tied the law together.
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bymeneth, ye men that ben murye, / Devyne ye – for I ne dar, by deere God in
heven)!” (B.Prol.209-210) 15
For the wise mouse, the important thing is order. He does not want to disrupt
the status quo because men, cat, rats and mice currently all have their place in the
social order:
For may no renk ther reste have for ratons by nyghte.
For many mennes malt we mees wolde destruye,
And also ye route of ratons rende mennes clothes,
Nere the cat of the court that kan you overlepe;
For hadde ye rattes your [raik] ye kouthe noght rule yowselve.
(B.Prol.197-201)
The rats cannot rule themselves, so without the tyranny of the cat there would
be the worse state of chaos; the king would have failed to keep his peace, one of his
first duties as the people’s protector. Langland moves from there to describe the
corruption of lawyers detailed in chapter one so there is no doubt from the Prologue
that responsibility for the just and peaceful ordering of society rests firmly with the
King: the clergy cannot be relied upon to protect the people spiritually nor can the
sergeants at the Barre be relied on to enact justice. The people’s protection rests with
the king alone, for good or bad.
Langland is no revolutionary. His poem advocates the central importance of
order over violent action, stressing the role of the law and that the King should be a
leader in love. Kean noted that the Lunatic’s use of the idea of the King being ‘the
15

Samantha Rayner points out (in Images of Kingship in Chaucer and his Ricardian contemporaries.
D.S Brewer, Cambridge, 2008: 39) that sermons on the accession of Richard II usually used the verses
of Isaiah 11:6 “and a little child shall lead them.”
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‘leader’ in relation to Love and Law’ 16 echoes Aquinas’ use of the idea of the King
directing or steering the kingdom in the right direction with the image of king as
helmsman. He goes on to illustrate that the idea that the King should administer the
laws rightly and voluntarily accept to be bound by the Law, despite the fact that
legally no-one could restrain him, was a commonplace, both in the writings of
Aquinas and in popular literature of the time such as the Secreta Secretorum.
Furthermore, it was a part of the coronation oath both in the Latin form: ‘concedis
iustas leges et consuetudinis esse tenendas….?’ and in the French: ‘Sire, graunte
vous a tenir et garder le Loys, et les custumes droitureles, les quiels la Communaute
de vostre roiaume aura esleu?’ 17 But the need for strong leadership extends to more
than the upholding of the law but also to making sound decisions and it is this that
will be emphasized in the ensuing passages.

The C-text sets out the duties of the

King in order at lines 381-2:
So comune cleymeth of a kyng thre kynne thynges,
Lawe, loue, and leaute, and hym lord antecedent.
The people have a claim and right to their king upholding the law, keeping the peace
and ensuring earthly justice. Thus, Langland’s initial vision of kingship ends with
hope for a just society in the promise of a good king, but it is a hope tempered with
realism through Langland’s description of the corrupt clergy undermining the
people’s hopes of spiritual health, and corrupt lawyers disabling earthly systems of

16

Kean, 244.

17

Ibid., 246. Kean is quoting from a discussion by E.T. Donaldson in Piers Plowman: the C-Text and
its Poet, (New Haven, 1949):106 where Donaldson discusses the oath but not the speech of the
Goliardeis in relation to it.

147

justice, while oblique references to real kings of the last century highlight their very
real shortcomings.
Langland then uses the trial of Lady Mede in Passus II to explore the
principles by which a king should be guided in forming an administration. When the
dreamer describes his first sight of Lady Mede, he details the richness of her attire
and describes her crown as equal to the King’s own. The dreamer comments that
‘Hire array me ravysshed, swich richesses saugh I nevere’ (B.II.17), illustrating
through the transporting idea of ‘ravysshed’ how easy it is to be distracted from a
goal on a personal level through fascination with Mede. In contrast, Holy Church
describes Mede as someone who ‘hath noyed me ful ofte’ (B.II.20) because of the
ways in which she has corrupted not only her followers but also those who administer
both the secular and spiritual laws. Holy Church is not carried away; she leaves no
doubt that Mede is anything but a negative influence. The dreamer is on a search for
Truth, and Holy Church quickly warns that Mede is ‘manered after’ her father, False,
who has never spoken the truth. The dreamer is warned that Mede is fickle and
treacherous, and though he may learn all about men from watching her, he must guard
himself from her temptations. It is the alliance of Fals with Cyvylle and Symonye
that allows for the marriage of Mede to Fals-Fikel tonge, but after the false
documents have been prepared they must still be witnessed in Westminster; ultimate
earthly authority still resides in the King’s name, however much that name might
have been appropriated by others. The King is warned of the impending arrival of so
many miscreants by Truth and angrily summons all of these characters to his court.
Langland then gives his most extended example of leadership and governance in the
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poem by assembling characters representing the various administrative departments
of the court, and peopling it further with personifications of sins and virtues and
abstract moral principles. This allows him to put forward an array of perspectives on
a multitude of often conflicting ideas, from wealth to greed, just and unjust reward,
Civil Law and Simony, Fals and Truth.
Langland’s King shows his instant mastery of the obvious villains,
immediately threatening Fals, Favel, Falsnesse, Gyle, and Lyere with hanging.
However, he emphasizes that their punishment shall be based on the law: “right as the
lawe loke[th], lat falle on hem alle!’ (B.II.198) so that even in his retribution he is
acting justly. Furthermore, when Lady Mede is brought before him, he is courteous
to his prisoner, calling a clerk and asking him ‘To take Mede the maide and maken
hire at ease.’ (B.III.4) It is hard to see any criticism of the King’s behavior here,
since there is no evidence that the King has been fascinated by Mede, but rather it
should be noted that he is acting chivalrously and ensuring that her rights as an
accused but not convicted noblewoman are respected. This is a King in charge.
However, the dangers of giving Mede any quarter become instantly apparent
in the description of the small court she forms around herself in her chamber:
‘Ac ther was murthe and mynstralcie Mede to plese;
That wonyeth at Westmynstre worshipeth hire all.
Gentilliche with joye the justices somme
Busked hem to the bour there the burde dwellede,
Conforted hyre kyndely by Clergies leve,
And seiden, “Mourne noght, Mede, ne make thow no sorwe,
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For we wol wisse the Kyng and thi wey shape
To be wedded at thi wille and wher thee leef liketh.’ (B.III.11-18)
Mede thanks the lawyers who come to her aid, and promises them all social
advancement to go with the gold, silver and jewelry that she distributes. She then
goes about corrupting the confessor with the suggestion that he overlook her sins in
exchange for a stained glass window, and persuades the mayor to allow merchants to
sell at unreasonable prices. By the time that Mede meets the King therefore, the
reader is prepared to see her manipulate him also. However, although the King
forgives her for her attempted marriage to Fals, he wisely recognizes the dangers she
poses and insists that instead she should marry Conscience, a suggestion to which
Conscience objects vehemently before listing the many ways in which she has
corrupted all levels of society, from Kings and Popes to widows and monks. The
warning is both general and personal, for Conscience tells the King: ‘Youre fader she
felled through false biheste.’ Since Edward III was probably on the throne at the date
of Langland’s writing, this could refer to the murder of Edward II but more probably
refers to the bankruptcy of the Black Prince who supported Pedro of Castile’s
campaign to regain his kingdom from Henry of Trastamara at his own expense only
to find that Pedro would not pay him the money promised for that support. Langland
makes the point that one of the responsibilities of a good king is to use sound
judgment in leadership, while giving an example that could be a specific king or any
one.
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The contemporary references continue, as outlined in Chapter 1, 18 in the many
ways in which the example of Lady Mede make most sense in the parliamentary
setting if interpreted as a reference to Alice Perrers, the mistress of Edward III. After
detailing the ways in which many levels of society can be corrupted by Mede,
Conscience warns the king that she spreads woes around her:
Ther she is wel with the kyng, wo is the reaume –
For she is favorable to Fals and defouleth truthe ofte. (B.III.153-4)
In particular, she corrupts the workings of the law with her bribes and payoffs on
settlement days, so that honest men have no chance of reparation through litigation,
the only system in place for earthly justice. The result is that ‘povere men may have
no power to pleyne though thei smerte, / Swich a maister is Mede among men of
goode.’ (B.III.169). The emphasis of this passage is therefore both that the king
should avoid Mede for the danger that she can lead him into personally – as she did
his father – but also for the danger that she poses to his ability to carry out his role as
king i.e. to protect and guide his people.
Mede tries to sway the king by answering in her defence that rather than being
a danger to good government, she is essential to it for she ensures the smooth running
of the social order by providing the king with gifts to give his people:
It bicometh to a kyng that kepeth a reaume
To yeve [men mede] that mekely hym serveth –
To aliens and to alle men, to honouren hem with yiftes;
Mede maketh hym beloved and for a man holden.

18

See pp 44-45 referencing Matthew Giancarlo’s argument in “Piers Plowman, Parliament, and the
Public Voice.” YLS 17: 135-173.
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Emperours and erles and alle manere lordes
Thorugh yiftes han yonge men to yerne and to ryde.
The Pope and alle prelates presents underfongen
And medeth men hemselven to mayntene hir lawes,
Servaunts for hire service, we seeth wel the soth,
Taken mede of hir maistres, as thei mowe acorde. (B.III.209-218)
Although the king is moved by Mede’s defence – ‘By Crist, as me thynketh / Mede is
worthi the maistrie to have!’ (B.III.228-9) – Conscience is not. Again Langland
adopts an ambiguous position: since conscience is obviously a personification and
Reason has yet to be summoned, which part of the King’s mind is swayed by her
argument? If it is Kynde Wit, the inference must be that all men, even kings, are
essentially material creatures. Whatever the inference, the importance of Conscience
in guiding the King is emphasized.
Conscience points out that God has created two types of meed: the one that is
given by God as a reward for living a righteous life, and the other that is simply an
earthly temptation. Doing justice to each man means that an honest wage is fair
payment; as detailed above, ‘it is no manere mede but a mesurable hire’ (B.III.266),
just as commerce is not Mede but rather should be an honest exchange. Conscience’s
first speech has already listed the ways in which bribery and corruption prevent these
honest exchanges. The implication is that it is for the king to establish a regimen
whereby men are encouraged to live a just life, not because it will bring them earthly
riches but because it will bring with it a just reward. Conscience then describes an
ideal state when:
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.. love and lowenesse and leautee togideres –
Thise shul ben maistres on moolde [trewe men] to save.
And whoso trespaseth ayein truthe or taketh ayein his wille,
Leaute shal don hym lawe, and no life ellis.
Shal no sergeant for his service were a silk howve
Ne no pelure in his [pavilioun] for pledynge at the barre. [B.III.291-296]
which fits in with the idea that justice is for the humble as much as for the mighty,
and is not to be regulated by the administrators of the common law but rather by an
abstract, conceptual idea of justice based on the divine law. In such a scenario, the
good King becomes analogous to the Messiah in that his work’s natural conclusion is
the end of the administrative state of the temporal government when all men are
judged on a divine scale. Conscience imagines an ideal state where:
Shal neither kyng ne knight, constable ne meire
Over[carke] the commune ne to the court sompne,
Ne putte hem in panel to doon hem plighte hir truthe;
But after the dede that is doon oon doom shal rewarde
Mercy or no mercy as Truth [moste] acorde.
‘Kynges court and commune court, consistorie and chapitle –
Al shal be but oon court, and oon b[ur]n be justice. [B.IV.315-321]
Although it appears extreme and apocalyptic to the modern ear, this tone was a
common part of contemporary sermons. Most importantly for our purposes, it is the
actions of the king that lead the people to a state of peaceful justice but he is as bound
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by its rules as they are. Langland makes it clear that no man in the current social
hierarchy, be he ‘kyng’ or ‘meire’, can escape the constraints of true justice.
Mede attempts to answer Conscience by quoting a line from Proverbs that
appears to illustrate that the giving of gifts is good, but Conscience quickly points out
that she has dishonestly quoted only half of the scriptural line to bend it to her
purposes; she has overlooked that part of the passage which warns that the taking of
gifts (i.e. bribes) leads to corruption. In the reference to scripture, Langland is
emphasizing the importance of being guided by a moral code and also of
understanding the whole of a law not just part of it, perhaps suggesting that a wise
King must be sure of both the learning and the judgment of his advisors.

By

implication he is also endorsing the Roman idea that justice is only to be found in the
ways in which laws fit together, by an understanding of a complete moral code rather
than in the letter of an individual law.
The King of the first vision does not know how to reconcile the two opposing
voices of Conscience and Mede, despite the fact that Langland has presented Mede’s
arguments as indefensible positions. The only rational interpretation of this is that the
fascination of Mede is so great that conscience alone is not enough to overcome it,
however much more objectively compelling his arguments may be. Despite the
implied criticism, the king should at least be commended for being wise enough to
recognize his own shortcomings and for turning to Reson for help, symbolically
placing Reson right by his side. As detailed in chapter two, since reason is the faculty
by which the king shall know natural justice, this is a hopeful sign. Waryn Wisdom
and Witty her fere – Worldly Knowledge and Intelligence – hope to sidetrack him,
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but Conscience warns Reason of their self-serving motivations and Reason ignores
them. However, rather than dealing with Mede, Reason is now sought to arbitrate in
the dispute between Wrong and Peace.
As explained in chapters two and three, this is a poem that emphasizes the
importance of the tempering of law and justice with Mercy. However in this episode,
even though Peace is willing to accept monetary compensation from Wrong and
‘forgyve hym that gilt with a good wille’ (B.IV.101), the King refuses to drop his
desire for Wrong to be punished in a way that makes him suffer, arguing that ‘Lope
he so lightly, laughen he wolde / And eft the boldere be to bete myne hewen.’
(B.IV.107) The King stands firm against the easy solution that Mede offers to the
problem on the principle that Wrong must be prevented from acting in the same way
again. Since neither Conscience nor the King can be persuaded differently, Reason is
approached to ask for mercy. However, Reason takes an even firmer tone demanding
that no-one should ask him for Mercy until society as a whole is virtuous and just,
‘Til the Kynges counseil be the commune profit’ (B.IV.123) or ‘While Mede hath the
maistrie in this moot-halle.’(B.IV.135) Reason takes the emphatic absolutist doctrine
of Innocent III’s just judge of De Contemptu Mundi who leaves no evil man
unpunished and no good man unrewarded to reject Mede’s influence decisively and
give the King’s decision additional moral force:
That I were kyng with coroune to kepen a reaume,
Sholde never Wrong in this world that I wite myghte
Ben unpunysshed in my power, for peril of my soule,
Ne get my grace thorugh giftes, so me God save!
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Ne for no medehave mercy, but mekeness it made;
For “Nullum malum the man meet with inpunitum
And bad Nullum bonum be irremuneratum.” (B.IV. 138-144)
In addition, Reason promises that if his argument is followed then “Lawe shal ben a
laborer and lede afeld donge / And Love shal lede thi lond as the leef liketh.’
(B.IV.145-146). The relegating of Law to a laborer illustrates not only how both the
biblical, canon and civil laws should be working to establish justice but also how
these laws should be useful tools when effected properly. The striking image that
they ‘lede afeld donge’ contains both the idea that they can disperse the lowest forms
of nature and also that they can put that baseness to good use by disposing of it
effectively, here by reference to its common use as fertilizer. The reference again to
Love leading the land further enforces the idea of a society working for the benefit of
all.
Reson speaks powerfully here and it is hard to see how there might be
criticism of his idealism except that it is exactly that, i.e. an ideal only, which
Langland illustrates in the way that the speech is received:
Clerkes that were confessours coupled hem togideres
Al to construe this clause, and for the Kynges profit,
Ac noght for confort of the commune, ne for the Kynges soule,
For I seigh Mede in the moot-halle on men of lawe wynke,’
And they laughynge lope to hire and lefte Reson manye.
Waryn Wisdom wynked upon Mede
And seide, ‘Madame, I am youre man, what so my mouth jangle;
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(B.IV.149-155)
Man’s weakness of nature and propensity to sin means that Reason’s ideal state will
always be fighting against corrupt officials, who seek to bend whatever rules might be
in place for their own good. The law here is a tool for corruption rather than for good
and, worse still, corruption in the King’s name. Langland is clear that when the law
is not being used to benefit ‘the commune,’ although the King may profit from it, his
soul is the poorer for it. The strong implication is that when the King allows those in
administration to be influenced by Mede instead of encouraged to work for the
common good, he has failed to live up to the responsibilities of his position and his
soul will bear the burden of that. The politician’s argument that might be offered in
the King’s defence, that he is doing what necessity or compromise demands, is neatly
cut off by the admission of Wordly-Wise that he is Mede’s man, whatever he may say
to the contrary.
Nonetheless, Langland provides hope with the description of ‘mooste peple in
the halle and manye of the grete’ (B.IV.159) agreeing with Reason and damning
Mede while the commoners in the hall join in with a more colorful epithet. Given the
contemporary backdrop of the Peasant’s Revolt and the tumultuous parliaments of the
fourteenth century, it is important that Langland includes amongst the righteous
‘many of the grete;’ it is not the authority of the upper classes, per se, that makes
them unjust, only the way in which they choose to exercise that authority, and their
damning of Mede in their terms puts them on an equal moral footing with the
commoners who damn her in theirs.
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Now the King agrees with Conscience and Reason, and appears to be about to
provide an example of good leadership. However, his anger that Mede has almost
destroyed the law is diverted to focus on the law itself, which he criticizes
emphatically, but ironically not because it has been a source of injustice but rather
because it has caused him to lose money. Even at this stage, the King cannot be said
to have understood the lessons of Conscience and Reason since he is now doing the
right thing but for the wrong reason. He is being guided by his desire for the wrong
meed but it nonetheless leads him to the right conclusion: he ends the Mede episode
by saying ‘I wole have leaute in lawe’ (B.IV.180) so fulfilling the coronation oath and
finally taking the advice of the lunatic of the Prologue. Is the implication that actions
the King takes to advance himself inevitably advance the good of the people as a
whole in a sort of medieval version of modern Republicans’ ‘trickle down’ economic
argument?
Langland does not elaborate but puts the emphasis instead on ‘leaute’ as the
starting point of good governance. Kean has examined the literary and popular use of
lewte in detail 19 to show that earlier critics’ reading of lewte as ‘scrupulous regard for
law’ or ‘strict adherence to the letter of the law’ does not make sense in the context of
Love and lewte being the two forces needed to defeat the work of Lady Mede and her
followers.

Instead, he proposes two most useful contexts in which to view

Langland’s usage of the word: firstly, the idea of ‘loyalty’ or ‘fidelity’ (such as shown
by Noah in the Cursor Mundi 20 when God promises to save him ‘for 3our true leute,’
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Kean, 241-61.

20

Ibid., 255. Kean quotes from MS. Go (umlaut)ttingen 1655 and notes that Cotton and Trinity omit
‘treu’ while Fairfax reads ‘for thi ri3twisnes and thi lewte.’
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and in Barbour’s Bruce where the list of Douglas’ faithkeeping virtues ends with a
praise of ‘leawte’ itself); 21 and, secondly, the idea of ‘living righteously,’ of living
well. Both the example of Noah and the Barbour include both of these ideas, which
leads Kean to conclude that the most important reading of lewte is to signify the
Aristotelian virtue of Justice - defined in the Nicomachean Ethics as ‘complete
virtue, but not absolutely, but in relation to our neighbour.’ 22 Kean summarizes this
concept of justice as follows:
The main points which Aristotle makes concerning this ‘justice in a wide
sense’, and which St. Thomas reproduces, may be summed up as follows: it is
coextensive with virtue (Ethics, v.i, ii; Summa, II.II. q.58 a. 5-6); it is virtue
directed towards one’s neighbour (Ethics, V.I; Summa, ibid., a.12); it is linked
to law because practically the majority of the acts commanded by the law are
those which are prescribed from the point of view of virtue taken as a whole;
for the law bids us practice every virtue and forbids us to practice any vice.
(Ethics, v. II. 1130b)
If we accept Aristotle’s idea of justice as the aim, the King’s promise to have ‘leaute
in lawe’ is a promise to make the law serve the community as a whole, to have justice
for every man in relation to his neighbor. Reason and Conscience support him
emphatically so that the episode ends with an upbeat sense of a new society governed
by moral principles that allows for communal hope. When the King says, at the end
of the Passus, ‘Als longe as oure lyf lasteth, lyve we togideres!’ it seems that he is not
only addressing Conscience and Reason, who have agreed to be bound to him, but
rather the community as a whole, in the hope that good governance will enable them
to live peacefully together.
21

Kean quotes from Barbour (i. 365-74): Leavte to luff is gretumly; / Throuch leavte liffis men
rychtwisly: / With A wertu [of] leavte / A man may 3eit sufficyand be: / And but leawte may nane
haiff price, / Quhethir he be wycht or he be wys; / For quhar It fail3eys, na wertu / May be off price, na
off valu, / To mak A Man sa gud, that he / May simply gud man callyt be.
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The second vision begins with Reason preaching to the ‘feld of folk,’ heavy
handedly listing in detail the varied number of ways in which they are sinful. Most
importantly, for the purposes of this project, his counsel to the King is to love his
common subjects since ‘It is thi tresor, if treson ne were, and tryacle at thy nede.’
(B.V.49) The C-text, written after the 1381 Peasant’s Revolt, omits this reference to
popular treason making the image even more powerful. The people are the King’s
earthly treasure in that they are ultimately the source of all his temporal wealth, but
they are also a source of spiritual wealth in that the way he fulfills his obligations to
them now will have direct consequence for him in the afterlife. The obligations are
not limited to the King however. By surrounding him with the people and their
manifold shortcomings, Langland is suggesting that they play a part in governance
too. It is not for the King to manage their sins but for them to take responsibility for
their own actions and fulfill their part of the social contract. To do this, like the
dreamer, they too must look for Truth in their own lives.
It is the plowman, the epitome of the honest laborer, who is the only one able
to lead the people to Truth. Theologie has introduced the figure of the laborer worth
his hire – ‘dignus est operarius his hire to have’ - in Passus II (B.II.123) when he
quotes from Luke 10:7 to show the link between reward and the “Truthe” of a good
life. We know that Langland does not object to payment for good work done since
the dreamer comments that minstrels entertain ‘And geten gold with hire glee –
[gilt]less, I leeve,’ (B.Prol.34) and he does not object to the honest trade of merchants
and workers since Conscience explains in Passus III that the money:
That laborers and lewede [leodes] taken of hire maistres,
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It is no manere mede but a mesurable hire.
In marchaundise is no mede, I may it wel avowe:
It is a permutacion apertly – a pennyworth for another. (B.III.255-258)
The key is that there is a fair exchange since all men are bound to do justice by their
neighbor. Piers explains that true satisfaction comes from having ‘that I wan with
truthe, and namoore’ (B.VI.96), a position which contrasts dramatically with that of
the examples of the corrupt officials surrounding Mede.
The mutuality of the relationship between the nobility and the people is the
focus of the episode at the beginning of Passus VI when the knight offers to help
Piers plow the half acre for him. The knight recognizes that Piers has wisdom to
offer him and is not so attached to his position and dignity that he cannot seek help
from him. Rather, he regards Piers as an equal, and shows his willingness to do
Piers’ work for him despite the fact that he has never been shown how to lead a
plough-team. In turn, Piers recognizes the graciousness of the spirit of the knight’s
offer, but turns it down, equally politely, on the grounds that he needs the protection
that comes from the knight actively taking care of the responsibilities of his own
degree in order to complete his work in peace:
…I shal swynke and swete and sowe for us bothe,
And [ek] labour[e] for thi love al my life tyme,
In covenaunt that thow kepe Holy Kirke and myselve
Fro wastours and fro wikked men that this world destruyeth;
And go hunte hardiliche to hares and foxes,
To bores and to bukkes that breken down myne hegges;
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And go affaite thi faucons wilde foweles to kille,
For thei cometh to my croft and croppeth my whete.’
Curteisly the knyght thanne co[nseyved] thise wordes:
‘By my power, Piers, I plighte thee my trouthe
To fulfille this forward, though I fighte sholde;
Als longe as I lyve I shal thee mayntene.’ (B.VI.25-36)
The knight’s duties are to protect the Church and the people from the actions of the
wicked and idle, and to enable the people to do their work without fear of attack.
Importantly, it is only as a last resort, when the people are threatened, that the knight
will be forced to resort to fighting. Piers agrees to this bargain but adds one more
condition, that in dealing with his tenants, the knight only demand what is justly owed
to him and, in cases when he would be fully justified in fining them, ‘lat mercy be
taxour / And mekenesse thi maister, maugree Medes chekes.’ (B.VI.39-40) The
emphasis on Mercy is part of this image of mutuality, an understanding of the
common humanity that binds men and the need for compassion in the administration
of a just society. The work of the one estate affects the condition of the other, and
vice versa. Giving an example of the people righting their own wrongs, when the
work begins it is Piers who first admonishes the lazy and wasteful. However, he is
unsuccessful and turns to the knight for his promised protection. The knight in turn
warns Wastour that he must change his ways ‘Or thow shalt abigge by the lawe, by
the ordre that I bere!’ (B.VI. 166) The knight does not threaten him with force but
with the power of the law, and this too is ineffectual. It is only Hunger, a force of
necessity, that compels everyone to work so that Piers is able to ‘yaf hem mete as he
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myghte aforthe and mesurable hyre.’ (B.VI.198) Again, each man gets what is due to
him in return for his ‘mesurable hyre.’
Langland uses this episode to comment on the duties of leadership.

He

suggests that there is a point of ease at which men will not respond to the usual tools
used to maintain order, i.e. social custom/pressure and the law because they are so
comfortable in their lot. Their energies then are directed not towards honest work but
towards complaints and laziness. Piers is a harsh taskmaster in calling in Hunger to
motivate them to work again, but his method is effective for so long as it lasts, and he
then gives them the benefit that comes as a result of that work. Piers’ authority lies in
his independent moral certainty, which would be a dangerous tool if it were not
moderated by moral principles. Once again, Langland’s message is ambiguous: is it
justifiable for a leader to put his people through suffering for the greater good? This
episode would suggest so, except that Langland ends the Hunger passage with the
people once more eating well and complaining of ‘the Kyng and his Counseil after /
Swich lawes to loke, laborers to greve.’ (B.VI.315-6) The overall message of the
passage is the benefits of all things in moderation but it also suggests that a virtuous
king can impose hard measures on his people for their greater good. The important
point, of course, is that it must be for the people’s good, not his own.
In terms of leadership however, the model of Piers and the second vision as a
whole foregrounds the importance of all levels of society working together in a
relationship of respect and harmony for the common good. Piers is a decisive leader
who delegates efficiently, and both asks for the help that he needs and knows when to
decline it. His profound moral center and faith give him the certainty he needs to
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pursue aggressive tactics to achieve his goals. Although his authority is limited on
earth through his equivocal position as lowly plowman, Piers is a model of the sort of
leadership a King should display. Since the ultimate goal is a place in the heavenly
Kingdom, and Piers is the one who knows the way, the message of this vision is that
all men, of whatever degree, can achieve salvation if they take a moral approach to
the duties that come with their station in life.
In contrast to the second vision’s emphasis on community, the third vision
(the so-called ‘vita’) of the dreamer focuses on the individual’s responsibilities to lead
a virtuous life rather than the importance of a co-operative community. However, the
same leveling of all stations in the social hierarchy underpins the advice the dreamer
receives. In Passus X, Scripture tells Will that he is no further off than the nobility in
his attempts to find salvation:
Kynghod ne knyghthold, by noght I kan awayte,
Helpeth noght to heveneward oone heeris ende,
Ne richesse right noght, ne reautee of lordes.
Will is also reassured through the example of the just pagan emperor Trajan that it is
not only those who have had the opportunity to study Christian teachings who can be
saved. The eponymous character of this medieval legend was the epitome of justice
but since he was damned as a pagan, St. Gregory interceded with God to save to his
soul. However, Trajan is not given as an example because he was a good emperor,
but because he was a good man. Like Scripture, Trajan emphasizes the irrelevance
of status in whether or not a man might be redeemed by pointing out that God could
have made all men rich if he so chose:
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Ac for the beste ben som riche and some beggeres and povere,
For alle are we Cristes creatures, and of his cofres riche,
And bretheren as of oo blood, as wel beggeres as erles. (B.XI.277-9)
In this argument, all men are brothers before Christ and should work together within
their various estates for the good of the community. Each man must work according
to his station towards a good life with the skills and gifts that God has given him.
Kingship is not a focus of the poem again until the harrowing of hell in Passus
XVIII when Christ answers the Devil’s question of who wants to enter hell by saying:
Rex glorie,
The lord of myght and of mayn and alle manere virtues –
Dominus virtutum.
Dukes of this dymme place, anoon undo thise yates,
That Crist may come in, the Kynges sone of Hevene! (B.XVIII 316-21)
At the moment of redemption, Christ’s answer emphasizes his part in the Trinity as
both King of glory and the son of Heaven’s King. The effect of the listing of these
titles is to emphasize Christ’s power, and that is taken up in the next Passus when
Conscience explains to Will why he calls Christ “Crist” rather than “Jesus:”
.. thow konne reson,
That knight, kyng, conqueror may be o persone.
To be called a knyght is fair, for men shul knele to hym;
To be called a kyng is fairer, for he may knyghtes make;
Ac to be conqueror called, that cometh of special grace,
And of hardynesse of herte and of hendenesse –
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To make lordes of laddes, of lond that he wynneth,
And fre men foule thralls, that folwen noght hise lawes.” (B.XIX.26 – 33)
By making these distinctions of rank, Conscience emphasizes both the grace of God
in the redemption, and God’s victory over death, and also the limitations of an earthly
King who can offer only earthly distinction. When Piers returns, he is accompanied
by Spiritus Paraclitus, the Holy Spirit, who Conscience explains is called Grace.
Grace explains the importance of each position in the social hierarchy fulfilling their
role to the best of their ability for the benefit of their fellow man, their ‘bretheren’:
Thynketh [that alle craftes,’ quod Grace], ‘cometh of my yifte;
Loketh that noon lakke oother, but loveth alle as bretheren.
‘And who that moost maistries kan, be mildest of berynge;
And crouneth Conscience kyng, and maketh Craft youre stiward, (B.XIX.255259)
Each person has their own role and different gifts and talents which should be used
for the common good within the hierarchies created by God.

By crowning

Conscience king, Grace calls for everyone to work together according to their
Conscience. 23 Conscience then calls for everyone to take communion together but
this causes only objection from the people who do not want to give up their vices for
holiness. The vision comes to an end with the last image of a lord and a king, both
explaining that they are going to continue taking from the people, the former because
he is following the directions of his accountant and steward, the latter because he
must take what he needs to defend the church and the land. Conscience agrees with
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Sarah Wood finds parallels with medieval sermons for a full theological explication of this passage
in “Ecce Rex”: Piers Plowman B.19.1 – 212 and its contexts.” YLS 21 (2007): 31-56.
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the King but reminds him of the most important condition, that what he asks is truly
what is needed for protection of the kingdom:
‘In condicion,’ quod Conscience, ‘that thow [the commune] defende,
And rule thi reaume in reson, right wol and truthe
That thow [have thyn asking], as the lawe asketh:
Omnia sunt tua ad defendendum set non ad deprehendendum.’ (B.XIX.480-4)
After this Will wakes, so nothing is resolved because although his visions have
revealed the way to salvation they have also revealed that the path involves the
people, commoner and king alike, having to make sacrifices they are unwilling to
make.
So far as the depiction of kingship is concerned, the poem suggests that the
peaceful and just ordering of society depends upon the working of Aristotle’s concept
of each man doing justice to his neighbor, of men of every estate working together for
the common good. Langland is not advocating revolution or any form of new social
order but rather the just working of each man within his capabilities and capacities.
The king is to lead the people towards living a life of ‘truth’ in the general sense of
living a good life, but his position carries great responsibilities in that his power
comes from the will of the people to be led by him, and in return they have a right to
his protection and good guidance. Conscience will only allow him to take from the
people what is needed for their good, not for his own. The relationship is one of
mutual faith and benefit, a hierarchical partnership. Thus, when Christ, the selfproclaimed King of Glory and son of the King of Heaven, tells the Devil
by right and by reson raunsone here my liges:

167

Non veni solvere legem set adimplere.’ (B.XVIII.349-351)
he is explaining that it is not only the laws of the Old and New Testament that he is
fulfilling - not simply that he is doing justice by acting mercifully towards Mankind-,
but also that he is fulfilling his part of the kingly contract created by Mankind’s faith
in him. By taking on the role of their King, he has implicitly agreed to play his part
in their salvation, since Mankind’s service of faith in him demands his reciprocity,
that he act to protect them.
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Chapter 5: The influence of Langland’s view of kingship on the contemporary
courts
Seeking an explanation for a paradigm shift in the law
In looking at the development of the concept of citizenship as the basis for
divisions between people and the most significant factor in determining a person’s legal
status, Kim concludes that “the beginning itself cannot be explained by precedents or
their judicial interpretation. It lies outside.” 1 Kim is explaining that the move from an
understanding of the divisions of personal status being between the ‘free’ and the ‘unfree’
to a division based on a person’s nationality “does not form part of the textual contents of
legal discourse.” He is trying to understand how the law can have moved from one,
ancient, much used and clearly defined distinction, to another that has an utterly different
concept at its heart. Since it cannot be explained through examination of the usual ways
in which laws develop, Kim is forced to the understanding that the use of a completely
different legal platform by which to divide people must have begun in the public sphere
in which the law was practiced, moved from there into the courtroom, and thence statute
and case law.
It is my contention that it is texts such as Piers Plowman that explain that
conceptual shift. Langland understands his poem to be a part of the public discourse, to
be read by the very people developing the institutions he is discussing, and from the
beginning of the poem, discussions of the legal constructs of institutions are
foregrounded. In the Prologue, an angel of heaven first reminds the community of the
distinction between the human institution of the law and the idealization of law as a
1
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reflection of divine justice. It is significant that the angel chooses to use Latin, the
language of the educated elite, because it suggests that his message is directed at them
alone; certainly, the mice, the lowest in the social order, do not understand his message
but are simply afraid for their immediate safety. Only the ‘goliardeis, a gloton of wordes’
and the surrogate for Will in this example, is able both to understand and to respond, also
in Latin. The debate about the authority of earthly institutions is prominently located in
the poem, directed squarely at the educated reader and mediated by the narrator poet.
As detailed in chapter 1, from their school work and clerical studies, the educated
elite had an understanding of the importance of texts to comment and reframe the
language itself and to help them see their contemporary world in a new light through that
process of refashioning. When Will is looking for knowledge in Passus XV, Anima, his
guide, comments that grammar is ‘the ground of al’ (B.XV.370), and notes that a sign of
the current social decay is that rather than enlightening children, language is perplexing
to them because ‘noon of thise newe clerkes … kan versifye faire ne formaliche enditen.’
(B.XV.371-372). Anima’s argument is based on the assumption that a good poet teaches
by making poetry ‘formaliche,’ according to the rules. In this way, he is the keeper of
tradition and truth. In his own role of poet, Langland is using the accepted methods of
learning in the grammar schools and universities (such as the framing and reframing,
visioning and revisioning detailed in chapter 2) to show how he ‘kan versifye’ and
illuminate his contemporary world. It is my contention that what Kim finds in his
examination of the development of the law of alien status is the real world effect of that
illumination.
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In order to show the way in which Piers Plowman can be shown to have played a
part in the legal paradigm shift from ‘free’/’unfree’ to a division based on citizenship, I
will first explain the history of the ‘free’/’unfree’ construct, and then show how the
platform of citizenship to which the law shifted was profoundly different, but rooted
firmly in Langland’s understanding of the ideal role of the monarchy demonstrated in
chapter 4.

The position in the courts: ‘Free’ or ‘unfree’?
The relationship of mutual benefit and respect illustrated in chapter four was very
different from the order imposed in the king’s name in the contemporary courts. At the
beginning of the fourteenth century, the law did not codify the relationship between the
king and his people in terms of mutual benefit and respect. Unlike the personal divisions
in contemporary society, the basis for the distinctions of personal status in the Middle
Ages was not nationality. The Roman concept of slavery was enshrined in the early
common law because of the common law’s basis in Roman law. When the writer known
as Bracton discusses the law of the thirteenth century in his De legibus et consuetudinibus
Angliae (c.1220-50) he explains that “Est autem prima divisio personarum haec et
brevissima, quod omnes homines aut liberi sunt aut serui” [“the primary division of the
law of personal status is simply that all men are either free or unfree”]. 2 His phrase is
almost identical to that of Gaius’ found in a fifth-century manuscript of his Institutes

2
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despite the fact that Gaius was teaching law a millenium earlier in the second century. 3
The principle is found in Justinian’s sixth century compilation of Roman law, Corpus
Iuris, (where it is credited to Gaius) and, later, the author of the late twelfth century
(c.1187) Glanvill spends a lot of time discussing the distinctions between the free and the
unfree which he describes as “natiui” or “aliqui in uilenagio” 4.

The writer of the

thirteenth century Fleta (c.1290) considers this distinction so important that his first
chapter is entirely given over to it, and the contemporaneous Britton (c.1292) similarly
distinguishes those villeins who are free from those in “servage”. Perhaps the strongest
description of this position is found in The Mirror of Justices 5 (also c. 1290) where it is
argued that the unfree status was ordained from time immemorial by divine law, accepted
by human law and confirmed by canon law. Likewise the principle seems to have been
equally important in France during this period. Li livres de jostice et de plet written in
the late thirteenth century also claims that “La bone devise de droit des persones, des
gens, est tele que tot homes ou il son franc ou serf”[The good division of the law of
persons is that all men are either free or servile]. 6
It would appear that a thousand years had made little difference to this central
understanding of personal status; however, the truth can be seen hidden in the translation
from Gaius’ Latin to the French of Li livres de jostice et de plet. Gaius’ “serui” is easily
translated to “serf” despite the fact that slavery was not a part of the economy of either
3

The Institutes of Gaius, Eds. E Seckel and B Kuebler, trans. W M Gordon and O F Robinson (Ithaca, NY,
1988), 1, 9 : “Et quidem summa diuisio de iure personarum haec est, quod omnes homines aut liberi sunt
aut serui”
4

The treatise on the laws and customs of the realm of England commonly called Glanvill, Ed. G. D. G.
Hall, reprinted with a guide to further reading by M. T. Clanchy, (Oxford, 1993), lib. 5.

5

7 Seldon Society (1893), 77.

6

Li livres de jostice et de plet, Ed. Pierre N. Rapetti (Paris, 1850): 54.

171

late medieval England or northern France. Similarly the thirteenth century “serui” of
Bracton and Fleta were not the same as the “serui” Gaius had in mind. A lot of work has
been done by legal scholars to answer the questions as to what exactly were the legal
rights and restrictions applying to the “liberi”, “serui” and “libertini” (freed men) during
this thousand year period, and whatever their differing opinions it is clear that “the
primary tool for analyzing legal relationships among human beings was the varying
amount of privileges and franchises a person was allowed to enjoy.” 7 However, it is
equally clear that by the time Fortescue wrote De laudibus legum Anglie in the fifteenth
century (c.1468-70), the idea of servitude was not viewed as part of the divine law
envisaged by the writer of The Mirror of Justices. Fortescue wrote:
Crudelis etiam necessario judicabitur lex, quae servitutem augmentat, et minuit
libertatem; nam pro ea Natura semper implorat humana. Quia ab homine, et pro
vicio, introducta est servitus; sed libertas a Deo hominis est indita nature. [Hard
and unjust, we must say, is the law which increases servitude and diminishes
freedom, for which human nature always craves; for servitude was introduced by
man on account of his own sin and folly, whereas freedom is instilled into human
nature by God. 8]
His contemporary, Thomas Littleton exhibits this same approach in his Tenures (c145060). In the passage explaining tenure in villeinage, Littleton lists six categories of people
who are not allowed to bring real or personal actions: where legal disability used to be
the rule, he now views it as the exception. This marks a clear change from the time of
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Bracton in what was considered a basic tenet of the law of personal status. Indeed, by the
time of William Blackstone’s Commentaries on the law of England in the eighteenth
century, the basic framework of legal reasoning had shifted completely; he starts his
discussion on the laws of personal status with the statement that “the first and most
obvious division of the people is into aliens and natural-born subjects.” 9

By then,

although there had been ownership of foreign born slaves allowed in England, the judges
were following a clear line of reasoning that English common law made no provision for
slavery. In Shanley v Harvey (1763), 10 Lord Henley LC stated that as "soon as a man
sets foot on English ground he is free," and, nine years later, the case of R v Knowles, ex
parte Somersett (1772) 11 resulted in the Lord Chief Justice, Lord Mansfield, stating that
whatever the precedents might say, and however inconvenient his decision might be to
slave owners:
The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on
any reasons, moral or political, but only by positive law, which preserves its force
long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself from whence it was created, is
erased from memory. It is so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but
positive law. Whatever inconveniences, therefore, may follow from the decision, I
cannot say this case is allowed or approved by the law of England; and therefore
the black must be discharged. 12
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Somersett was the slave of a Boston customs officer who escaped when the ship was in England. The
ship’s captain (Knowles) recaptured him and took him back to his boat but three abolitionists claimed to be
his godparents and applied for a writ of habeas corpus. Since the decision was given orally, no formal
written record was given by the court and various different reports of the decision circulated. Abolitionists
celebrated that slavery did not exist under English law but Mansfield himself later commented that he was
deciding the narrower issue of whether or not a slave could forcibly be removed from England against his
will. Since there was no positive law of slavery, this constituted false imprisonment and/or assault under
the English common law.
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It is worth noting that in the twenty-first century, international conventions on
human rights routinely provide the basis on which legal discrimination cannot be based in
terms similar to Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) which
states:
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in the Declaration,
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, [sic.] sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
Nationality (which is not the same as national or social origin) is not included in this list.
On the contrary, the only discrimination now commonly held to be acceptable is that
based on nationality:

see for example Article 16 of the Council of the Europe

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms regarding the
non-discrimination articles 10, 11, and 14 before it: ‘Nothing in Articles 10, 11 and 14
shall be regarded as preventing the High Contracting Parties from imposing restrictions
on the political activity of aliens.’ Even in the twenty-first century, discrimination on the
basis of nationality is enshrined in law. The question then for legal historians is what was
it that bought about this change?

From slave to subject, property to partner

Until recently, legal historians have generally followed F. W. Maitland’s
explanation of the beginning of the English law of alien status. Maitland explains:

Feudalism is opposed to tribalism and even to nationalism: we become a lord’s
subjects by doing homage to him, and this done, the nationality.. and the place of
our birth are insignificant. In England, however, a yet mightier force than
feudalism came into play. A foreigner .. conquered England, became king of the
English, endowed his followers with English lands. For a long time after there
could be little law against aliens, there could hardly be such thing as English
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nationality … It is, we believe, in the loss of Normandy that our law of aliens
finds its starting point. 13
Maitland argues that the beginning of the law of alien status came with the loss of
Normandy because the seizure of the Normans’ lands by John in 1204 provided the
momentum for the later development of “an exaggerated generalization of the crown
prerogative” 14. However, the seizure of the lands was not itself based on questions of the
Normans’ alien status but rather on the legal feudal relationship between a lord and
tenant 15. Those Normans doing fealty to Philippe Auguste became “inimici” 16 of John.17
Indeed, the very fact that the Normans were able to hold land in the first place indicates
their subject status. 18
Scholars of the 20th and 21st centuries have tended to assume with Maitland that
the origin of the distinction between citizens and non-citizens came with the demise of
feudalism in medieval Europe and its replacement with the State structure that exists
today, because it was only then that the personal legal divisions of the State were
important and in need of clear definition. They are following Maitland’s proposal that
when the Normans became rulers of the English, the legal distinction between citizens

13

F. Pollock, and F.W. Maitland, The History of English Law before the time of Edward 1. 2nd edn,
reissued with an introduction by S.F.C. Milsom, 2 vols. (Cambridge, 1968).
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Ibid., 463.
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Seizure of Norman lands in and around 1204 is recorded in Rotuli de oblatis et finibus in Turri
Londiniensi asservati…., ed T.D. Hardy, Records Commission (1835) p335 and Rotuli Normanniae in
Turri Londiniensi asservati…., ed. T.D. Hardy, Records Commission (1835) pp122-37.
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and non-citizens inevitably lost its significance. He believes it did so until the Norman
kings were driven out of Normandy and forced to settle in England permanently and then
to adopt the identification of being English. He argues that it was at this point that the
distinctions between citizen and non-citizen became important again. However, this
model does not fit well onto our current knowledge of medieval Europe, and particularly
post-Conquest England, which was already a unified kingdom – in theory at least - with a
relatively strong central government. Furthermore, there is now a great deal of critical
debate as to whether or not feudalism in fact worked against the establishment of a
central government, and had to disappear in order for the state structure to take hold.
Nonetheless, scholars do seem to be in agreement that the oath of fidelity to the
political rulers, as distinct from the feudal rite of homage, was a widespread practice in
France and England throughout the Middle Ages. Giordanengo summarizes historical
studies on feudalism in France and concludes: “No-one believes any more that the
existence of feudal relationships would necessarily lead to the destruction of public
authority or that its establishment would at least be hampered by those relationships.”19
Looking at the position in England at this time, Kim notes: “all medieval English law
tracts …. contain passages which suggest the unstinted importance of the relationship of
fidelity between the king and his subjects, as distinct from the personal feudal
relationship between the king and his tenants.” 20 He goes on to highlight a passage in
Glanvill that states that the rite of homage to mesne lords must be accompanied by a
19

Giordanengo, Gérard. “Etat et droit féodal en France (XIIe-XIVe siècles).” L’Etat moderne: Le droit,
l’espace et les formes de l’état, ed. N. Coutle and J.-P Genet (Paris, 1990): 64-5. See also, Jean Barbey,
Etre roi: le roi et son gouvernement en France de Clovis a Louis XVI (Paris, 1992):111-112; Eric
Bournazel and Jean-Pierre Poly, La mutation féodale, 1st edn. (Paris, 1980): 276; Jacques Le Goff ed.,
L’Etat et les pouvoirs, historie de la France, vol. II (Paris, 1989): 101.
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proviso saving the fidelity to the king (salua fide debita domino regi et heredibus suis).
The main point in both arguments is that homage to a feudal lord did not necessarily
weaken the bond between a king and his subjects. As explained above, this was not a
problem after the Norman Conquest in any event because of the Norman kings’ claim to
be the legitimate successors of the English kings. It is interesting to note that those
Normans who did not come to England were no different in status from other Frenchmen
ruled by the princes of medieval France and did not become English simply because their
duke was now King of England. Quite the contrary - as subjects of the duke they were
still subject to the French king’s rule over Normandy.
Evidence of the relationship of homage and fidelity to the king being unaffected
by duties owed to a liege-lord can be seen in the evidence of the “Record and Process” of
the Rotuli Parliamentorum at the time of Richard II’s deposition in 1399. The last act
listed in the process of deposition was the estates’ request that members of the deposition
committee return to Richard and renounce all homage and fidelity to him “ut nichil desit
quod valeat aut debeat circa premissa requiri” 21 [“so that nothing that ought to be done
should be left undone”].
Kim convincingly argues against Maitland’s contention that it was the Norman
Conquest that brought about the change for the legal basis for personal status by pointing
out that there are no records of distinctions being made between citizens and non-citizens
until much later, in fact, not until the fourteenth century with the passing of the statute De
natis ultra mare (1351). It was only then that there was a real shift in outlook from this
fundamental division in the law of personal status between the free and the unfree. From
then on, faith and allegiance brings with it legal rights and benefits within the realm and,
21

Rotuli Parliamentorum, p422.
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correspondingly, lack of this faith and allegiance disqualified a person from this
advantage within the realm. The division in the law of personal status thus moved to
distinctions between those within the faith and allegiance of the king and those outside it.
The expression “alien ne hors la ligeance” now denotes a personal status that it did not
connote before.
An example of this principle in action can be seen in the case of foreign
merchants wishing to trade in the cities 22. By the end of the thirteenth century, cities had
become the most important centers of commercial activity, and any unenfranchised
outsider attempting to do business within the city walls had to overcome great legal
discrimination to trade there as the burgesses of the city enjoyed monopolistic control of
the city’s commercial activity.

For example, the Liber albus 23 (c.1285) of London

explains that merchants who were not of the liberty of London (mercatores qui non sunt
de libertate) were prohibited from selling wine or other wares by retail within the city.
So far as this law was concerned there was no difference between the merchants of
Norwich and the merchants of Antwerp as neither of them had the liberty of London.
The question of their rights would not involve their nationality but the
comprehensiveness of the privileges they might have acquired by charters. Thus, in 1373
when the burgesses of Beverley had their goods seized on refusal to pay tolls in order to
do business in York, they had to defend themselves on the basis of a charter with a

22

It is important to note that the trading conditions in the cities were very different from those in the
travelling fairs which were governed by their own courts, “piepowder courts,” and which issued charters of
safe conduct to the merchants trading there. Again, however, there is no evidence of distinctions being
made between merchants on the basis of their alien status. In fact, the evidence is to the contrary showing
that the piepowder courts were specifically set up to create a fair trading environment for foreign merchants
and local tradesmen alike, most likely because a fixed portion of the fair’s profits went to the landowner
who held the fair on his land so landowners were keen to attract as much trade as possible.
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provision exempting them from tolls in all of Yorkshire. 24 Whether or not they were
English was irrelevant. The only question was whether or not they could prove that they
had specifically acquired the necessary liberty of the city. A Norwich customs document
from 1340 sums up this activity:
Item nullus mercandizet in ciuitate qui in eadem facit residentiam nisi sit ad
lottum et scottum illius civitatis et ad communia eiusdem auxilia contribuat et
quia omnes qui recipientur in parem ciuitatis sint liberi et non servi alicuius [ Noone who resides in the city shall conduct mercantile activities unless he is in scot
and lot of the said city and contributes to the communal aid because all those who
are received into the citizenry are liberi and no serui of anybody.” 25
The only distinction of importance is that between liberi and serui; alien status plays no
part.
In many books attempting to outline the history of the development of the
common law, questions of personal status and liberty are addressed after those of
property rights and actions. Although personal status had an enormous influence on
those rights or even a person’s capacity to enter into a contract or to have access to the
common law system, this generality reflects the relative lack of prominence given to the
question of status in contemporary legal sources. It is in the light of the importance of
property rights and actions that we should look at what led Edward III to pass the 1351
statute De natis ultra mare which began a process that would fundamentally alter the
structure of society into today’s international divisions.

24
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The statute that enabled allegiance to become the platform for legal status: De natis
ultra mare (1351)

As demonstrated in chapter 4, Piers Plowman suggests that only a two-way
relationship can effect a meaningful allegiance. It is because they value the protection
and guidance of the King that his subjects offer him their allegiance, and because his
authority is founded in their consent to his rule that he protects and guides them in return.
Although it was not articulated in these terms at the time, the two-way relationship can be
seen at work in practice in the drafting of the 1351 statute De natis ultra mare which was
passed to solve a practical problem of how the King might repay his subjects for their
service in the Hundred Years War.
The start of The Hundred Years War between England and France in 1337
brought into focus a practical problem of inheritance for those fighting for England
overseas. In the latter half of the twelfth century, Henry II had introduced four petty
assizes which had led to the use of inquest to solve regional land disputes. 26 Since it was
primarily through their lands that men gained power, whether in the aristocracy or lesser
social ranks, one of the most important issues covered by these assizes was the question
of descent and inheritance of land rights. As Kim points out 27, the inquests (whether
grand or petty assizes) moved the conditions for judicial truth beyond their customary
realm of oath, ordeal or battle which all theoretically required some involvement of a
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See R.C. Van Caenegem, The birth of the English common law, 2nd edn (Cambridge, 1988):40-50 which
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supernatural divinatory force 28 into the arena of earthly proof that could be required to be
seen by a judge before the grant of official remedy. Since the fourth Lateran Council of
1215 had abolished recourse to trail by ordeal and proof by oath had by then fallen
mostly into disuse, the only other recourse available was judicial combat - and even this
could be avoided in a writ of right if the tenant chose the grand assize instead. This
meant that in practical terms the grand assize or inquest was the most common method of
settling disputes and the only way to begin such an assize was by writ.
That writ would state the proof necessary for the inquest to find in favor of the
commencing party. For example, the writ for the assize of mort d’ancestor had to specify
the location of the land and to summon twelve free and lawful men (duodecim liberos et
legales homines) who were from the vicinity of that vill (de uisneto de illa uilla) to hear
their evidence that the deceased was seised of his demesne as of his fee one virgate of
land in that vill on the day he died and that the party bringing the suit was his next heir. 29

28

Supernatural forces were believed to take an active role in worldly matters, especially on occasions that it
did not appear that the systems in place would provide justice. For examples of charms see G. Storms,
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inside of his eyes was seen to be full of putrid flesh….’ Hudson goes on to note that ‘the proportion of
recorded cases involving divine or saintly intervention seems to have been high in William I’s reign
relative to those of his sons’ (p12, n52) but it should be born in mind that the supernatural was still
considered an active part of legal proceedings. This tradition is reflected later in the belief that the King
was administering God’s justice as his chief agent on earth.
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Given the importance of rights of tenancy these proceedings were not undertaken
lightly, and the death of a tenant brought about careful scrutiny of his circumstances in
order to determine the legal distribution of his assets and rights. Glanvill states 30 that in
the event of questions arising as to who was the rightful heir, a lord could take the
deceased tenant’s fief into his own hands until those questions were lawfully resolved.
That resolution had to take place through adversarial trial proceedings initiated by the
heir claiming to be the rightful descendant. Fiefs held in-chief (i.e. directly) from the
King automatically fell back into the King’s hands regardless of whether or not there
might be doubt as to the identity of the rightful heir. As a matter of course, the King’s
escheators would then investigate the claims to inheritance, again through inquest of the
neighbors. 31 The result was that whether in an adversarial trial proceeding or in the nonadversarial sessions of the king’s escheators, the sworn evidence of neighbors was the
key to establishing rights of inheritance. 32
Evidence from the year books also shows that those jurors deciding the matter at
inquest must be relying on first hand knowledge. As Belknap CJ explained: ‘In an assize
in a county, if the court does not see six or at least five men of the hundred where the
tenements are, to inform the others who are further away, the assize will not be taken. A
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multo fortiori, those of one county cannot try a thing which is in another county.’ 33 The
punishment of attaint was available to the jurors of an inquest that presumed to accept
knowledge of an event that transpired in another county.’ 34 Given that another county in
England was considered too far away for a jury to have first-hand knowledge of the
claimaint, clearly a foreign-born defendant would have even greater difficulty in
establishing his proof before a judge and jury. The Coram rege roll of 1285 records a
case in which the defendants successfully argued that the King’s escheator should not
have conducted an inquest to prove the age of a foreign-born person 35 and the jurors were
summoned to appear back before the King to explain how they might lawfully have come
to their decision. Langland refers to the common reluctance to serve on a jury because it
was such an onerous task in Passus III when Conscience says that after the Day of
Judgment, no-one shall: ‘Over[carke] the commune ne to the court sompne / Ne putte
hem in panel to doon hem plighte hir truthe’ (B.III.316-317). Since the King’s writ could
not run overseas, Kim argues persuasively that ‘a foreign-born person was left with no
adequate means to defend himself from allegations regarding under-age or proximity of
blood.’ 36 By way of example he quotes Herle J in a 1321 case asking a defendant: ‘Your
father was not from England. How could this court be apprised of whether he was a
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brother or the uncle or the son since he was not born in this land?’37 A foreign born heir
would have no common law remedy against a lord who would refuse to allow
inheritance, and this would be worth the lord’s while to do since without a rightful heir
the fief would fall back to him as his escheat.
Similarly, the canon law also provided no recourse for the foreign-born heir since
it too was based upon the evidence of neighbors with first-hand knowledge. To combat
the question of bastardy alleged against a party, certification by the archbishop or bishop
of the place of birth had to be obtained. But under the canon law, a person’s status was
determined mainly by their domicile 38 so if the person facing an accusation of bastardy
did not have domicile within a diocese controlled by a bishop bound to execute the
command of a writ of the English king, he had no means of gaining that certification.
Even within an English domicile, the bishop’s inquest would depend on the common
knowledge of neighbors.
Many of the magnates and soldiers accompanying the King overseas were
accompanied by their wives and naturally concerned that offspring born outside of the
jurisdiction, and hence outside English territory and the jurisdiction of English law,
would be unable to inherit their lands in England. Therefore, at the 1343 Parliament,
three questions were raised: (i) could the King’s children born beyond the sea inherit?;
(ii) could children born abroad ‘in the King’s service’ inherit?; and (iii) could foreign-

37

The translation is quoted from Kim’s translation of ‘vostre pier ne fut de la ligaunce dengleterre. Coment
purra cest court ester apris lequel il fut frer ou uncle ou fuyz, depus qil ne fut pas neeen cest terre?’ from
The Eyre of London, 14 Edward II, 1321, vol. II, 86 Selden Society (1969) p.214.
38

W. Onlin,‘Le Statut des etrangers dans la doctrine canonique medievale’ in L’Etranger, part 2 (Brussels,
1958): 42-7.

184

born children in general inherit? 39 The first two questions were answered immediately in
the affirmative: ‘les enfantz nostre seignor le Roi, queu part q’ils soient neez …porteront
leritage’ [the children of our lord the King, wherever they may be born .. shall have the
inheritance]; 40 ‘accordez est en ce Parlement, q’ils soint aussint enheritez queu part q’ils
soient neez en las service le Roi’ [it is granted in this Parliament that they shall also
inherit wherever they shall be born in the service of the King.] The service referred to
was knight service so it did not apply to women and carries the implication that it applied
mainly to the King’s tenants-in-chief; the answer was effectively granting them the right
not to have their lands reclaimed by the King on their deaths. Kim argues that since the
King could not demand feudal services in the form of an overseas expedition, Edward III
had to grant his soldiers many favors to gain their participation and this promise to allow
their foreign-born children to inherit ‘was just another example of these special deals
which were liberally offered during the war.’ 41
The last question posed more problems and the reply from the lawyers, the ‘gentz
de lei,’ was simply that it needed ‘grant advisement et bone deliberation’. 42

The

problems were procedural. The lawyers could not find an acceptable way around the
‘diverse doutes et difficulteez q purront avenir de prover q tieux soient verrois hes si
debatz our empeschementz soient mys en lour leritages’. 43 How could they draft a law
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justly bypassing the proofs demanded by an inquest in the event of a dispute? It took
eight years for the lawyers to solve the problem with the 1351 passing of the statute De
natis ultra mare 44 which neatly redefined inheritance law so that English law would now
consider children born to English parents (‘de la ligeance du Roi’) outside the boundaries
of English lands (‘dehors la ligeance le Roi’) nonetheless within the ‘ligeance’ of the
King (‘deinz la dite ligeance’). They were therefore able to be protected by English law
and claim their inheritance. The procedural problems of the common law proofs needed
to establish descent and inheritance were simply bypassed by the concept of faith and
allegiance to the King. 45 An Englishwoman giving birth overseas was therefore in the
interesting semantic position of being simultaneously both dehors la ligeance and de la
ligeance of the same King.
There is no evidence that at the time of its passing, the statute was intended to
have any greater significance than the practical effect of solving a problem caused by the
realities of extended warfare. However, the statute marks the first time in English legal
history that the reach of the law was based not upon land and feudal relationships and
responsibilities surrounding its management but rather on the temporal personal
relationship between a King and his subject. Kim argues that this statute enshrined into
law the movement of ‘the question of political subjection into the arena of private law
discussion’ and so set the course for the birth of the modern state. A common law is
territorial in that it applies to people within a specific geographic territory. What we are
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seeing here is the first move to a ‘personal’ form of the law that is based on people’s
allegiances and interpersonal relationships instead of relationships based on land
ownership.
Although the statute was framed in the language of feudal vassals to their lord, the
shift of emphasis comes through the statute’s use of the term ‘ligeance,’ with its emphasis
now solely on the rights and privileges that came with allegiance to the sovereign.
Again, we are back to the duties that fall on a King as part of his relationship with his
liges, the same relationship with which Langland framed the harrowing of hell. The
Middle English Dictionary entry for ‘ligeance’ gives: Ligeance :(a) Allegiance of a
feudal vassal to a lord or of a subject to a sovereign; the total of obligations, services,
privileges, etc., entailed by such allegiance; (b) don (maken) ~, don oth of ~, to swear
allegiance; (c) fig. fidelity to God. The importance for our purposes is the link in (a)
between allegiance and the obligations that are entailed by such an allegiance; the MED
quotes the C-text of Piers – ‘Ac looke þow leyue hit leelly al þy lyf-tyme, that þe bylongeþ to on lorde that lygaunce cleymeþ’ (C.19.2002). The link in (c) of the term’s
figurative use of fidelity to God is extremely important in Langland as he uses Christ’s
behaviour as a model of good kingship, and as a balance to the idea of men being free or
unfree in asserting that the king owes his power and position to his subjects. The quotes
from the MED make it clear what is owed in return to a good king: from Gower’s
Confessio Amantis Prol. 25: ”A bok for king Richardes sake, / To whom belongeth er my
ligeance /With al myn hertes obeisance” and also at 8.3058: “To him [a king] belongeth
the leiance of Clerk, of knyght, of man of lawe.”
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The legal theorists point to different interpretations of the term: Maitland posits
that the term ‘ligeance’ was originally used to refer to a piece of land before its usage to
denote the interpersonal relationship of allegiance. 46 However, Kim counters that ‘this
may be true but not entirely true’ by pointing out that ‘Glanvill, for instance, used the
term to explain the pre-eminent relationship between a tenant and his ‘liege’ lord,’ 47 that
the Treaty of Falaise of 1174 (between Henry II and William, King of Scots) used the
term to refer to the relationship rather than the land, 48 and that Bracton also used the term
to refer to something other than land. 49 From Kim’s evidence it seems that for both
Glanvill and Bracton, land was land but ligeance was a personal relationship. However,
by the end of the thirteenth century, this is not the case; when ligeance was used it could
denote the territorial extent of the king’s power, as reflected in the commonplace usage of
the terms ‘hors de la ligeance’ to mean ‘out of England’ and ‘deinz la ligeance’ to mean
‘in England’ in early fourteenth-century cases.
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This ambiguity of meaning can be seen at work in the interesting report of the
case of Rex v Philip de Beauvais brought before the eyre of London in 1321. 50 The case
was about the inheritance of a franchise which the defendant was trying to prove was
passed to him from his grandfather. The hurdle he faced was that his father was born
outside England, so Geoffrey Scrope, then acting on behalf of the king as his serjeant,
argued that he could not establish the necessary descent because ‘vostre piere ne fut nient
de la ligaunce dengleterre.’ For the defendant, Shardlow responded that ‘the grandfather
was married to his wife in London, and the father was held and reputed as their son, and
did homage to the king of England and died in his homage, and therefore the father was
of the ligaunce of the king of England.’ 51 The judges seem to have accepted this use of
the term since they found for the defendant on this point with Herle J commenting that if
a person were in the king’s ligaunce ‘il serra mult fort en tiel cas destrangere le’ [‘it
would be very hard in this case to exclude him’]. Hard indeed, but cases often had harsh
effects, and the judges were not usually inclined to make decisions on that basis alone.
What it does example is the contemporary changes in the way that the concept of
allegiance was being used. In any event, the reality was that the defendant was excluded
from justice, since on the day assigned for judgment, Shardlow did not appear, so the
franchise was taken into the king’s hands and the defendant fined. Kim posits that this
might have been because ‘it must have been difficult to find jurors who would ignore the
threat of attaint and give a verdict in favour of the defendant without firsthand knowledge
of the circumstances of the father’s foreign birth.’ Shardlow may have won the battle but
it would take the statute De natis ultra mare of 1351 to win the war by superseding the
50
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procedural problem by enshrining in statute that same manipulation of the concept of
ligeance. The term itself carried broad enough meaning to overcome the legal disability
of a person born ‘hors la ligeance’ and bring them ‘deinz la dite ligeance.’ To see how
quickly the idea was taken up, it is worth noting that in 1368 Parliament granted a
petition extending equal legal inheritance rights to children born in Calais, Guines,
Gascony and the other overseas lands and seignories of ‘our lord the King’ without any
worries about a jury trial or certification of bastardy. 52
Under the Roman laws men were divided into free and unfree. Now they were
divided into those ‘within’ and those ‘without’ the body politic. The legal status of those
‘within the ligeance’ is homogenized as the individual receives all the rights and liberties
associated with those within the group just as those outside the group are denied them.
Now, faith and allegiance are the first steps towards a place in both the mystic body
politic and the mystic body spiritual, a commonly understood idea in a Christian society;
see, for example, Langland’s use of the body metaphor when the Samaritan explains the
concept of the Trinity in terms of a body at B.XVII.140 – 167. Both have the effect of
putting faith and allegiance to the King at the center of all hopes for advancement,
whether spiritual or temporal, the one with the King as Christ’s deputy on earth, and the
other with the King as the source of earthly justice and social order. A new regime is
underway as villeins now have the opportunity to advance themselves and seek legal
redress as part of the group of insiders united within their faith and allegiance to the
King. The bonds of faith and loyalty between the King and his subjects, his ‘fideles’ or
faithfuls, intertwined ideas of subjection and loyalty with the idea of faith in a higher
power that was naturally guiding the King as the head of the body politic. Langland
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explains this interrelationship in Passus XIX when Conscience reminds the King that he
has his position:
‘In condicion’ quod Conscience, ‘that thow [the commune] defende
And rule thi reaume in reson, right wol and truthe
That thow [have thyn asking], as the lawe asketh:
Omnia sunt tua ad defendendum set non ad deprehendendum.’ B.XIX.480-482a.
Since the king is placing himself at the head of the political body temporal he is also
accepting a responsibility to dispense justice to those under his protection through the
two-way spiritual relationship denoted by ‘ligeaunce’. Given the understanding of the
‘natural’ or ‘divine’ nature of the common law headed by the King as detailed in chapter
three, this responsibility to dispense earthly justice was naturally linked to the dispensing
of divine justice.
Once the principle had been established that it was faith and allegiance to the
King that brought one into the group of those with legal rights and advantages, there was
little legal discussion about personal status until the vigorous debates about the
succession to the English throne that came to a head with the death of Elizabeth I in 1603.
The accession of James I marked the first real testing of the mystic body politic as he
attempted to unite England and Scotland. The uniting of the Christian ideas and the legal
theory of the mystic body politic is apparent in his speech to the English Parliament:
‘What God hath conioyned then, let no man separate. I am the Husband, and all
the whole Isle is my lawfull Wife; I am the Head, and it is my Body; I am the
Shepard, and it is my flocke: I hope therefore no man will be so vnreasonable as
to thinke that … I being the Head, should have a divided and monstrous Body’.
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Whatever James might have hoped, however, a practical union of the two body politics of
which he was the head was not so easily effected and, some 250 years after it had been
written, the statute De natis ultra mare was once again at the center of the discussion of
personal status: what is interesting for the scope of this project are the assumptions from
which the court started in interpreting the statute, because they reflect the contemporary
understanding of the terms and illustrate the remarkable shift that had taken place in
society.
In 1607, two civil suits were initiated in the King's Bench and Chancery Courts
effectively over the same issue. The initiators of the suits, John and William Parkinson,
were the guardians of a Scottish child, named as Robert Calvin in the pleadings 53 to
whom two estates in England had been conveyed. 54 On Robert’s behalf, the Parkinsons
claimed that he had been forcibly dispossessed of both estates 55 In both cases, the
defendants argued “in disability of Robert Calvin’s person” 56 saying that under English
law Robert could not be seised of a freehold in England because he was an alien:
therefore the writs were inadmissible. Robert was born in Scotland after 1603, the year
in which the English throne descended to James I, but the defendants argued that he was
an alien because he had been born. "within [James's] kingdom of Scotland, and out of the
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allegiance of the said lord the King of his kingdom of England." 57 The point at issue
therefore was the status of those people born in Scotland after the accession of James I to
the English crown. In their decision, the judges divided persons born in Scotland into
two groups: the postnati who were born after the accession of James to the English
throne in 1603, and the antenati who were born before that date. The postnati were to be
regarded in England as natural born subjects since they were born into the allegiance of
James when he was King of England and Scotland, effectively giving them dual
nationality; since the antenati were born into the allegiance of a King who had no
authority in England they were to be treated as aliens unless naturalized by statute. 58 In
arguing Calvin’s case, both parties agreed that the starting point for personal status was
that “every man is either an alien born or a subject born.” It was allegiance to the King
that was regarded as the essential element for the granting of the privileges that came
with being considered within the citizenry.
Since there is no legal explanation for this paradigm shift, the cause must lie
elsewhere in the culture of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century. I believe that
literature such as Piers Plowman must have been one of those causes since it was
indubitably a major part of the cultural backdrop of the time, a part intricately intertwined
with the discourse of Christianity. There is sufficient extant evidence of the widespread
reading and distribution of Langland’s poem – not least the fact of there being 50 – 56
surviving manuscripts – to suggest that the poem was a significant part of the
contemporary cultural landscape. Obviously, it would be foolish to say with certainty
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that any correlations apparent between a version of the poem and a contemporary event
are directly connected. However, there are enough correlations for us to see the influence
of the poem at work, whether directly or indirectly. That is not to say that there were not
other forces also at play - perhaps most significantly, the economic and social turmoil
caused by the Black Death and the resulting labor shortages and the costs of the Hundred
Years War – but it can be argued that the discourse and language directing how the
changes these forces wrought would be dealt with was, at the very least, in part provided
by the literature of their time.
It is certainly not hard to see parallels between the ideas of kingship put forth in
Langland’s poem, ideas of the king providing justice and protection across all stations in
society, reflected in the discourses surrounding the major events of the period.

In

discussing the Peasant Revolt or English Rising of 1381, Rodney Hilton 59 argues that the
evidence produced by Rosamond Faith 60 of a widespread ideology of freedom from the
southern and south-western counties in the 1370s (such as court rolls being burnt as an
anti-seigneurial gesture in tenurially free Kent) shows that the freedom conceived was in
‘much more general terms than freedom of tenure.’ Hilton goes on to say:
‘No doubt preachers like John Ball helped to knit together strand of popular demand
into something approaching a coherent programme, but their moral doctrine of the
freedom and equality of the descendants of Adam and Eve would not have been so
readily received had it not fitted into an old demand for freedom expressed in many
conflicts at law between lord and tenants.’
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What the peasants were hoping for was justice, not solely in the terms of economic trends
in rents, wages and prices but in ‘the jurisdictional domination by the lord over the
tenant, whether at the manorial, county or national level.’ If we accept the argument that
it was the strengths and weaknesses of manorial jurisdiction that provided the crucial
element in decisions over rent levels, either because it was the basis for the real power of
individual lords over their tenants or because of the more general weakening of legal
powers through the attenuation of the terms of full servile villeinage, then it is clear that
shifts of the balance of legal power between landlord and tenant were ‘as important as
purely economic factors in shaping the conditions of the late medieval peasantry.’ There
was a fundamental understanding in the community that the law could and should
provide justice for men at every level of society. The fact that Dyer’s sampling of those
involved in the revolt shows that those involved ‘seem to represent a wide spectrum of
rural society with a slight bias towards the better off’ 61 suggests that this was not simply
an economic dispute but rather a demand for justice and recognition of personal status in
a larger sense. Dyer finds that the ‘most striking common characteristic of our sample of
rebels is their prominence in the government of their manor, village or hundred’ 62
suggesting that they were aware that the current system of justice was inadequate and that
they could expect more. As the head of the legal system, the King should be the
embodiment of justice. It is worth noting that during the Peasants’ Revolt the peasants
made direct appeals to the King which suggests that despite the animosity with which
they viewed the courts, there was nonetheless a widespread belief that he was still a
figure representing justice. Examples such as the St Albans crowd marching under the
61
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banner of St. George, 63 and the London rebels using ‘With King Richard and the true
commons’ as their password, suggest that there was a general belief, particularly in East
Anglia, that the rebels even had the King’s blessing.
Hilton criticizes the view of scholars and non-scholars that medieval peasants
naively and blindly revered the King himself but thought that he was surrounded by evil
counselors by pointing out that ‘a commonplace of medieval politics’ was the criticism
and indeed execution of those same ‘evil counselors.’ 64 This is certainly a part of
Langland’s poem when the dreaming Will sees the King initially act justly in arresting
Mede’s train: ‘the kyng comaunded constables and sergeaunts / Falsnesse and his
felawship to fettren and bynden’ (B.II.207-208) and in wanting to wed Mede with
Conscience. However, the King is led astray at the trial of Lady Mede and even at one
point gets angry with Lawe, not because it is failing to provide justice but rather because
through its application he has lost land: [The Kyng] gan wexe wroth with Lawe, for
Mede almost hadde shent it, / And seide, ‘Thorugh youre lawe, as I leve, I lese manye
chetes.’ (B.IV.174-175) Langland’s is a rather more complete depiction of a King who is
full of good intent but easily led astray. At its heart, the peasants’ belief showed a lack of
understanding of the true nature of monarchy and the practicalities of its hold on power.
They saw the monarchy as “an institution standing above individuals and classes, capable
of dispensing even-handed justice’ 65 without considering their simultaneous judgment
that the systems of justice were not only vulnerable to corruption but inherently corrupt.
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Langland had no such blindness.

The many frames for his poem, the

narrator/dreamer, the visions, the allegories, all allowed him to include the corrupt
realities of contemporary society, accusing all while accusing none, and presenting a
vision of the whole ‘feeld’ of ‘folk’ for his contemporaries to make of what they would.
What is clear from the development of the law of alien status is that they did exactly that.
Langland’s ideas of the duties of kingship and the personal relationship that resulted
between a King and his liges became a part of the cultural landscape as they affected how
statutes were interpreted in the courts of law.

Ironically, I believe that it was the

appreciation and consent of his community, the forces of populist authority, that were the
means by which Langland’s ideas of natural or divine justice would eventually be written
into statutory authority for the courtroom.
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CONCLUSION:
What we call the beginning is often the end
And to make an end is to make a beginning.
The end is where we start from.
T.S.Eliot, Little Gidding, V
This project began with my determination to make sense of ‘the fair feeld’ of this
extraordinary work. I soon discovered that the implications of Piers Plowman’s links
with Lollardy have been investigated fully after Wendy Scase had led the way. Andrew
Cole’s recent work seemed to me to bring to fruition modern discussion of Piers and the
intellectual atmosphere, and the non-political but religious implications of the text have
also been exhaustively examined. This left scholars merely with arguments about the
details of salvation which have since been beautifully elucidated by David Aers’
thoughtful work. However, when I looked for scholarship on the legal implications of the
poem, it was immediately clear that there was much to be done. John Alford made great
strides in opening up the legal language; Richard Firth Green followed after; and the
more recent work of Emily Steiner, Candace Barrington and Andrew Galloway is
showing how much work there remains to be done on the implications of Langland’s use
of terms so very much at the heart of the great legal questions of his time. My goal in
this project, as one originally trained in law, was to begin some of that necessary work by
examining in detail the legal implications of the salvation and the linguistic choices that
Langland makes in presenting it.
Crediting Langland with poetic authority, and accepting Middleton’s argument
that puts Langland’s text as a parallel discourse to that of the state’s
administrative machinery, allow us to view his poem as offering a third way for
the law to progress. It is clear that Langland has not used the terms ‘right’ and

‘reson’ lightly. It is only when the two legal traditions of equity and formalism
work together with the authority of positivism and naturalism that Christ will be
able to fulfill the promise of the law. This is not just the law of the Bible but the
‘natural’ law representing the divine will of God as revealed to man through
reason. I believe that in the repeated references to the importance of the inclusion
of mercy in the establishment of true justice, and the rejection of an approach
based on the letter of law that is articulated first by the angel of heaven in the
prologue and then taken up repeatedly throughout the poem, the early courtroom
approach of rigor iuris is being rejected by Langland as both unjust and
impractical.
Piers Plowman is both a literary document and also, because of its
content, a legal authority. It is a document that is part of a documentary culture
that holds that justice can only occur when documents can be trusted to hold a
complete record.

What better document to rely on than a literary text that

contains all the ambiguities of life and a host of conflicting voices and
perspectives? Langland’s inclusive poem becomes the only sort of document that
can be trusted, a place for all the competing contemporary voices to be heard.
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